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STATUTES AND RULES
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1

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 49(a)(4)

v
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals issued a decision in this matter on December 26, 2008.
This Court granted certiorari on April 1, 2009. Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction after
grant of certiorari is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), and Rule
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^ 9, 179 P.3d 775;
See also, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Corn'n, 2006 UT 58, Tj 8, 147
P.3d 1189; Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, U 8, 27 P.3d 538. "The correctness of the court
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^j 9; Clark, 2001
UT 44, ^f 8. Review in certiorari is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the
questions presented for review. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856
(Utah 1998). However, there is a presumption created by Rule 49(a)(4) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure "that each issue will also include subsidiary questions that may
fairly be included in the issue presented." Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah,
902 P.2d 629, 637 (Utah 1995); Willardson v. Industrial Corn'n of Utah, 904 P.2d 671
(Utah 1995). This presumption "should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion
of reviewable issues, however peripheral." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 637. Occasionally this
Court will address all the merits of the underlying appeal when it makes procedural sense
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to do so. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, \ 15, 982 P.2d 572; Iron Head Const, Inc. v.
Gurney, 2009 UT 25, — P.3d —-, 2009 WL 1098110.
In the present case Third-Party Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Appellants presented the
following questions for review:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's imposition of an
equitable constructive trust without also finding that the trial court had abused its
discretion?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to remand the case for further findings
of fact concerning the existence of an express trust when the trial court based its decision
on a finding of an equitable constructive trust and the Court of Appeals held that the
different legal standard of an express trust was the applicable legal theory?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that there are only two types of

constructive trusts, express and equitable, when previous decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court indicate that there are unlimited types of constructive trusts, and that the nature of
the remedy defies limiting definitions?
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to construe the findings of fact of the
trial court, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, in favor of the ruling of the trial
court?
5. Did the Court of Appeals err in fashioning a remedy which has the practical
effect of a clearly erroneous finding, when Donald and Jeannette had failed to marshal
the evidence?

-2-

In granting the Petition for Certiorari, this Court stated it would review "[wjhether
the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive
trust." (See Order of Supreme Court dated April 1, 2009). Thus this Court has granted
certiorari review of all issues surrounding the reversal of the imposition of a constructive
trust, including all subsidiary questions to that issue. In addition to the questions raised
above, the Petition also raised the issue of whether the district court correctly applied the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the constructive trust had been
repudiated. Petitioners specifically stated "If this Court grants the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule are
substantive issues that will be raised in the briefing." (See Petitioners Reply Brief, page
5). Although the Court of Appeals failed to reach the question of the applicability of the
discovery rule because it found that no constructive trust could be imposed, this decision
was error. Moreover, the question of whether the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of
limitations in constructive trust cases until the time that the trust is repudiated is a
subsidiary question which is fairly included in the question of the imposition of a
constructive trust, and which, under the broad interpretive guidelines of Rule 49(a)(4) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, should be included in the briefing. As such,
Petitioners have briefed this issue.1

1

The Court has not granted certiorari on the second issue addressed by the Court of
Appeals, i.e. the reversal of the imposition of sanctions on Donald and Jeanette for their
failure to mediate in good faith after the district court ordered mediation. The Court of
Appeals found that Donald and Jeanette's refusal to entertain or make any offers, or in
any other way communicate during mediation, could not be sanctioned. Because

-3-

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 200 P.3d 662.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal
issues present in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The present case involves a dispute between siblings over the family farm,
comprised of fruit orchards and livestock. In 1944, the father, Arnold Rawlings acquired
the property in question, the farm, from his mother. (See Trial Exhibit 3). Until 1967,
Arnold had title to the farm in his name. Id. The property has never been in the name of
Arnold's wife, Cleo Rawlings. (See Trial Exhibit 3, Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I,
52:15-16, 280:14-16). By October of 1966 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer and
required a substantial amount of medical care, including expensive cobalt treatments.
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22).
certiorari was not granted on this issue, it will not be briefed. Appellants, however, wish
to note that the mediation and legal communities in Utah have been greatly concerned by
the implications of this holding. It has the effect of making court-ordered mediation
unenforceable because parties can show up and state that they refuse to mediate, without
fear of being sanctioned for acting in bad faith, and even though "imposition of sanctions
for failure . . . to participate in good faith in the ADR procedure assigned" is expressly
permitted under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-205(3)(p). The holding eviscerates the power
of the courts to enforce court-ordered mediation. In the event that this Court finds in
favor of Appellants, and in the event that the Supreme Court is concerned with the
implications of, or disagrees with, the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this
issue, the Supreme Court has the power to vacate the Court of Appeals' decision as to the
mediation sanctions, thereby negating its precedential value, without expressing an
opinion thereon.
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These expenses threatened to consume Arnold's estate, i.e. the farm. (Record p. 1451,
Trans. Vol. I, 134:2-10). In order to avoid losing the farm, Arnold was specifically
advised by the welfare department that he should transfer the farm out of his name. (See
Trial Exhibit 68).

At first, Arnold wanted to transfer the farm to his son LaRell

Rawlings, LaRell, however, declined and suggested that Dwayne Rawlings, his brother,
would be a better choice because he would be fair to all the members of the family. In
March of 1967 Arnold finally decided that his eldest son, Donald Rawlings, would hold
the farm for the benefit of Arnold and the family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:2025, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24, 134:2-16, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 333:925, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5).

In reaching this

decision and communicating it to the family, Arnold had multiple conversations with the
family. Donald was present at these discussions and did not object to the plan that he
would hold the farm for the benefit of the family. Id.
Consistent with the plan and with the understanding of the family, title to the farm
was transferred into Donald and his wife Jeanette's name on March 24, 1967. (See Trial
Exhibit 14). Although before the transfer, the farm was solely in Arnold's name, Arnold
asked all of his children and their spouses to sign a quit claim deed. (Record p. 1451,
Trans. Vol. I, 63:6-23, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 247:2-10, 336:1-19). After the
1967 transfer, Arnold continued to work the farm and refer to it as "his" farm. (See Trial
Exhibits 19-29, Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 191:3-18, Record p. 1459,
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 252:10-23, 338:16-25, 339:1-22).
Specifically, Arnold ran livestock on the farm, just as he did before; he cultivated the
-5-

orchards, just had he had done before; and considered the farm to be his. Id. In several
letters written to the military, all written after the 1967 transfer, Arnold specifically refers
to the farm as "my farm."

(See Trial Exhibits 19-29). At Arnold's request, other

prominent persons in the community, including judges, also wrote letters to the military
and referred to the farm as Arnold's farm. Id. The children also continued to treat the
farm as solely owned by their father. LaRell continued to help his father market the fruit
in Wyoming. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 99:2-25, 100:1-6). While Arnold was still
alive, and with Arnold's direct permission, Bryce Rawlings (the fourth son) moved into a
trailer Bryce placed on the farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 248:6-20). In short,
Arnold continued to operate in a manner that indicated his sole control, authority, and
ownership over the farm, thereby demonstrating that although legal title had shifted,
Arnold intended to retain, and in fact did retain, equitable title to the farm.
Arnold died on March 30, 1971. After his death, Arnold's widow, paid the taxes
on the farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). Bryce continued to live there
for four to five years after Arnold's death. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 248:6-20).
All of the siblings (except Donald ironically) continued to labor on the farm. (Record p.
1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. Q,
238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). In 1974, a boundary dispute with the Vinyard
Meadows development arose on the southern border of the farm. (Record p. 1451, Trans.
Vol. I, 104:9-24, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1,
344:1-25, 345:1-25, 346:1-25, 347:1-21).

Donald required his siblings and mother to

sign an additional quit claim deed to clear up some purported fault in the title so that he
-6-

could properly prosecute litigation against Vinyard Meadows on behalf of the family. Id.
After successful litigation against Vinyard Meadows, Donald distributed a small part of
the proceeds from the judgment award to his siblings and his mother, thereby
acknowledging his role of holding the farm for the benefit of the family. (Record p.
1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25, 240:1-17,
255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19). None of Donald's siblings were
informed of the exact amount of the settlement and were under the impression that the
bulk of it had been distributed to their mother for the purchase of a car. It was not until
the inception of this litigation that Donald's siblings learned exactly how large the
settlement was ($52,000) and how little of it Donald had distributed to the family.
Regardless

of the amount

distributed, Donald's

distribution

demonstrated

an

acknowledgment of his responsibility to hold the farm for the benefit of the family. In
1978, Donald and Jeanette, and Dwayne and Paulette, traded a small part of the farm
("the Pinegar lot") for another piece of land referred to as the 'industrial property.'
(Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22). Immediately before this trade,
Donald and Jeanette also deeded, without consideration, a half interest in the Pinegar lot
to Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings. Id. Donald and Dwayne operated a top soil business
on the farm property, and reserved surplus profits for the benefit of the family. (Record
p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 354:24-25, 355:1-6).

Throughout the following years, the

siblings continued to work the farm and give the proceeds of fruit sales to their mother,
Cleo. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record p.
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22).
-7-

Finally, in March of 1993, Donald sold two lots off of the farm and purchased
property located near St. George, Utah ("the Hellwell trade"). (See Trial Exhibit 48).
The siblings had no notice of this trade until the late summer of 1993, but when Dwayne
learned of it, they understood that Donald was still acting for the benefit of the family.
(Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11, Record p. 1461, Trans.
Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). In late October or early November of 1993, Dwayne and
Donald had a conversation in which Donald indicated for the first time that he had
conducted the Hellwell trade for his own benefit and not for that of the family. This was
the first time that Donald indicated to any of his family that he was holding the farm for
himself thereby repudiating the trust. Id. The resulting disagreements over Donald's
repudiation of the trust and disputes over the top soil business led to the disintegration of
Donald and Dwayne's business and litigation ensued. Id. Three and a half years after the
repudiation , within the statute of limitations, Dwayne and his siblings filed a
counterclaim against Donald, asserting the existence of a constructive trust. (Record p.
23-38). After several pretrial motions and a lengthy discovery period, the trial court
bifurcated the case. The initial part of the trial would address the issue of the imposition
of a constructive trust. The remaining causes of action between the parties, including a
determination of damages, or partition of the constructive trust property, was reserved for
2

The parties agree that a four year statute of limitations applies to constructive trust
actions. The dispute between the parties lies in the application of the discovery rule to
toll the statute of limitations until such time as the trust is repudiated. The trial court
determined, as a finding of fact, that the trust was not repudiated until the fall of 1993 and
that, consistent with existing law, the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of
limitations until the trust was repudiated.
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the second part of the trial. The first half of the trial addressing the imposition of a
constructive trust went forward on March 12 through March 15, 2007. (Record p. 144967). Witnesses were called by all parties and, after post trial briefing, the District Court
ruled on May 24, 2007, imposing an equitable constructive trust, and entered a Rule
54(b) certification on that issue. (Record p. 1540, 1583). Donald and Jeanette sought
review of the imposition of the constructive trust, and review of the prior imposition of
sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith. On December 26, 2008, the Court of
Appeals handed down its decision, reversing the trial court on both issues. See Rawlings
v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 1j 10, 200 P.3d 662.

Donald's siblings, Dwayne

Rawlings, LaRell Rawlings, Bryce Rawlings, and Carol Lynn Masterson petitioned for
certiorari review on the Court of Appeals' reversal of the imposition of a constructive
trust. On April 1, 2009, this Court granted the siblings' petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the present case, the Court of Appeals has issued a decision which conflicts
with precedent on several important aspects.

In reaching its decision the Court of

Appeals also misunderstands the meaning of the trial court's findings of fact and
consequently reaches an illogical result. Specifically, the Court of Appeals failed to
construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the ruling, as required, and fashioned
a ruling which, in effect, found clear error, without examining the facts below.
Moreover, a plain reading of the findings of fact, read in their entirety rather than
selectively, demonstrates that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to impose a
constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds. The statement by the trial court
-9-

that the evidence was conclusive as to a constructive trust because Arnold did not intend
the signing of the 1967 deed to affect a transfer of his ownership rights in the farm was an
express finding that Arnold intended to transfer legal title while retaining equitable title,
thereby creating an express trust.
The Court of Appeals" decision violates precedential requirements in several other
areas: the decision limits and narrowly defines the doctrine of constructive trusts, which
contradicts case law that indicates that there are unlimited types of constructive trusts and
that the doctrine of constructive trusts should not be limited or narrowly defined; the
decision fails to find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a constructive
trust, which is an express requirement before an appellate court can overturn a trial
court's imposition of a constructive trust; the decision examines the evidence below
despite Donald and Jeanette's failure to marshal the evidence in their favor; the decision
misinterprets or misunderstands that evidence; and, the decision, in direct conflict with
case law and general appellate practice, changes the legal standard by which this case
should be decided, but does not remand the case to the trial court to make findings of fact
in light of the new legal standard.
A simple survey of the evidence presented at trial, and the evidence upon which
the trial court expressly relied, demonstrates that the imposition of a constructive trust is
clearly justified under either an express constructive trust theory or an equitable
constructive trust theory. Finally, the trial court was correct in finding that the discovery
rule operates to toll the statute of limitations until such time as the trust was repudiated in
the fall of 1993.
-10-

The failure of the Court of Appeals to follow several areas of binding precedent
and to understand the import of the trial court's findings requires that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed, and that the ruling of the trial court be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSTRUE THE FINDINGS
OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING.
In reviewing a trial court's decision, "Utah appellate courts do not take trial

courts' factual findings lightly." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1994). Rather, an appellate court reviewing or applying
a trial court's findings of fact is required to "view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the trial court's findings . . . . [and] recite the facts in accordance with that standard."
State v. A House and 1.37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 South, 886 P.2d 534,
535 (Utah 1994); Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, lj 34, 189 P.3d 51 ("In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's findings, we review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings."); State v. Widdison, 2001
UT 60, If 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (The appellant must show that the evidence when viewed "in a
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling is insufficient to support the trial court's
findings.") Not only should trial court's findings be construed in favor of the ruling, if
the findings of fact are lacking or even absent, the appellate court is required to assume
that findings of fact exist to support the ruling if it is reasonable to do so. "[A] court
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would
be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." State v. Ramirez,
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817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991). Even when "no findings of fact appear in the record, we
assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the
decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." Id. at
787. This rule has been repeatedly affirmed.

ww

[W]hen a trial court has failed to make

findings of fact on the record, we will assume that the trial court found facts in accord
with its decision when it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings."

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994).

This requirement is

founded in good public policy. Unlike appellate courts, trial courts generally do not have
a transcript of the trial to which they may cite. The trial court judge generally takes
notes, admits exhibits and testimony, and then makes a ruling. In doing so, the trial court
will weigh the sufficiency and the credibility of the evidence. An appellate court is less
well equipped to conduct this analysis because a record or transcript will not reflect the
nuances and the visual/auditory cues of the evidence as it came in at trial. When a trial
court renders its ruling, it considers all of these nuances, even though the findings of fact
may not and cannot reflect them. Ockey, Widdison, Ramirez, and others recognize these
considerations and, thus, the importance of construing the findings in favor of the ruling
of the trial court.
Even more specifically, when addressing the imposition of a constructive trust, an
appellate court is required "to view the evidence, including the fair inferences to be
drawn therefrom, and all the circumstances shown thereby, in the light most favorable to
the successful party below." Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977).
Appellate courts are to "affirm [a trial court's decision] if there is a reasonable basis for
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doing so." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ^f 34. Because appellate courts are to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the successful party below and affirm a trial court's
decision if there is a reasonable basis for doing so, appellate courts "must give great
weight to findings made and to the inferences drawn by the trial judge." State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Findings of facts made by the trial court judge are
rejected only "if [the appellate court] considers them to be clearly erroneous."

Id.

(emphasis added); State v. A House and 1.37 Acres of Real Property located at 392
South, 886 P.2d, 534,535 (Utah 1994) (Appellate courts "reverse a trial court's findings
of fact only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'"); Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ^ 34, ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.").
In the instant case, instead of following the practice prescribed by legal
precedent—that is, determining if there was a reasonable basis for affirming the trial
court's decision, construing the findings below in favor of the trial court's ruling, and
reversing only if the findings are clearly erroneous—the Court of Appeals took
extraordinary measures to reverse the trial court's decision by taking out of context one
incomplete phrase in the Ruling of the trial court and misinterpreting its plain meaning
when taken in context with the other findings made by the trial court.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied solely on one portion of
one sentence in the trial court's Ruling, to the exclusion of the intent and meaning of all
other findings of fact, and without examining the evidence to determine if the trial court
was "clearly erroneous." The Court of Appeals determined, contrary to the conclusions
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of the trial court, that Arnold did not have the appropriate intent to transfer the property
into trust either "directly or by imposition of a legal constructive trust." Rawlings v.
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ^f 22, 200 P.3d 662. Taken in context, the entire sentence
by the trial court states: "The referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of
constructive trust and supports the conclusion that Arnold did not consider the
conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property." (Record p. 1535).
The full sentence demonstrates that this finding was supposed to be viewed in the context
of the other findings made by the court, or "[t]he referenced evidence" and was not meant
to stand alone. A review of the "referenced evidence" preceding this sentence shows that
the "intent" described is that Arnold intended to transfer legal title to the property without
transferring equitable title to the property, which is the precise legal principle upon which
trusts, both traditional and constructive, are founded.

Examples of this "referenced

evidence" cited by the Ruling of the trial court include: (1) "As Bryce Rawlings testified,
his father signed the deed intending only to make it a temporary transfer, with the
children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the farm.

Other evidence

corroborates that intent." (2) "Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the
conveyance was because Arnold had to get the property out of his name as required by
the welfare department.

The Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs produced any

persuasive testimony contradicting their testimony on that subject." (3) "Also, since the
property conveyance in 1967, there has been an inadequate explanation as to why the
siblings and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked to sign the
quit-claim deed, Exhibit 68." (4) "LaRell Rawlings who testified that in late February or
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early March, his father had a conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he needed
to get the property out of his name because of the welfare department's requirement that
it be transferred out of his name." (5) "Arnold indicated he was going to deed the
property to Donald because of the welfare requirement for receiving assistance. That
conversation was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed by Donald at trial and
remains uncontradicted and unrebutted." (Record p. 1535-40).
Thus, the "referenced evidence" supports the finding of a constructive trust. By
latching onto this one incomplete phrase, the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to
analyze and apply the other "referenced evidence" or findings made by the trial court.
This rejection of the "referenced evidence" has the effect and purpose of a "clearly
erroneous" finding, without reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence below. Such a
holding does not satisfy the precedential requirement that the findings and inferences of
the trial court be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision below.
Given that it is incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to "view the evidence . . . in the
light most favorable to the successful party below," the Court of Appeals should not have
reversed the trial court. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d at 710. By so reversing, the Court of
Appeals has issued a decision which is in conflict with existing case law.
A review of the trial court's Ruling shows how, when the Ruling is read in its
entirety, the evidence and the findings of fact completely support the imposition of a
constructive trust. Respondents Donald and Jeanette previously asserted, and the Court
of Appeals erroneously agreed, that the trial court found that no transfer was intended by
Arnold when he signed the 1967 deed.

Upon a plain reading of the Ruling, these
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statements clearly mistake the trial court's findings. At trial, the parties did not dispute
that the 1967 deed transferred legal title to the family farm. The evidence showed that
the whole family was gathered, each sibling signed a deed, and it was clear that a transfer
of title was affected. Oddly, by latching on to one incomplete phrase of the trial court's
Ruling, the Court of Appeals found that this signing was done without the intent to affect
a transfer, which begs the question: If there was no intent to affect a transfer, then what
was intended? Arnold and his children did not prepare and sign all these deeds just for
fun. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not cross check its logic to ask whether its
conclusion made sense.
While it was clear and undisputed that Arnold transferred legal title to the farm,
what was not initially clear, and what was at issue at the trial, was whether this transfer
was intended to be a transfer of Arnold's ''ownership rights" in his farm, or in other
words the equitable title or beneficial interest in the farm. If the legal title and the
equitable title had been divided, then the imposition of constructive trust was appropriate.
Why would the trial court state that a transfer of ownership rights was not intended and
yet still impose a constructive trust? Because by affecting this transfer, Arnold bifurcated
legal and equitable titles, thereby warranting the imposition of a constructive trust.
The division of legal and equitable titles is the fundamental principal upon which
trusts, both traditional and constructive, are based. Ockey, 2008 UT 37, f 11; In re
Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129.

The fundamental principal of law

underlying trusts is that the legal title is held by the trustee, while the equitable title is
held by the beneficiaries to the trust. Id. The trial court found that, although a transfer of
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the legal title occurred, it did not affect a transfer of Arnold's u ownership rights" in the
farm. Arnold continued to refer to the farm as his own and treat it as if no change in
ownership had occurred. In other words, when legal title was transferred, there was no
intent to transfer equitable title. In the proper context, therefore the Ruling of the trial
court clearly articulates a finding of an express trust.

The trial court stated, wThe

referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of constructive trust and supports the
conclusion that Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership
rights in the property." (Record p. 1535). When the trial court found that Arnold did not
intend to transfer his "ownership rights in the property," that was an express finding that
Arnold had not transferred the farm in fee simple to Donald and Jeanette, and that he
intended to retain equitable title. In other words, it was an explicit finding of the intent to
create an express trust.3 Thus, the trial court made findings concerning the creation of an
express constructive trust. Ironically, the exact part of the Ruling which provides the
legal basis for the imposition of a constructive trust is the part of the Ruling which the
Court of Appeals misunderstood and misconstrued to hold as barring the imposition of a
constructive trust. Thus the Court of Appeals failed to pick up on the nuances of the trial
court's Ruling and erroneously reversed. As noted before, this error by the Court of
Appeals violates important case law, including the requirement to construe the trial

3

Although this topic will be addressed more extensively below, it is worth pointing out
now that if the Court of Appeals had simply recognized the import and meaning of the
trial court's Ruling on this one issue, then it should have upheld the trial court's decision
imposing a constructive trust, either on express constructive trust or equitable
constructive trust grounds.
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court's findings in favor of the ruling and to only disturb findings of fact when clear error
is shown. By failing to construe the trial court's findings in favor of the Ruling, and by
failing to perceive the meaning of the trial court's Ruling that equitable and legal titles to
the farm had been divided, thereby requiring the imposition of a constructive trust, the
Court of Appeals has issued a decision which departs from precedent and which conflicts
with basic trust law. As such, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS IN CONTRADICTION
WITH EXISTING CASE LAW THAT INDICATES THAT THERE ARE
UNLIMITED TYPES OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals attempts to clarify the law of constructive

trusts by limiting the term into two distinct areas: express constructive trusts and
equitable constructive trusts.

This attempt to refine constructive trust law is in

contradiction with existing case law, and violates the public policy objectives upon which
constructive trust law is based.
Several important Utah cases state that the doctrine of constructive trusts is not a
legal theory which should be limited or narrowly defined.

"An attempt to define or

describe a constructive trust would be inadequate because such definition or description
would be too narrow in its scope and fail to include important types of constructive
trusts." Parks v. Zions First Nat Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted).
u

[T]he forms and varieties of these trusts . . . are practically without limits."

Id.

Furthermore, "[a] court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no
unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each
transaction." Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949).
-18-

These holdings are founded in good public policy.

Inevitably, when a legal

doctrine is narrowly defined, its applicability is decreased and certain aggrieved parties
will no longer be able to avail themselves of this legal theory. Such a circumstance can
lead to the unavailability of a remedy for wrongs committed and result in unfairness.
Therefore, the doctrine of constructive trusts has been purposely left undefined so as to
permit courts to fashion a remedy in equity to prevent injustice. The facts of this case are
an example of how a narrow definition of constructive trusts can result in injustice. The
trial court found that Arnold Rawlings deeded his farm to Donald to hold for the benefit
of the family. The trial court further found that, later, Donald repudiated this trust and
declared his intent to keep the farm for himself. In finding that no constructive trust can
apply, the Court of Appeals recognized that its decision "produces results that, under a
pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed inequitable." Rawlings, 2008 UT App
478, ]J 18. Thus, the Court of Appeals itself recognizes the conflict between its decision
and the policy of fairness and equity underpinning an undefined constructive trust
doctrine.
Several cases present instances where the Utah Supreme Court indicated that a
constructive trust should be imposed that did not fit within the new definitions articulated
in the Court of Appeals' decision. In Acott v. Tomlinson, the Utah Supreme Court found
that a transaction that is "unfair and lacking in disclosure of material facts" can qualify
for imposition of a constructive trust. 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). Recently, in
Parduhn v. Bennett, the Utah Supreme Court held that a constructive trust was an
appropriate remedy for the provision of insurance proceeds to those equitably entitled to
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them, rather than to those named on the policy as beneficiaries. 2002 UT 93, ^j 17, 61
P.3d 982. Neither of these cases fits within the narrow definition of constructive trusts
which the Court of Appeals has now articulated.
Because Parks and Haws expressly state that the constructive trust doctrine cannot
and should not be strictly defined, because Acott and Parduhn demonstrate the wisdom of
this principle in action, and because the Court of Appeals has, in violation of Parks and
Haws, limited and narrowly defined the constructive trust doctrine, the Court of Appeals
has issued a decision which departs from precedent handed down by the Utah Supreme
Court and which conflicts with the policy reasons of a broadly defined constructive trust
doctrine. In contrast, the trial court issued an opinion which conformed to established
precedent and which exercised a court's discretionary powers to impose a constructive
trust when the evidence demonstrated that such an equitable remedy was justified. As
such, the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the trial court's decision
should be affirmed.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S
IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WITHOUT MAKING A
FINDING OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc. establishes the standard by which

constructive trust cases must be reviewed. "We can reverse the trial court's imposition of
a constructive trust only for an abuse of discretion." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996). This ruling has since been reiterated in
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 UT App 37, 2000 WL 33249399 (unpublished opinion, see
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Appendix). Moreover, an appellate court "will only conclude the trial court abused its
discretion if the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Tolman, 912 P.2d at 462.
A reading of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, as contrasted with that in
Tolman and Neilsen, leads to confusion about whether the Court of Appeals will address
a constructive trust case as a question of law or as a question of equity. In its decision,
the Court of Appeals indicates that it reviews "the legal requirements for the imposition
of constructive trusts, for correctness." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ^j 10. The Court of
Appeals then cites Flake v. Flake, a case involving the validity of a traditional trust
instrument, rather than the imposition of a constructive trust, as the controlling authority.
2003 UT 17, If 8, 71 P.3d 589. This holding suggests that the standard of review for the
imposition of a constructive trust is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. The trial
court made no findings as to what the "legal requirements for the imposition of a
constructive trust[ ]" are. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, If 10. Rather, the trial court
imposed a constructive trust consistent with the case law as it found it.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals suggests that existing case law on
constructive trusts is "confusing." Id. at f 13. The Court of Appeals then proceeds to
clarify the issue, bifurcating the doctrine between "express" and "equitable" constructive
trusts. Id. at Tf 14-19. Once the Court of Appeals articulates the doctrine, however, no
analysis is conducted as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
constructive trust in this case. The term 'abuse of discretion' is not used and there is no
discussion as to whether the trial court went 'beyond the limits of reasonability'. No
mention is made of either Tolman or Neils en. This failure to address whether the trial
-21 -

court abused its discretion or acknowledge and deal with case law imposing that
requirement undermines the statement by the Court of Appeals that constructive trusts are
reviewed for correctness.
As a result, a reader of Tolman, Neils en, and now Rawlings, is left with the
irreconcilable standards articulated and followed in each, further confusing rather than
clarifying the law of constructive trusts. Precedent establishes that equitable decisions
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, as Tolman and Neilsen indicate. See
also, Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 1995). The decision by
the Court of Appeals now disregards and directly conflicts with these previous legal
precedents.

If the Court of Appeals wished to distinguish or overturn Tolman and

Neilsen, it should have expressly so stated. Because the Court of Appeals has not done
so, the Court of Appeals has issued a decision which contradicts precedent without
explaining the discrepancy.
In prior briefing Donald and Jeanette have argued that a finding of an erroneous
conclusion of law implicitly includes a finding of abuse of discretion. To support this,
Donald and Jeanette cited to Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., the latest in a long
string of cases which hold that, in the context of discovery sanctions, an abuse of
discretion can be found when there is an erroneous conclusion of law.4 This rule is
expressly limited to discovery sanctions and does not have applicability elsewhere. Thus,
the requirement laid down in Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co. Inc. and Nielsen v.
4

See also, Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997); Askew v.
Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996).
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Neilsen, that an abuse of discretion must be found in order to overturn a trial court's
imposition of a constructive trust, is good existing law.
A simple review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a constructive trust.5 The evidence presented showed that Arnold
meant to convey his farm to Donald and Jeanette "to hold for the family." He continued
to treat the farm as his and to refer to it as "my farm." The status quo continued after
Arnold's death, in which all of the siblings continued to manage the farm, harvest fruit,
and either divide the profits of give them to their mother. Moreover, the trial court found
that Donald first repudiated the trust three and a half years before suit was filed. These
findings of fact can only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. Based on these
findings of fact, it cannot be said that the imposition of a constructive trust is "beyond the
limits of reasonability. Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the
imposition of a constructive trust must be upheld.
Because it is well established case law that equitable decisions are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a
constructive trust, the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the trial court's
decision should be upheld.

5

A more exhaustive examination of the evidence is included in a separate section below.
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IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS REACHED A DECISION THAT FOUND
CLEAR ERROR EVEN THOUGH DONALD AND JEANETTE FAILED
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
It is well established that when a "clearly erroneous" standard is applied or when a

trial court's findings of fact are reversed, as has been done by the Court of Appeals in the
instant case, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). Specifically, the appealing
party
must play the devil's advocate. Attorneys must extricate
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the
marshaling duty, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists. Once the appellants have established
every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. They must
show the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to
be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them
clearly erroneous.
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991); accord, In Re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36
(Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).
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"When the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, [appellate courts] refuse to
consider the merits of the challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid."
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also,
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989). An
appellant's failure to meet this burden "allows [the appellate court] to affirm the [trial]
court's findings on that basis alone." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60, 28 P.3d 1278.
It is not the duty of the appellate court to "review the trial court's findings where the
party challenging those facts fails to marshal the evidence." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy
Corporation, 2004 UT 28, f 10, 93 P.3d 193 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Moon v.
Moon, 1999 UT App 12, \ 12, 973 P.2d 431). Rather, upon an appellant's failure to
marshal, the appellate court "must assume that the record supports the findings of the trial
court." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, jf 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because
Donald and Jeanette failed to marshal any evidence in support of the trial court's
decision, precedent requires that all of the findings, including those supporting a finding
of an equitable or express constructive trust in the instant case, should have been
accepted as valid by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' failure to
reject Donald and Jeanette's substantive evidentiary arguments because of their failure to
marshal the evidence directly contradicts existing case law.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that "we examine the particular
elements urged by the [Appellants] and the sufficiency of the evidence to support those
elements." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, \ 20 (emphasis added). The proper procedure
established by precedent when an appellate court examines the "sufficiency of the
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evidence" requires the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appealing party has
fully marshaled the evidence as set forth above. In the instant case, however, the Court
of Appeals specifically rejected this established requirement and failed to take the
required step of determining whether the appellants had appropriately marshaled the
evidence. Surprisingly, Court of Appeals recognized that it was skipping an important
analytical step.

"[T]he Grantees ask us simply to reverse the district court without

remand, arguing that the evidence presented can only lead to a finding of no enforceable
trust." Id. (emphasis added). And, "[i]t is somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be
asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support findings that were
not actually made by the trial court." Id. (emphasis added). More than unusual, it was
error—and a clear departure from binding precedent. All the "evidence presented" was
in favor of the Siblings, because Donald and Jeanette had failed to marshal the evidence.
Because the Court of Appeals recognized that it was reviewing the "sufficiency of the
evidence" and because the Court of Appeals was required to review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals was required to
apply the clearly erroneous standard and require Donald and Jeanette to marshal Ihe
evidence.6

The Court of Appeals' failure to enforce this procedural requirement,

grounded in prior precedent, is error and the Court of Appeals' decision should be
reversed.

6

A separate section (below) has been devoted to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the imposition of a constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds.
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V.

IN CONTRADICTION WITH EXISTING CASE LAW, THE COURT
OF APPEALS CHANGED THE LEGAL STANDARD BY WHICH THIS
CASE SHOULD BE DECIDED, BUT DID NOT REMAND THE CASE
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT IN LIGHT
OF THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD.
In handing down its decision, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial

court's imposition of a constructive trust on equitable grounds was improper, and held
that the proper analysis was under the theory of express constructive trusts. Rawlings,
2008 UT App 478, *|ffi 16-19. However, after changing the legal standard for the analysis
of the case, the Court of Appeals failed to remand the case for findings of fact consistent
with the new legal standard. Id. at ^f 20. Because the Court of Appeals changed the legal
standard by which this case should be judged, but failed to remand the case to the trial
court to make findings under the new legal standard, the Court of Appeals has issued a
decision which conflicts with existing case law. In general, when an appellate court
issues a decision which holds that the trial court has applied the wrong legal standard, the
case is remanded back to the trial court for findings consistent with the new legal
standard. Moler v. CWManagement Corp., 2008 UT 46, t 14, 190 P3d 1250. "Because
the district court applied the wrong standard, it did not make the findings necessary for us
to conduct a review using the correct standard. Therefore, we remand for the district
court to make factual determinations and apply the correct standard." Id. The reason for
this procedural practice is self-evident: when a trial court makes findings of fact with a
specific legal theory in mind, those findings will not reflect the legal elements of other,
separate legal theories. As such, the legal elements of a different legal standard not
considered by the trial court, will be lacking from the trial court's findings of fact. Thus,
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the proper procedure is to remand in order for findings of fact to be made, consistent with
the evidence presented, on the legal elements of the new legal theory.
The Court of Appeals itself recognized this important procedural step, but, without
explanation, refused to follow it.
It is somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be asked to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support
findings that were not actually made by a trial court.
Ordinarily, when the district court applies the wrong legal
standard the matter is reversed and remanded so that the
district court may consider the evidence under the proper
standard.
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, f 20. However, after making this statement, the Court of
Appeals inexplicably goes on to determine that the findings of fact made by the trial
court, entered under an equitable constructive trust theory, were insufficient to support an
express trust theory.

By reversing the trial court's application of the equitable

constructive trust theory, but not remanding the case for findings on the new legal
standard imposed, the Court of Appeals directly violated the rule laid down in Moler that
the case should have been remanded for findings of fact on the elements of an express
constructive trust, the new legal standard. In the event that this Court reverses the Court
of Appeals on the grounds articulated above this Court need not reach the issue of
whether this case should be remanded. If in fact the Court does reach the question of
remand, precedent makes it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in not remanding the
case back to the trial court for findings consistent with the new legal standard and
therefore the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
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VL

THE
EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS
THE
IMPOSITION
OF A
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, EITHER ON AN EXPRESS OR
EQUITABLE THEORY.
Assuming for the moment that the Court of Appeals was correct in narrowly

defining the doctrine of constructive trusts into either express or equitable grounds, the
evidence presented to the trial court and the trial court's subsequent findings of fact
support the imposition of a constructive trust, either on an express or equitable theory.
According to the Court of Appeals, an express trust can be created when the evidence
demonstrates a "manifestation of intent to create it." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ^ 22
{citing Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987)). As has been articulated above,
the trial court made the factual finding that, "The referenced evidence is persuasive on
the subject of constructive trust and supports the conclusion that Arnold did not consider
the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property." (Record p.
1535). This finding indicates that, although Arnold transferred legal title to the property,
he retained the "ownership rights" or equitable title for himself. When Arnold transferred
the farm, he intended to, and in fact did, retain the equitable title to the farm, thereby
demonstrating that he intended to create a trust.

In other words, the evidence

demonstrated a clear manifestation of intent to create a trust. The elements of an express
constructive trust as articulated by the Court of Appeals are thereby satisfied. Thus,
when the findings of fact are not taken out of context or misinterpreted, and when they
are construed in favor of the Ruling of the trial court, the findings satisfy the
requirements for the imposition of an express constructive trust.
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The findings of the trial court and the evidence also support the imposition of a
constructive trust on an equitable theory as well. Assuming again that the Court of
Appeals was correct in narrowly defining constructive trusts, the findings and evidence
both support the elements articulated by the Court of Appeals that there has been a
wrongful act, unjust enrichment, and specific property that can be traced to the wrongful
behavior. States the Court of Appeals, "in order for the Grantees' conduct to have been
wrongful, Arnold would have needed to express his intent to transfer the property into
trust—i.e., Arnold would have had to have attempted to create an express trust." This is
precisely what the trial court determined that Arnold did. He transferred the family farm
to Donald and Jeanette with the express intent that he retain his ownership rights in the
farm.

Arnold expressed the intent to create a trust. By the Court of Appeals own

language, the wrongfulness prong is satisfied by Donald and Jeannette's failure to honor
the trust under which they received the property. Donald and Jeannette would be unjustly
enriched if they retained the property in violation of the trust under which the property
was received, and specific property, i.e. the family farm and subsequent real estate trades,
can be traced to this wrongful behavior.
Alternately, the evidence supports the finding of other wrongful acts by Donald
and Jeanette. Specifically, Donald and Jeanette took the subject property based upon a
confidential relationship, and thereafter violated that confidence. When it is shown that,
1) a party transferred certain property to another with the verbal understanding that the
latter hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family, 2) that the transferor
reposed confidence in the transferee, and 3) that the transferor and the transferee were
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close relations, such as parent and child, then such evidence is sufficient to establish a
confidential relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949); Walker v.
Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah
1953).

"While kinship may be a factor in determining the existence of a legally

significant confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in addition to the kinship, a
reposal of confidence by one party and the resulting superiority and influence on the
other party." Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Utah App. 1988) (citation
omitted) rev'd on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993);
See also Estate of loupe, 878 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah App. 1994).
The evidence supports both the existence of an express trust, and the violation of
that expression, and the existence of a confidential relationship and the violation of that
confidence. Arnold Rawlings was suffering from cancer (eventually terminal) and was
under heavy cobalt treatments. Consequently, he was under great stress to get the farm
out of his name. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25,
64:1-23, 133:16-22, 134:2-10). LaRell Rawlings, Donald's brother, testified that his
father Arnold told LaRell that he wanted to get the farm out of his name so that he could
qualify for government assistance due to his medical needs.7 Id. Arnold initially wanted
to put the farm in LaRell's name, since he was doing most of the work on the farm.
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:11-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-3). LaRell suggested,

7

Arnold was specifically instructed by the welfare department to transfer the farm out of
his name so that he could qualify for benefits that would cover the costs of his medical
treatment. (See Letter from Welfare Department, Trial Exhibit 68).
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instead, that Arnold put the farm in Dwayne's name, feeling that Dwayne would be
fairest to the family. Id. Arnold finally settled on Donald as the person who would hold
the farm for the benefit of the family, he being the oldest son. (Record p. 1449, Trans.
Vol. I, page 48, lines 20-25; page 49, lines 1-25; page 50, lines 1-25; page 51, lines 1-24;
page 177, lines 18-25; page 178, line 1). LaRell testified, "[W]hen I and my ex-wife
Arlene went down to sign [the deed], Dad told me, he says 'This is not Donald's
property. This is the family's/ He told me that before I signed it. I didn't ask him that;
he told me that." (Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 60:8-12). LaRell further testified that
his father and the rest of the family, including Donald, continued to treat the farm as
family property, and to run the farm as a family farm, not as Donald's farm. (Record p.
1449, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11). The understanding was that
the proceeds from the farm would continue to benefit Arnold, Cleo (the mother) and the
rest of the family.

(Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 182:23-25, 184:16-23, 191:3-18).

LaRell testified:
Q. At the time did you believe that Donald would do what your
father told you was to be done with the farm?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. At that time you trusted that he would do that?
A. Yes, I did.
(Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 127:19-25, 128:1-3).
Bryce Rawlings offered similar testimony to that of LaRell. He testified that
Donald and Arnold approached Bryce, informed him that the farm needed to be taken out
of Arnold's name, and that Donald would hold the farm for the benefit of the family.
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8). In addition, the children continued to
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work the farm, and the farm continued to be treated as a family asset. (Record p. 1451,
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 248:6-20, 252:10-23, 254:1-10).
Proceeds from the farm went to Arnold and Cleo. Id. Bryce further indicated that
Donald exercised influence over the family in that he managed the legal affairs of the
farm and dealt with legal disputes. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16,
298:19-25, 299:1). The proceeds of these legal disputes were distributed to both siblings
and parent, with the understanding that all of the family was entitled to the proceeds,
because Donald was holding the farm in trust for the family. Id. Such distribution would
not have been necessary if Donald had not been holding the farm for the benefit of the
family.

It was not until this case was commenced that the siblings discovered that

Donald had not properly distributed the proceeds from these legal disputes, and had kept
the majority of the funds for himself. Regardless of the amount of funds dispersed, by
distributing funds Donald acknowledged that he was holding the farm in trust.
Dwayne Rawlings testified that Arnold and Donald approached him on the
driveway of Arnold's house, and explained the medical situation and the need to get the
farm out of Arnold's name. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 381:415, 388:20-25, 389:1-5. Arnold specifically told Dwayne, in the presence of Donald,
"that they had to get it out of Dad's name, and they were going to put it in Donald's name
to hold it for the rest of the family." (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:21-23). Arnold
told Dwayne that the farm would be divided up between the family members at a later
time. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 335:23-25, 336:1-2). Further, Donald exercised
influence and deceit over the family in that, when managing a boundary dispute, he
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falsely represented to the family that additional deeds were required before he could
proceed with litigation on behalf of the family. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 346:1022, 352:9-19, 398:3-7, Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). Throughout the years
the family trusted Donald and followed his lead both in terms of legal issues and in
finances. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 396:11-25, Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill,
420:10-20, 421:1-20, 430:11-21, 462:3-13).
Donald and Jeanette have previously asserted that neither a confidential
relationship nor a constructive trust can be established by only 'self-serving' testimony.
While such argument might have some merit if the only evidence supporting the trial
court's imposition of a constructive trust were the self-serving testimony of the siblings,
the trial court had much more than sibling testimony on which to base its conclusions.
There is ample evidence outside the testimony of interested parties which both
substantiates and independently establishes propriety of imposing a constructive trust.
Several letters and affidavits written three years after the transfer, both by Arnold, and by
associates of his who were prominent in the community, substantiate the testimony.
These letters were written after the transfer of the title of the farm to Donald, and yet,
Arnold refers to the farm as "my farm" and repeatedly asserts and implies ownership and
control.

(See Trial Exhibits 19, 20). Arnold's associates do the same.

(See Trial

Exhibits 21-29). After Arnold's death, Cleo continued to pay the taxes on the farm, not
Donald. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16).
Next, Donald sold a portion of the farm and purchased some commercial property
from the proceeds of the sale upon which he and Dwayne operated a business. (Record p.
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1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). The brothers recognized
that surplus proceeds of this business were to be held for the benefit of the family. Id.
The record shows that Donald deeded Dwayne a one half interest in a small portion of the
farm (known as the Pinegar lot) which was subsequently traded for some commercial
property to start a business.

Donald deeded this half interest to Dwayne without

receiving or requiring any remuneration in return. Id. Such actions further substantiate
that the farm and its derivatives were family assets, not Donald's assets.
Furthermore, both Donald and Jeanette, against their own interest, failed to rebut
any of the testimony given in support of a confidential relationship. Before trial Donald
and Jeanette had asserted that they had paid off a small amount of back taxes and in
return, Arnold had deeded them the entire farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:125, 334:1-4). At trial, however, it was shown that Dwayne had paid the majority of these
back taxes, and that he had done so on behalf of the family. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol.
11, 392:7-25). In addition, Donald did not rebut or dispute the testimony concerning his
presence during both the conversation with Dwayne, Arnold and himself, and the
conversation with LaRell, Arnold and himself. The uncontroverted testimony in regard
to those conversations was that Donald indicated that he would hold the farm for the
benefit of the family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:124, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 134:2-16, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:912, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald had
ample opportunity to rebut this testimony, since he also was at the meetings, but he did
not, thereby indicating that the testimony was truthful. Moreover, the uncontroverted
-35-

evidence is that after settlement of the border dispute, Donald distributed some of the
proceeds to the family, thereby indicating that he was holding for the benefit of the
family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:2225, 240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19).

In sum, there is

abundant evidence on which the trial court relied to find that Arnold expressed an intent
to transfer the property in trust to Donald, and to support a finding that Donald was in a
confidential relationship with his father. Donald's violation of the express trust and his
violation of the confidential relationship clearly establish the wrongful act necessary for
the imposition of an equitable constructive trust. Furthermore, the abundance of evidence
on this issue is definitive; the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion and was
not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed
and the trial court's Ruling should be affirmed.
VII.

THE DISCOVERY RULE OPERATED TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS UNTIL THE TRUST WAS REPUDIATED, AND THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE TRUST
WAS NOT REPUDIATED UNTIL THE FALL OF 1993.

As was outlined above, the question of whether the statute of limitations was
tolled by the discovery rule until the trust was repudiated is a question which Appellants
indicated would be briefed. (See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
page 5). Moreover, the issue of whether the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of
limitations is a subsidiary question fairly encompassed within the question of "[wjhether
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive
trust." See Order of Utah Supreme Court, dated April 1, 2009.
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Statute of limitations issues in constructive trust actions are complicated. Being a
creature of equity, the constructive trust requires the trial court to consider all the
evidence before it can rule on the issue. This is true because in constructive trust cases,
and especially those involving family members, there is a presumption that the 'discovery
rule' tolls the statute of limitations until discovery of repudiation of the trust. Answering
this question requires factual findings, which generally have to be resolved at trial. The
district court directly acknowledged this issue at the outset of the case. (Record p. 259260). The uncontradicted evidence is that Donald and Jeanette first repudiated the trust
(to Dwayne only) in early November of 1993. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25,
356:1-25, 357:1-11; Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). Three and a half
years later, Appellees filed their claim for constructive trust. (Record p. 24).
The discovery rule is an equitable doctrine which tolls the statute of limitations
when a person lacks knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of action.
While a statute of limitations generally begins running when a
plaintiff has a completed cause of action, the discovery rule
may nonetheless operate to toll a statute of limitations until
the time at which a party discovered or reasonably should
have discovered facts forming the basis for the cause of
action.
In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, f35, 144 P.3d 1129 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Christiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, ^fl2, 136 P.3d
1266.
[Tjhere are two situations in which an equitable discovery
rule will operate to toll a statute of limitations: (1) where a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
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conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule would
be irrational or unjust.
Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, Tf35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
concealment prong of the discovery rule the claimant must demonstrate that "he neither
discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying the cause of
action before the limitations period expired due to the defendant's concealment." Id. at
^|36. When such a factual circumstance is established, the "statute of limitations will not
commence running until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or constructive knowledge
of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause of action." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
Furthermore, in cases involving families and constructive trusts, the discovery rale
presumptively applies.
[W]hen a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something
has occurred to give the beneficiary a "clear indication" that a
breach or repudiation has occurred, or, alternatively, the
circumstances must be such that the beneficiary must be
charged with knowledge of such a repudiation or breach.
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ^fll, 998 P.2d 262 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A statute of limitations defense "is not available to a trustee as against his
beneficiaries until something has occurred to give a clear indication to them that he has
repudiated his trust; or the circumstances are such that they must be charged with
knowledge of such repudiation." Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); See
also Snow, 2000 UT 20, ^fl 1. Although a court would normally conduct a balancing test
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to determine whether the discovery rule should apply,

ww

[i]n the category of cases

involving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, [a court has], in effect, already
conducted this balancing test." Snow, 2000 UT 20, If 11.
Good public policy undergirds the presumptive application of the discovery rule to
cases involving familial relations and constructive trusts. The case of Walker v. Walker is
particularly on point. 404 P.2d 253 (Utah 1965). In Walker, the father of the family died
much earlier than did the mother, leaving a substantial estate. Id. at 255. The estate was
not probated and the mother continued to manage the affairs of the family assets,
including a mercantile store and farm land. Id. When the family fell on hard times and
family assets were jeopardized, the oldest son agreed to take title to the store and farm in
order to avoid the loss of the property. Id. at 255-56. Mother and siblings continued to
live in the house, work on the family farm, and run the family business for another thirty
six years. Id. at 256. Finally, when the mother died, the eldest son repudiated his trust
and declared that he considered the property to be exclusively his. Id. In addressing the
issue of statute of limitations and laches, the court found that in such cases, the statute
does not begin to run until the beneficiaries have actual or constructive notice of
repudiation of the trust. Id. at 257. This was especially true because of the close familial
relations involved.
Where a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to
find a repudiation. This is so because of the greater
likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed confidence in
him; and also, they would have a natural reluctance to sue
him unless circumstances forced them to do so. . . . Under the
facts shown there wouldn't be anything strange or
unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, as they say they
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did, that the defendant was holding the property for the family
until after the death of their mother, so that she would be
provided with a home; and that after her death, their father's
estate would be settled and each would receive his share.
These considerations together with the fact that some
members of the family remained in the property, make the
refusal of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs
harmonize with reason.
Id. (emphasis added); See also Acott v. Tomlinson, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). More
recently, the Utah Supreme Court clarified this doctrine in Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20.
[W]here a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a
violation of the trust, it constitutes an "exceptional
circumstance" calling for application of the discovery rule.
We have held that under certain "exceptional circumstances"
we will find that a rigid application of the statute of
limitations may be "irrational and unjust" and thus make the
discovery rule available. To determine when this is the case,
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship imposed on
the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
passage of time." In the category of cases involving
beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, we have, in
effect, already conducted this balancing test. In Acott and
Walker we found, in substance, that to not apply the
discovery rule would lead to unjust results because of the
close familial relationship involved. In such a situation, the
beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the
trustee and less likely to sue. Therefore, it is appropriate to
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged breach or
repudiation."
Snow, 2000 UT 20, ^11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Early on in the instant case, while ruling on a motion for summary judgment based
on a statute of limitations theory, the trial court correctly noted that this case presents an
issue where the discovery rule might appropriately apply. (Record p. 259-260). Later, at
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trial, the district court appropriately found that the case at bar does in fact present all the
factual circumstances required to presumptively apply the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations: the parties are siblings, and the evidence strongly demonstrates that
both Arnold and each sibling reposed trust in Donald that he would hold the farm for the
benefit of the family. (See Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25,
51:1-24, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 127:19-25, 128:1-3, 184:16-23, 191:2-18; Record p.
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8, 333:1-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15,
388:20-25, 389:1-5, 396:11-25; Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:1-20,
430:11-21, 453:7-25, 454:1-7, 462:3-13; Trial Exhibits 19-29). Donald and Jeanette
produced no evidence at trial that the parties were not siblings, and almost no evidence
that the siblings did not repose trust in Donald and Jeanette. The trial court correctly
sided with the great weight of the evidence. Thus, the findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Because the discovery rule applies to the facts of this case, the only remaining
question is whether and when repudiation occurred.

In other words, when did the

siblings know, or when should they have known that Donald and Jeanette were no longer
going to honor their duties as trustees? When did Donald and Jeanette demonstrate that
they would treat the family farm as solely their own property?

In addressing this

question, the trial court made the following factual finding:
In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell
property, shown as Exhibit [4]1, for 6.5 acres in Washington
County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time,
told any siblings they believed they owned the trust property,
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and they were using the funds or income from the trust
property in any way they chose.
(Record p. 1561). In other words, repudiation of the trust did not occur until after
Dwayne knew of the Hellwell trade, and of Donald's intent on how he was planning to
use the traded property.

Substantial evidence supports this factual finding.

Dwayne

Rawlings testified that he and the rest of the family learned of the Hellwell trade in the
summer of 1993, a few months after it occurred. (Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. II, 453:725, 454:1-7). When the Hellwell trade was discovered by the siblings, it was generally
understood that the trade was done for the benefit of the family. (Record p. 1461, Trans.
Vol. Ill 453:7-25, 454:1-7; Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11).
It was not until late October or early November of 1993 that Dwayne finally learned of
Donald's true intentions. Dwayne testified that in late October or early November of
1993, he and Donald had a conversation about the Hellwell trade.
A. . . . I asked him what he'd give Mother for compensation
for these two lots; and he told me he didn't give her anything.
It was his lot. I says, "What have you - - how did you
compensate Mother for the topsoil you've been taking off the
farm?" He says, "I didn't compensate her at all. It was my
property. It was my soil. I sold it, and put the money in my
account, and spent it any way I wanted to."
Then I said, "What about your brothers, your three brothers?"
I said, "Why don't you - -" after he told me it was his
property, I said, "Why don't you transfer a lot to each one of
your two brothers and sister?" I said, "That would really help
with the family relations." He said, "I'm not going to give
that blank, blank, blank Larell anything." I said, "What about
Carol and Bryce?" "I'm not going to give them anything
either."
I finished up - - I told him at that time, I says, "I'll finish up
the job I'm working on," and I was doing most of the work
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for the business. "I'll finish up the jobs I'm doing, and I will
not do any more with you."
Q. Was that the reason?
A. That was the reason.
Q. That caused the break up of your business?
A. Yes.
The district court specifically found that this was "the first time" that Donald gave
an indication to anyone that he would no longer hold for the benefit of the family, and
repudiated the trust. Furthermore, LaRell Rawlings testified that he had no notice that
Donald had begun to treat the family farm as his personal property until after this action
was initially filed by Donald. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 177:18-25, 178:1). Three
and a half years after Donald and Dwayne's conversation, on May 8, 1997, Dwayne and
his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald alleging constructive trust, well within
the four year statute of limitations period. (Record p. 23-28).
Interestingly, although both Donald and Jeanette took the stand at trial, neither
testified as to the repudiation of the trust. The Hellwell property was not mentioned in
their testimony; the 1993 conversation with Dwayne was not brought up. Donald and
Jeanette made no efforts to rebut the evidence and testimony regarding repudiation of the
trust. Naturally, the trial court followed the only evidence presented on repudiation, and
correctly found that Donald initially repudiated the trust in the fall of 1993. Therefore,
Appellants' 1997 counterclaim for constructive trust was well within the statute of
limitations.

The Court of Appeals' decision reversing trial court's imposition of a

constructive trust, and failing to address the issue of whether the discovery rule operates
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to toll the statute of limitations until the trust was repudiated was error, and should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated, the decision of the Court of Appeals violates precedent and
reaches a decision which does not conform with the findings of fact, and which does not
make sense. Because the Court of Appeals fails to construe the findings of fact in favor
of the trial court's ruling, and instead takes one phrase of the ruling out of context and
misinterprets it; because the findings of fact, when read correctly, establish that legal and
equitable titles were intended to be divided and an express trust established; because the
Court of Appeals limits and narrowly defines the doctrine of constructive trusts; because
the Court of Appeals fails to find an abuse of discretion; because the Court of Appeals
examines the evidence and finds clear error when the evidence had not been marshaled;
because the Court of Appeals fails to remand the case to the trial court after changing the
legal standard; because the evidence satisfies the requirements for the imposition of a
constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds; and because the discovery rule
operates to toll the statute of limitations until the trust was repudiated, the decision of the
Court of Appeals was in error. For these reasons the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed and the ruling of the trial court upheld.
DATED and SIGNED this IV

""day of May, 2009.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

M. Dayle Jeffs
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390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
39QVIKC) Actions
390k372 Evidence
390k372(3) k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Evidence was insufficient, in action by siblings of
grantees of family farm brought against grantees, to
establish express trust on farm either directly or by
imposition of a legal constructive trust, on the basis of
a purported unwritten express trust; grantor did not
intend to transfer the farm at all but instead continued
to work it, and thus did not intend to transfer it in trust,
and grantees were entitled to ownership under the
express terms of grantor's clearly-expressed deed,
which was executed and delivered.
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Most Cited Cases
Courts recognize a constructive trust as a matter of
equity where there has been (1) a wrongful act, (2)
unjust enrichment, and (3) specific property that can
be traced to the wrongful behavior.
181 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust.
Most Cited Cases
Equitable constructive trusts are usually imposed
where injustice would result if a party were able to
keep money or property that rightfully belonged to
another.

151 Trusts 390 € ^ > i
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390kl k. Nature and Essentials of Trusts.
Most Cited Cases
An express trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation
of intent to create it and subjecting the person in whom
title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for the
benefit of others.

121 Trusts 390 €^>95
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k95 k. Fraud or Other Wrong in Acquisition of Property in General. Most Cited Cases
To establish a wrongful act under Utah law as an
element of the imposing of an equitable constructive
trust, an entity must have obviously received funds by
mistake or participated in active or egregious misconduct.

161 Trusts 390 €=>17(3)
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390kl7 Validity of Oral Trusts, and Requirement of Statute of Frauds
390kl7(3) k. Trusts in Lands in General.
Most Cited Cases
When no written instrument evidences a trust involving real property, the trust is enforceable only in
limited circumstances. Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 45.
121 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust.

[101 Trusts 390 €^>103(2)
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl03 Contracts and Transactions Between Persons in Confidential Relations
390kl03(2) k. Family Relation in General. Most Cited Cases
Law of express trusts, rather than law of equitable
constructive trusts, applied to claim of siblings of
grantees of family farm under a fee simple deed that
grantees' had wrongfully failed to comply with grantor's alleged expressed intentions at time of the transfer that the deed transfer property to the grantees in
trust.
[Ill Trusts 390 €^>336
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390 Trusts
390VI1 Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKA) Rights of Cestui Que Trust as
Against Trustee
390k336 k. Enforcing Performance <>1" Pu
ties of Trust. Most Cited Cases
The law governing the enforcement of express trusts is
clear and must be applied even when it produces results that, under a pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed inequitable.
J J 21 Trusts 390 €=>1
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390kl k. Nature and 1 v„ ;. .^ •;
s
Most Cited Cases
An express trust requires the grantor's manifestation of
intent to create it.
[131 Trusts 390 € = > !
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390kl k. Nature and Essentials of Trusts.
Most Cited Cases
An inter vivos trust can be created only by a grantor's
intent to transfer property into trust.
[1.4] Alternative Dispute Resolution,. 25T <-- 491
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TIII Mediation
25TIIKE) Mediation Proceedings
25Tk491 k. Costs. Most Cited Cases
Grantees of fee simple estate in family farm, who were
being challenged by siblings who asserted existence of
constructive trust in their favor, did not act in bad faith
justifying imposition of sanctions, but instead, exercised their statutory right to "terminate the proceedings at any time" by appearing at mediation session
and informing mediator they would neither make nor
consider any offer and would refuse to attempt to
resolve case other than by trial; grantees merely held
firm belief, vindicated by later court decision, in validity of their claims and had no interest in a compromised settlement. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rule 101(c).

*664 M. David Eckerslev, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
M. Dayle Jeffs and Thomas W. Seiler, Provo, for
\ppellees.
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., THORNE, Associate
P.J., andORME, J.
OPINION
TMORNE, Associate Presiding Judge:
1[ 1 Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (collectively, the
Grantees) appeal from the district court's entry of
judgment finding an equitable constructive trust in
favor of Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings, LaRell
Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R.
Masterson (collectively, the Siblings).— We reverse
the judgment of the district court, as well as an order
imposing sanctions against the Grantees for failing to
participate in mediation proceedings in good faith.
FN 1. Dwayne Rawlings's full name is Arnold
Dwayne Rawlings, and LaRell Rawlings's
full name is Theron LaRell Rawlings. We
refer to them as Dwayne and LaRell to be
consistent with references in the record and
to differentiate between Dwayne Rawlings
and his father, Arnold Rawlings. We also
note that when we employ the term the
Siblings as a descriptor of the beneficiaries of
the purported trust in this case, the term includes all purported beneficiaries, including
Grantees and Arnold and Cleo Rawlings.
If 2 This dispute centers on a family farm that Arnold
Rawlings transferred to the Grantees by deed in 1967.
The Grantees are Arnold and Cleo Rawlings's oldest
son, Donald, and Donald's wife, Jeanette. The Siblings
comprise the rest of Arnold and Cleo's children, along
with Dwayne's wife, Paulette. As summarized in
greater detail below, the Grantees' position in this
litigation is that they own the farm in fee simple pursuant to the 1967 deed from Arnold. The Siblings
argue that the Grantees hold the farm in trust for the
entire surviving family under a constructive trust
theory. After a four-day trial exploring the circumstances of the 1967 deed, the district court agreed with
the Siblings and imposed an equitable constructive

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

200P.3d662
200 P.3d 662, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 2008 UT App 478
(Cite as: 200 P.3d 662)

trust on the Grantees in regard to the farm.

BACKGROUND
^13 Arnold acquired the farm from his mother in 1944.
In 1966, Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold
believed that he would be unable to obtain
state-provided cancer treatment if he retained the farm
in his name. This belief motivated Arnold to explore
the possibility of transferring the farm to one of his
sons as a means of getting it out of his name while still
keeping it in the family. On March 24, 1967, Arnold
conveyed the farm to the Grantees by warranty deed.
Arnold's wife, Cleo, also signed the warranty deed
although her name was not on the title to the farm.
That same day, each of the Siblings signed quit-claim
deeds transferring any interest they may have had in
the farm to the Grantees. The Siblings contend that the
transfer to the Grantees was always meant to be for
their collective benefit as a family farm.
T[ 4 After the transfer, Arnold and Cleo continued to
live and work on the farm as if no transfer had occurred. When Arnold died in 1971, Cleo continued to
live on the farm and family members worked the farm
for her benefit. In 1974, the Grantees litigated a
boundary dispute with the farm's southern neighbor.
The Grantees' success in litigating the matter led to a
settlement with several title companies, who paid the
Grantees $52,000. The Grantees kept the bulk of that
money but did distribute portions to Cleo and the
Siblings.
11 5 In 1978, the Grantees deeded one of the lots
comprising the farm to themselves and Dwayne and
Paulette in joint tenancy. About this same time, Donald and Dwayne began a business selling topsoil. In
1993, the Grantees asserted, allegedly for the first
time, that they owned the farm free and clear and were
not holding it in trust for the Siblings. This dispute
over the nature of the Grantees' ownership interest in
the farm led to the dissolution of Donald and
Dwayne's *665 business, and the Grantees eventually
sued Dwayne and Paulette. Dwayne and Paulette filed
a counterclaim and self-described third-party complaint against the Grantees in their individual capacities and as trustees of an alleged trust, asserting a
constructive trust over the farm property. The remainder of the Siblings joined in the counterclaim and
third-party complaint. After extensive discovery, the
district court bifurcated the parties' disputes and de-
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cided to first address the constructive trust issue.
T| 6 Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to
mediate their disputes. The Grantees informed the
Siblings before mediation that they had no intent of
considering any settlement of the matter. The Grantees
appeared at the mediation session and told the mediator the same thing. The mediation session did not
result in a settlement. Afterwards, the Siblings sought
sanctions from the Grantees, alleging that they did not
participate in mediation in good faith. The district
court agreed, and ordered the Grantees to pay the
Siblings $2937 in expenses that the Siblings had incurred during the mediation process.
K 7 A four-day trial on the constructive trust issue
commenced on March 12, 2007. The bulk of the trial
was comprised of the Siblings' testimony describing
the circumstances of the 1967 transfer and the family's
treatment of the farm property after that date. Several
of the Siblings testified to conversations that they had
had with Arnold prior to the transfer, conversations
that the Siblings interpreted as expressing an intent to
place the farm in trust. The Grantees used the Siblings'
testimony to explore issues regarding the Grantees'
payment of debts owed by Arnold, which the Grantees
argued supported their position that Arnold intended
to transfer the farm to them in fee simple.
H 8 At the close of the Siblings' evidence, the Grantees
moved for dismissal of the Siblings' constructive 1rust
claims. The Grantees' motion and the Siblings' opposition to that motion relied on very different legal
theories as to how the district court should evaluate the
evidence at trial. The Grantees argued that the only
way a constructive trust could have arisen in this case
is if Arnold had attempted to create an express trust at
the time of the transfer, but that express trust failed
due to the lack of a writing evidencing the trust. Under
the Grantees' theory, no trust was created unless Arnold intended to transfer the farm property into trust
and Arnold and the Grantees were in a confidential
relationship at the time of the transfer. The Siblings
theory was much broader, asserting that the district
court could simply employ its equitable powers to
impose a constructive trust if it felt the circumstances
warranted it. The district court requested written
briefing from the parties on their respective positions
and took the matter under advisement. The Grantees
then presented their case, comprised solely of their
own brief testimony, and the trial concluded.
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Tl 9 Two months after trial, the district court ruled on
the constructive trust issue. The district court expressly adopted the Siblings' argument that it could
impose a trust relying solely on equitable principles
and without regard to Arnold's intent or relationship to
the Grantees at the time of transfer. The ruling recited
an extensive factual summary of the testimony at trial,
rejected the Grantees' alternative argument that the
transfer was in consideration of them paying off a
prior mortgage, and determined that Arnold had intended the conveyance solely as a mechanism to protect the family's ownership of the farm and did not
intend the deed to operate as an actual transfer at all.
The ruling concluded with the statement that the district court was uexercis[ing] its equitable powers to
impose a constructive trust." In findings of fact prepared from the district court's ruling and later signed
by the court, the court found as a factual matter that
"Arnold did not consider the [1967] conveyance to be
a transfer of his ownership rights in the [farm]."
ISM k> AM) ^

\ .i > \iu>-- < '

'••
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[1"1[2] €, in On appeal from the district court's final
order imposing an equitable constructive trust, the
Grantees argue that the Siblings failed to present sufficient evidence in the district court to support the
imposition of a trust under the circumstances of this
*666 case.— " 'When an appellant is essentially
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a
clearly erroneous standard of appellate review applies/ " Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Ass'n v.
Bazlev & Co., 2008 UT App 105,11 10, 182 P.3d 417
(quoting Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487,
489 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). However, we review a
district court's decisions on questions of law, such as
the legal requirements for the imposition of constructive trusts, for correctness. See, e.g., Flake v. Flake,
2003 UT 17, H 8, 71 P.3d 589 ("The validity of [a]
trust is an issue of law, which we review for correctness.").
FN2. The Grantees also raise a statute of limitations argument that we decline to address in light of our resolution of the case in
the Grantees' favor on other grounds.
[311| 11 The Grantees also argue that the district court
erred when it imposed sanctions against the Grantees
based on their alleged lack of good faith participation
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in court-ordered mediation. The proper interpretation
of court rules presents an issue of law that we review
for correctness. See, e.g., N.A.R., Inc. v. Fair, 2000
UT App 62, 1] 5, 997 P.2d 343 (" CA trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration presents a question of law reviewed
for correctness.' " (quoting Loporto v. Hoegemann,
1999 UT App 175,11 5, 982 P.2d 586))..
ANATYSIS
I. I lie District Court's Finding of an Equitable Constructive Trust
J_4] )\ 12 Ihe Grantees first challenge the evidentiary
basis for the district court's imposition of an equitable
constructive trust. Specifically, the Grantees argue
that there is no evidence to support two elements that
they assert must exist in order to impose a constructive
trust in this case: (1) that a confidential relationship
existed between Arnold and the Grantees at the time
Arnold transferred the farm to the Grantees and (2)
that Arnold intended to transfer ownership of the farm
to the Grantees in trust for the Siblings. The Siblings
counter that neither a confidential relationship nor any
particular intent on the part of Arnold is a prerequisite
to a court's imposition of a constructive trust on purely
equitable principles. Thus, we first determine the
proper legal analysis for the constructive trust issue
and then turn to the question of whether the Grantees
have identified an evidentiary barrier to the imposition
of a trust in favor of the Siblings.
A. Trust Requirements
II 13 The Grantees and the Siblings present us, and
presented the district court, with two conflicting
theories for the proper analysis of this case. Confusingly, although the theories are conceptually quite
different, they are both properly referred to as constructive trusts. The legal constructive trust theory
urged by the Grantees allows for the enforcement, in
certain circumstances, of an express trust that would
otherwise be unenforceable. By contrast, the Siblings'
equitable constructive trust approach does not enforce
an otherwise unenforceable express trust, but rather
creates and imposes a trust in equity to avoid the unjust enrichment of one who has committed some
wrongful act. The district court accepted the Siblings'
theory of the case and ruled accordingly. We disagree,
and hold that, because the Siblings' claim for relief
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tion session. According to the Siblings' motion in the
district court, the Grantees informed the Siblings prior
to mediation that the Grantees did not want to participate in mediation and did not intend to make any
proposals or consider any settlement offers in the
mediation. The Siblings also asserted that "[a]t the
June 27, 2006 mediation, [the Grantees] informed the
mediator that they would neither make any offer nor
consider any offer that he might present to them, and
that they would refuse to attempt to resolve this case
other than to let the matter go to trial." The district
court found that the Grantees "came to the mediation
with a fully formed intention not to participate in the
mediation in good faith and had determined that they
would not be prepared to discuss all relevant issues in
this case" and awarded sanctions against the Grantees.
K 26 Mediation proceedings are governed by rule 101
of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative
Dispute Resolution. See Utah R. Ct. ADR 101. Rule
101(c) mandates that "[a]ll parties shall be present,
shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case."
Id. R. 101(c). However, "[t]he parties may terminate
the proceedings at any time." Id. R. 101(g). The rule
further contemplates the circumstances under which
sanctions may be imposed against a party: "Upon
written recommendation by the mediator or motion by
any party, the court may order absent parties to show
cause why they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be
imposed." Id. R. 101(h) (emphasis added).
TI 27 Here, it is undisputed that the Grantees attended
the mediation conference. However, the district court
concluded that the Grantees' actions at and prior to the
conference violated rule 101(c). Interpreting that rule,
the district court stated that it "requires good faith
discussion, and while parties may terminate that
process, they may only do so after they have engaged
in the settlement process in good faith." This interpretation is flatly contradicted by language elsewhere
in the rule, which clearly states that "parties may
terminate the proceedings at any time." See Utah R.
Ct. ADR 101(g) (emphasis added). The rule also
contemplates sanctions only when a party fails to
attend a mediation conference, not when a party's
actions at the conference fail to lead to a settlement.
See id. R. 101 (h); cf. Avrilv. Civilmar, 605 So.2d988,
989-90 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992) (quashing sanctions
order where the "basis for sanctions [was] merely that
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defendants were unwilling to make an offer of settlement satisfactory to [plaintiff]"). Finally, we disagree with the district court that the Grantees acted in
bad faith or violated rule 101(c). It appears that they
merely held a firm belief, vindicated by our decision
today, in the validity of their claims such that they had
no interest in a compromised settlement. Promptly
informing the other parties and the mediator of this
fact served to avoid unnecessary time and resources
spent in unproductive mediation efforts and cannot be
viewed as evidence of bad faith under the circumstances so long as the Grantees otherwise complied
with the terms of the rule.—
FN5. We also note that our decision today is
consistent with the high degree of confidentiality afforded to the mediation process. See,
e.g., Reese v. Tingev Constr., 2008 UT 7.11 8.
177 P.3d 605 (expressing the policy that
mediation communications "be protected
from postmediation disclosure").
K 28 For these reasons, we hold that the district court
erred in sanctioning the Grantees for their actions at
and leading up to the court-ordered mediation conference. Accordingly, we also reverse the order awarding sanctions and direct that all parties bear their own
costs and fees arising from the failed mediation.
CONCLUSION
K 29 We determine that the district court erred in
finding that a purely equitable constructive trust can
arise under the circumstances presented in this case.
Rather, the only potential relief available to the Siblings is the enforcement, by means of a constructive*670 trust, of an alleged unwritten express trust.
We have determined, however, that an express trust
can only exist in this case if Arnold intended to
transfer the farm into trust and that the district court's
finding that Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm
at all precludes an express trust from arising in this
case as a matter of law.— Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's judgment on the trust issue and remand
this matter for entry of judgment in the Grantees'
favor.
FN6. To the extent that the district court's
finding of Arnold's intent potentially affects
the validity of the deed itself or requires
further findings about the farm's ownership
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or chain of title, such matters exceed the
scope of today's decision, and we express no
opinion thereon
T| 30 We also reverse the district court's order awarding
sanctions against the Grantees for failing to engage m
good faith participation m court-ordered mediation
Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution implicitly contemplates
sanctions against parties solely for failing to appear at
a mediation conference, and explicitly guarantees the
rights of parties to terminate the proceedings at any
time For these reasons, we hold that the district court's
imposition of sanctions against the Grantees was improper under the circumstances
Tl 31 Reversed and remanded
K 32 WE CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K ORME, Judge
Utah App ,2008
Rawhngs v Rawlmgs
200 P 3d 662, 620 Utah Adv Rep 37, 2008 UT App
478
END OF DOCUMENT
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RULING RE: CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST

ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETT RAWLINGS,
Defendants,

Case # 970400260
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of
the evidence and by agreement, each of the parties submitted & Post-trial Memorandum marshaling
their arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties'
respective memoranda and the evidence presented in trial, the Court now makes the following
Ruling.

RULING
In this matter, Plaintiffs Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings characterize the issue in the
case as being limited to an express oral trust and assert that because there is no declaration of a trust
concerning the property in dispute, the alleged trust fails as a matter of law. Third-party Plaintiffs
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Theron LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. Masterson and Defendants/
Counterclaimants Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings, however, assert that the
persuasive evidence in this matter supports the implementation and imposition of a constructive
trust. The Court is persuaded by the authorities cited by Third-party Plaintiffs that a constructive
trust being an equitable remedy arises by operation of law and is not within the statute of frauds.
Examination of a constructive trust, therefore, encompasses a specific review of the factual
circumstances relative to each case.
The Court has given careful consideration to the evidence regarding the properties in this
matter, the parties' respective contentions, and the factual circumstances taken as a whole. From the
evidence, the Court is persuaded that in addition to the testimony of the beneficiaries of the trust,
there are numerous facts which demonstrate the necessity of the Court to establish a constructive
trust. The Court is persuaded with the arguments and authorities of Third-party Plaintiffs Theron
LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. Masterson as well as the arguments and
authorities marshaled by Defendants/Counterclaimants Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette
Rawlings on the subject, which marshaled arguments and authorities the Court adopts and
incorporates in this Ruling.
From the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that Arnold Rawlings acquired the property
from his mother in 1944, and from that time until the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was
not on the title to the property at issue in this case. It is also undisputed that at least by October of
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1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately required substantial medical
treatment. Mr. Donald Rawlings maintained that at that time, because his father was delinquent on
an indebtedness to Walker Bank and Trust Company, he inquired of each of his siblings whether they
wanted to buy a piece of the farm to pay the debt. Each of the siblings Dwayne, LaRell, Bryce, and
Carol deny that any such conversation took place, which testimonies the Court finds credible and
persuasive. Of significance, prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the welfare
department about his intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was
corroborated by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a prior meeting, and
provides proof of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt. On
December 22, 2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which
he labored to recover from his illness. Despite close contact with their father during this period of
time and prior to the end of December 1966, no mention was made to any of the siblings by Arnold,
Cleo, or Donald that there was any delinquency owing to Walker Bank and Trust. Plaintiffs have
asserted that checks were paid by them for Arnold's indebtedness. However, notations regarding
the checks were affixed to them some 30 years later, and the check register provided shows other
payments on loans owed by Donald and Jeanette to Walker Bank and Trust at the time. It is
undisputed that in 1963 the farm property was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a trust
deed, Exhibit 8. It is also undisputed that in 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a conditional
sales contract with the pledge of a Ford truck and an Oldsmobile automobile. Donald and Jeanette
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assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29, 1966 upon which the bank
surrendered its conditional sales contract. However, no evidence was presented that the check for
$579.06 was the required loan payoff. Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance
on the trust deed at the same time. That testimony, however, is unpersuasive. The persuasive
evidence supports the conclusion that the transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the
replacement of security. The Court notes that the conditional sales contract was stamped "paid," and
by the terms of that agreement, the bank's remedy was a recourse to the automobile company under
a full recourse clause. Noting the circumstances, the Court is unpersuaded with Plaintiffs' assertions
regarding the December 29,1966 check and concludes that Plaintiffs' statements are not supported
by the records. Noting the totality of the evidence, the Court is unpersuaded that the farm was deeded
by the parties' father to Donald because of his payment of the alleged indebtedness. The Court
adopts the arguments of Third-party Plaintiffs and Defendants/Counterclaimants on the subject. In
addition, the Court is persuaded by the testimony of the LaRell Rawlings who testified that in late
February or early March, his father had a conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he
needed to get the property out of his name because of the welfare department's requirement that it
be transferred out of his name. He further testified that in a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a
restaurant where both he, Donald, and Arnold were present; Arnold indicated he was going to deed
the property to Donald because of the welfare requirement for receiving assistance.

That

conversation was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed by Donald at trial and remains
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uncontradicted and unrebutted. No mention was made in that conversation of any payment of the
Walker Bank debt or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Bank debt. The
persuasive evidence in this matter supports the conclusion that the conveyance was made in an effort
to meet the requirements of the welfare department.
The Court is also persuaded by the testimony of Dwayne Rawlings who testified that one or
two days before March 24,1967, the date the property was deeded, that Donald and Arnold met with
him and informed him that they were deeding the property to Donald because Arnold needed to get
the property out of his name, consistent with other concerns regarding Welfare assistance; but that
no mention was made that such transfer had anything to do with the payment of the Walker Bank
and Trust debt. The deeding of the farm property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24,
1967, some three months after the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. Carol,
Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the conveyance was because Arnold had to get the
property out of his name as required by the welfare department. The Court is unpersuaded that
Plaintiffs produced any persuasive testimony contradicting their testimony on that subject. Also,
since the property conveyance in 1967, there has been an inadequate explanation as to why the
siblings and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked to sign the quit-claim
deed, Exhibit 68.
As argued by Defendants/Counterclaimants, following the signing of the deeds in March
1967, the persuasive evidence in this case supports the conclusion that Arnold continued to treat the
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farm as his own. As Bryce Rawlings testified, his father signed the deed intending only to make it
a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the farm. Other
evidence corroborates that intent. Significantly, the Court notes Exhibits 19-29 which contained the
sworn statements of Arnold Rawlings dated February 13, 1970. The exhibits reflect his efforts to
secure the weekend release of LaRell Rawlings from his military service at the Dugway Proving
Grounds to assist his father in running the farm. The exhibits include language written in third
person verbiage, requesting release of LaRell to assist Arnold in the operation of "his" (Arnold's)
farm, and that he needed LaRell's assistance in planting, cultivating, irrigating and harvesting "his"
crops and in caring for "his" livestock. The statements were notarized by Arnold's attorney Mr.
Dean Terry. Some five days later, he also prepared another sworn statement, Exhibit 20, indicating
it was impossible for him to do the hard work that was required on the farm. He said he had
livestock to feed and care for, and also that the fruit orchard required hard work. He addresses
matters at issue in this case and speaks in the first person. He also refers to the fact that because of
his failing health, he lost several hundred bushels of pairs the previous fall that would have paid the
back taxes. The referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of constructive trust and supports
the conclusion that Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights
in the property. At this same time period, Arnold also requested and procured help from a number
of people supporting his request to have LaRell discharged from the military to help him work "his"
farm, as referenced by Exhibits 22 and 24-29.
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On March 1, 1971 Arnold Rawlings died. On March 30, 1971 Cleo Rawlings, his widow,
paid the taxes on the 8.84 acres. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claim that they paid the back taxes and
brought them current in 1967, Cleo paid the taxes in 1971 for the year 1966. Such evidence also
supports the conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the farm was the family farm.
Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission to put a trailer on the farm
property for a temporary residence. Arnold showed Bryce where in the orchard to place the trailer
and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm for four or five years following his father's death. This
evidence also supports the conclusion that the parties considered the farm a family farm.
In 1974 Donald Rawlings requested the siblings and his mother to sign a quit-claim deed
purportedly to clear up a boundary discrepancy on the south border of the farm. Dwayne Rawlings
testified, which testimony the Court finds persuasive, that Donald told Dwayne that he needed to
clear up the title to "Mother's property." However, the description on the 1974 deed covered more
than just the south boundary. At the time there was a development on the south boundary that
appeared to be encroaching the farm property. Donald Rawlings initiated litigation and successfully
established the property line to be that of the old fence line. In the fence line lawsuit, Dwayne
Rawlings testified as to the long-existing fence line and the case was won for the family farm.
Following the lawsuit, Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence
line across the encroaching, developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with
the title companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000. From those
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proceeds he gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to Dwayne; with approximately $5,000
for a car and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. The Court is persuaded that the distribution of
such funds is an acknowledgment and action by Donald acknowledging that the farm was in fact a
family farm in which the parties each had a right. Further, Donald testified that the 1974 quit-claim
deed was not to convey any interest in the property from his siblings, but was only to clear up the
title problem on the south boundary.
In 1978, Plaintiffs Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pinegar
lot for partial purchase of property referred to as the industrial property. However, Donald conveyed
half interest in that property to Dwayne, recognizing part of which property constituted Dwayne's
inheritance. The property was later conveyed to Jack Hadley and Merrill Gappmeyer, Exhibit 35,
in return for conveyance by them of the industrial property, Exhibit 37.
In summary, the persuasive testimony of LaRell Rawlings and Duane Rawlings as to the
conversation with their father Arnold when Donald was present is that the only reason given for the
March 24, 1967 deed to Donald was because of the requirements of the welfare department, and no
reference was ever made that the conveyance was for the payment of the Walker Bank debt. This
evidence is strengthened by the admitted treatment of the farm by Arnold as a family farm after the
conveyance; the evidence of the welfare letter on December 16, 1966; the continued statements by
Arnold; his solicitation of various letters from persons with whom he was acquainted nearly three
years later; the affidavits by Arnold asserting that the farm was "his" farm and he needed help to run
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it, the payment of taxes by Dwayne after the conveyance to Donald; the payment of taxes in 1971
by Cleo; the work on the farm by family members with irrigating, harvesting, and marketing fruit,
as well as handling horses, with the proceeds of the harvest being given to their mother Cleo; the
placement of a house trailer on the property by Bryce Rawlings prior to Arnold's death; the request
that family members sign a quit-claim deed to clear up a southern boundary dispute with the
Vineyard Meadows subdivision; the payment by Donald of part of those proceeds to his siblings; the
conveyance of a half interest in the Pinegar lot to Dwayne to purchase the industrial property; and
the setting aside of funds for Cleo's burial and the payment to her for the purchase of a car. Such
evidence refutes the assertions of Plaintiffs that the conveyance was for payment of the Walker debt.
Such evidence as reviewed in the totality of the circumstances supports the imposition of a
constructive trust. The Court is persuaded by Defendants/Counterclaimants' and Third-party
Plaintiffs' arguments that unless the Court imposes the constructive trust, Plaintiffs will be unjustly
enriched in this matter, having received a windfall in variance of the intended trust. From the
inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received unjust enrichment of the
property which they treated as their own, which included $1,000 of the roughly $1,200 taxes paid
by Dwayne and his spouse, and a portion of the barn property. Further, they received approximately
$52,000 from the negotiated payments regarding the south boundary fence dispute. The Court is
unpersuaded that Arnold deeded approximately 8 .84 acres of his farm ground, which was his
primary source of support, to Donald for payment as alleged by Donald for taxes and the trust deed.
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The property was worth considerably more than any such tax obligation in 1967 and such testimony
is contrary to other persuasive declarations made by Arnold and the actions of the parties taken as
a whole. The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion that the
siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would do what
was right for the family and as buttressed by their own actions during the period following the
conveyance. The Court is persuaded, therefore, to the position of the Defendants/Counterclaimants
and Third-party Plaintiffs to exercise its equitable powers to impose a constructive trust in this
matter.
The Court directs that counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs
prepare joint Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with this Ruling, which may
include findings and recitals marshaled and set forth by Defendants/Counterclaimants and ThirdParty Plaintiffs from the evidence and as submitted in their post-trial memoranda.

Dated this ^//

day of May 2007

10

00

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the
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11

i ii» *

3

189 P.3d 51
189P.3d51,2008UT37
(Cite as: 189 P.3d 51)

c
Supreme Court of Utah.
Scott OCKEY and Catherine Condas, Plaintiffs, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee,
v.
John LEHMER; Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C.; Iron
Mountain Associates, L.L.C.; White Pine Associates,
LTD; White Pine Associates, Inc.; George Condas;
Nick J. Condas; Chris Condas; Ellen Bayas; Alexandra Ockey; John Condas; Susi Kontgis; Marina Condas; Hermione Bayas; Ellen Ockey-Johnson; Keith
Kelley; Walt Brett; and Tom Guald, Defendants,
Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
No. 20060142.
June 24, 2008.
Background: Trust beneficiary brought action
against cousin and developer entity which had developed ranch property that was part of trust, asserting
claim to quiet title to ranch and a claim for declaratory
relief as to his ownership in the ranch, and asserting
claims of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The
District Court, Third District, Silver Summit, Robert
K. Hilder, J., dismissed the declaratory relief and quiet
title claims and entered judgment for cousin and entity
on the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Beneficiary appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held that:
(1) conveyance of trust corpus to developer entity was
voidable rather than void ab initio;
(2) beneficiary ratified the conveyance;
(3) equitable discovery rule did not apply to toll the
statute of limitations on conversion claim;
(4) beneficiary had an adequate remedy at law and
thus was not entitled to an equitable remedy for alleged breach of fiduciary; and
(5) beneficiary's requested "return" of stock was an
inequitable remedy for alleged breach of fiduciary
duty.
Affirmed.
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investment caused company's value to greatly increase
such that beneficiary's purported share, which was of
negligible worth at the time of the alleged breach of
fiduciary duty, was worth several millions of dollars.
*53 Eric P Lee, Salt Lake City, for appellant
*54 TiovL Booher, Matthew L Lalh, Salt Lake City,
for appellee John Lehmer
Dennis J Conroy, Spencer C Siebers, Salt Lake City,
for appellee Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc
PARRISfj Justice
H 1 This case arises from an mtrafamihal struggle over
the division of profits from the development of a
2700-acre ranch situated between the Park City
Mountain Resort and The Canyons Resort in Summit
County Beginning in 1976, the ranch was held m
various trusts established by members of the Condas
family Scott Ockey ("Ockey"), one of the beneficiaries of the trusts, alleges that he was wrongly divested
of his real property interest m the ranch He also alleges that he was wrongfully deprived of his interest in
a company, Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc ("IMAI"),
that was dedicated to developing portions of the ranch
Ockey filed suit, asserting a claim to quiet title to the
ranch and a claim for declaratory relief as to his
ownership therein He also asserted claims of conversion against his cousin John Lehmer ("Lehmer") and
IMAI, as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against Lehmer
K 2 The district court dismissed the declaratory relief
and quiet title claims and ruled against Ockey as to the
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty
claims-decisions that Ockey appeals We affirm

BACKGROUND
I FACTUAL HISTORY
H 3 The parties do not dispute the factual findings of
the district court We therefore recite the facts in accordance with the district court's findings — The
ranch property in dispute was originally owned by
John Condas, a Summit County rancher, who left an
undivided one-sixth interest in the ranch to each of his
six children upon his death in 1969 Seven years later,
the children, seeking to avoid large estate taxes, con-
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veyed their interests in the ranch to various irrevocable
trusts The trusts named the third generation-John
Condas' grandchildren-as beneficiaries
FN1 Pack\ Case, 2001 UTApp 232 112 30
P 3d 436
K 4 Scott Ockey, one of those grandchildren, was the
named beneficiary under two such trusts The first
trust, settled by his mother, Alexandra Ockey, held an
undivided one-twelfth interest in the ranch The
second trust, settled by Ockey's uncle, Nick Condas
("Uncle Nick"), held an undivided one-eighteenth
interest in the ranch This left Ockey as the beneficiary
of trusts collectively holding nearly fourteen percent
of the ranch property
K 5 Both trusts, the terms of which were nearly identical, indicated that they would terminate upon the
beneficiary's twenty-first birthday Each trust could be
extended, however, at the beneficiary's election, until
he turned twenty-eight Upon termination, the corpus
of the trusts would pass to the beneficiary
U 6 Beginning as early as 1975, the Condas family
sought to capitalize on the ranch's location by developing it To this end, land-owning family members
leased their interests to IMAI, a development company, in May 1989 Lehmer, one of the grandchildren
and Ockey's cousin, represented the family in its
dealing with IMAI
U 7 In 1993, after defaulting on its lease payments
multiple times, IMAI delivered all of its stock to
Lehmer m satisfaction of the defaulted payments At
the time Lehmer received the IMAI stock, the sole
asset of IMAI was a lease on adjacent state lands that
were critical to the future development of the ranch
(the "State Lease") When Lehmer received the IMAI
stock, the annual payment on the State Lease was past
due, requiring the family to immediately raise funds in
order to retain the State Lease After discussing the
issue with some-but not all-family members, Uncle
Nick, the "family communicator," instructed Lehmer
to cancel the received IMAI stock and reissue new
shares that would be sold at $1 00 per share to representatives of each of the six families (the "1993 stock
transfers") This scheme allowed the family to raise
$6,000 to make the State Lease payment In subsequent*55 years, similar stock sales provided a way to
compensate family members who were willing to
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invest time or money into developing the ranch

claims

U 8 In 1994, in an effort to facilitate development of
the ranch, the family consolidated ownership of the
ranch by transferring their interests to a family limited
liability company, Iron Mountain Alliance, L td,
which, in turn, conveyed those interests to Iron
Mountain Holding Group ("IMHG"), the entity that
would eventually develop the ranch — The transfer
was accomplished through a document in which the
trustees conveyed the trusts' interests in the ranch to
IMHG (the "1994 conveyance") Sometime prior to
the 1994 conveyance, Ockey executed a document
directing the trustees to convey his interest in the
ranch property in exchange for a partnership interest in
IMHG

H 12 Before trial, various settlements and dismissals
narrowed the pool of defendants to Lehmer and IMAI
and narrowed Ockey's claims to four causes of action
(1) a declaratory relief claim that the 1994 conveyance
was void because Ockey's trust had terminated, vesting ownership in Ockey and divesting the trustees of
the authority to act on his behalf, (2) a quiet title claim
based on Ockey's interest in the ranch, (3) a conversion claim against Lehmer and IMAI, and (4) a breach
of fiduciary duty claim against Lehmer

FN2 For simplicity, we will refer to both of
the companies as "IMHG "
H 9 Since 1993, the ranch has become part of a successful real estate development All family members,
including Ockey, have enjoyed substantial profits due
to their ownership interests in IMHG, and it is anticipated that they will receive more m the future

T| 13 In 2000, the district court granted summary
judgment against Ockey on the declaratory judgment
and quiet title claims, holding that Ockey ratified the
1994 conveyance In 2002, the district court conducted a trial to consider Ockey's two remaining
claims (1) conversion against Lehmer and IMAI and
(2) breach of fiduciary duty against Lehmer Following trial, the district court dismissed both claims,
concluding that the conversion claim was barred by
the statute of limitations and that the breach of fiduciary duty claim failed for lack of a l emedy
ANALYSIS

II PROCEDURAL HISTORY
T| 10 In 1997, Ockey filed suit against fourteen family
members and IMAI — Ockey alleged that the 1993
stock transfers were improper because the IMAI stock
should have been split and issued to the legal owners
of the ranch, rather than sold to family members
willing to buy stock Accordingly, he brought claims
for conversion of his stock and breach of fiduciary
duty, as well as other claims arising from the 1993
stock transfers
FN3 Ockey's cousin, Catherine Condas, initially joined this suit but did not appeal
Therefore, we refer only to Ockey's claims in
this opinion
K 11 Ockey also contests the 1994 conveyance, arguing that it was void because his trusts terminated on
his twenty-eighth birthday, eight years before the 1994
conveyance, vesting in him individually both legal and
equitable title to his percentage interest m the ranch
and leaving the trustees nothing to convey This is the
basis of Ockey's quiet title and declaratory relief

11 14 Although Ockey raises eight issues on appeal,
three are dispositive (1) whether the district court
properly concluded that the doctrine of ratification
barred Ockey's quiet title and declaratory relief claims
arising from the 1994 conveyance, (2) whether the
district court properly found that Ockey's conversion
claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and (3)
whether the district court erred in refusing to fashion
an equitable remedy for Ockey's breach of fiduciary
duty claim We affirm the district court on all three
issues
I THE 1994 CONVEYANCE WAS VOIDABLE
AND RATIFIED BY OCKEY
H 15 The district court dismissed Ockey's declaratory
relief and quiet title claims on *56 summary judgment,
reasoning that Ockey ratified the 1994 conveyance of
his interest in the ranch to IMHG, the family-owned
holding company created to facilitate developing the
ranch property On appeal, Ockey argues that the 1994
conveyance was void ab initio because his trusts terminated in 1986, on his twenty-eighth birthday, vesting both legal and equitable title in his name and
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leaving nothing for the trustees to convey in 1994.
Because the 1994 conveyance was void ab initio, he
argues, it could not be ratified.
1! 16 The district court's summary dismissal of the
quiet title claim presents an issue of law that we review for correctness.—
FN4. See Wasatch Crest Ins. Co. v. LWP
Claims Adm'rs Corp., 2007 UT 32, 6, 158
P.3d 548.
A. The 1994 Conveyance Was Voidable Because It
Harmed Only Ockey and Did Not Violate Public
Policy
\ 17 By their terms, both of Ockey's trusts terminated,
at the latest, in 1986, when Ockey turned twenty-eight.
Upon termination, the trustees retained only the authority to wind up affairs of the trusts and to transfer
the corpus of the trusts, the ranch property, to the
beneficiary, Ockey.— Ockey is therefore correct in
arguing that by the time the trustees purported to
convey the trust corpus to IMHG in 1994, they lacked
the authority to do so. The fact that the trustees lacked
the authority to execute the 1994 conveyance, however, does not resolve the dispute over ownership of
the ranch, however, because it does not address
whether the conveyance was void ab initio or merely
voidable and therefore capable of ratification.
FN5. ffegRestatement (Second) of Trusts $$
344-45 (1959) (stating the general rule that
when a trust unambiguously ends on the
happening of a certain event, the trust terminates and the trustee retains only the authority to wind up the affairs of the trust or to
distribute the property in accordance with the
terms of the trust).
mr2ir31f41 U 18 The distinction between void and
voidable is important, although the terms are not always used precisely.— A contract or a deed that is
void cannot be ratified or accepted,— and anyone can
attack its validity in court.— In contrast, a contract or
deed that is voidable may be ratified at the election of
the injured party. Once ratified, the voidable contract
or deed is deemed valid. A deed that is voidable is
valid against the world, including the grantor,— because only the injured party has standing to ask the
court to set it aside.^^
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FN6. See, e.g., Consul. Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 n. 7
(Utah Ct.App.1996) (" 'The term "void,"
however, as applicable to conveyances or
other agreements, has not at all times been
used with technical precision, nor restricted
to its peculiar and limited sense, as contradistinguished from "voidable" ....' " (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 141.1 (5th ed.
1979))),,,
FN7. See, e.g., Mat. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.
Winne, 20 Mont. 20. 49 P. 446. 449 (1897)
("A thing is void which is done against law at
the very time of doing it, and where no person is bound by the act; but a thing is voidable which is done by a person who ought not
to have done it, but who nevertheless cannot
avoid it himself after it is done."(internal
quotation marks omitted)).
FN8. Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447.
452(7thCir,1978) ( " 'Another test of a void
act or deed is that every stranger may take
advantage of it, but not of a voidable one.' "
(quoting Winne, 49 P. at 449)).
F N9. 23 AmJur.2d Deeds j? 162 n. 3 (2002).
FN10. See, e.g., Wagner, 573 F.2d at 452 ("
'Whenever the act done takes effect as to
some purposes, and is void as to persons who
have an interest in impeaching it, the act is
not a nullity, and therefore, in a legal sense, is
not utterly void, but merely voidable.' "
(quoting Winne, 49 P. at 449)); Baldwin v.
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah 1993)
("[T]he general rule of construction fis] that
when an act is void as to persons who have an
interest in impeaching it, the act is not utterly
void, but merely voidable.").
[51 1,] 19 In general, the difference between void and
voidable contracts is whether they offend public policy. Contracts that offend an individual, such as those
arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, are
voidable. Only contracts that offend public policy or
harm the public are void ab initio.^J~
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FN11. Fletcher v. Stone, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.)
250, 252 (1825) ("Acts which affect injuriously the public interest are generally void;
and those which affect only private rights are
voidable."(citation omitted)); Black's Law
Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004) ("A contract
is void ab initio if it seriously offends law or
public policy, in contrast to a contract that is
merely voidable at the election of one party
to the contract.").
*57 [6] U 20 In this case, Ockey asks us to hold that the
1994 conveyance was void because the trustees lacked
authority to transfer the ranch property to IMHG after
the trusts terminated. We decline, concluding that the
1994 conveyance was merely voidable because the
trustee's actions were not contrary to public policy and
did not injure anyone other than Ockey himself.
[7ir81[91 «|| 21 In determining whether the 1994 conveyance was void or voidable, we start with the presumption that contracts are voidable unless they
clearly violate public policy. This presumption stems
from the general rule that "the law favors the right of
men of full age and competent understanding to contract freely." ^ ^ For a contract to be void on the basis
of public policy, "there must be a showing free from
doubt that the contract is against public policy." Ehl1
FN12. Frailev v. McGarrv, 116 Utah 504.
211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949); see also Phone
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^|
15, 8 P.3d256 ("[P]eople are generally free
to bind themselves pursuant to any contract,
barring such things as illegality of subject
matter or legal incapacity.").
FN13. Frailev, 111 P.2d at 847.
^j 22 For example, in Millard County School District v.
State Bank of Millard County, we considered whether
a contract was void or voidable. 2 ^ At issue was
whether the bank acted in excess of its statutory power
by issuing securities that were different from those
that the bank was statutorily authorized to issue. Acknowledging that the bank exceeded its authority by
issuing the securities, we disagreed that this ultra vires
act rendered the securities void.^ 12 "[B]y the great
weight of judicial authority it is well recognized that
there is a distinction between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires," which could become
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enforceable by ratification or estoppel.^^ We explained that only "contracts and corporate acts and
transactions which are malum in se or malum prohibitum, which contravene some rule of public policy,
[or] violate some public duty ... are illegal and void."
^ ^ Although the bank had acted in excess of its authority, its action did not violate the general policy of
the state so egregiously that the contract was void.
FN14. 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72
(1932).
FN15.A/.
FN16. Id. at 971-72 (citation omitted).
FN17. Id. at 972; see also Hatch v. Lucky Bill
Mining Co., 25 Utah 405, 71 P. 865, 866
(1903) (stating that corporate actions which
are "neither criminal, opposed to good morals, nor against public policy ... are not void,
but voidable only; and a stockholder aggrieved thereby may acquiesce in and ratify
what has been done, or may disaffirm and
repudiate the voidable proceeding").
T| 23 In contrast, in Zion's Sendee Corp. v. Daniel son,
we found a contract void where the purpose of the
contract was to control prices and limit competition
between the bids given by masonry contractors.^-^
Finding that the contract created an unreasonable
restraint on trade, we held it void as against public
policy.^^ Two elements were present in Zion's Service Corp. that are important to our analysis. First, the
legislature had specifically declared that contracts
formed to control prices were " 'prohibited and declared unlawful' " and would be " 'absolutely void.' "
^-^ Second, the contract harmed the public as a
whole-not just an individual.
FN18. 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982, 985-86
(1961).
FN19.M at 986.
FN20. Id. at 985 (quoting Utah Code Ann §§
50-1-1,-6(1953)).
[101 U 24 Comparing Ockey's case to these two cases
demonstrates that the 1994 conveyance was merely
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voidable. First, no statute declares ultra vires acts by
trustees absolutely void as against public policy.
Second, the trustees' actions only affected Ockey-they
did not harm the general public. Finally, in light of the
freedom to contract, we have a duty to employ "any
reasonable construction" to declare contracts "lawful
and not in contravention of public welfare."" ~L^I- N2 1.. Frailev, 211 P.2d at 847.
B. Ockey Ratified the 1994 Conveyance
[" 1 1. "1 f|j 25 Whether we characterize the facts found by
the district court in the worst *58 light or the best light,
Ockey ratified the 1994 conveyance.
112111311141II 26 Placing the worst gloss on the facts
found by the district court, it is possible that the trustees engaged in self-dealing and violated their fiduciary duty to Ockey by failing to transfer the ranch
property when the trust terminated. Even if this were
the case, the 1994 conveyance would be voidable and
ratified by Ockey. According to well-established case
law, a trustee's violation of his fiduciary duty is
voidable and capable of ratification.^^ "[Ajfter a
breach of trust has occurred, a beneficiary may expressly or impliedly express satisfaction with the
trustee's action and thereby prevent himself from
claiming thereafter that it was illegal." —^ As an
Illinois court recognized, "a trust beneficiary who
consents to or approves of an act, omission, or transaction by a trustee, may upon the ground of waiver or
estoppel be precluded from subsequently objecting to
the impropriety of such act, omission, or transaction;
this rule may arise from acquiescence, request, participation, or notification." -L^FN22. See, e.g., Hallin v. Hallin, 228 Wis.2d
250, 596 N.W.2d 818 (Ct.App.1999) (holding that a contract made in violation of trustee's fiduciary duty was voidable and ratified
by the beneficiary).
FN23. Id. at 824 (internal, quotation mai ks
omitted).
FN24. Mahle v. First Natl Bank of Peoria,
241 Ill.App.3d 672, 182 Ill.Dec. 69L 610
N.E.2d 115, 117(1993).
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Tl 27 Under this characterization of the facts, Ockey
ratified the 1994 conveyance. First, in 1993, before the
trust property was conveyed to IMHG, Ockey signed a
document directing the trustees to convey his ownership in the ranch property to IMHG in exchange for
his partnership interest in IMHG. Second, following
the 1994 conveyance, Ockey accepted the benefits
stemming from the contract. Consolidating ownership
of the ranch in IMFIG facilitated the successful development of the ranch. As a result, Ockey has received approximately two million dollars in profits,
and he stands to receive more. In 1998, Ockey entered
into a settlement agreement with IMFIG fs successor,
promising that the outcome of this litigation would not
affect ownership of the ranch. The settlement agreement enabled the ranch development to proceed and
allowed Ockey to continue to profit from the development. These two facts demonstrate that Ockey acquiesced in and ratified the 1994 conveyance.-1^
FN25. See Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215,
1219 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("A principal's
retention of the fruits of a contract can also
serve as an implied ratification of the contract.").
[15111 28 Placing the best gloss on the facts found by
the district court, it is possible that when the trust
terminated, Uncle Nick's role shifted from acting as a
trustee to acting as an agent on behalf of Ockey and
the other family members. Of course, actions that
exceed the scope of agency are merely voidable, not
void, and therefore capable of ratification by the
1 FN26

principal.
FN26. See, e.g., Zions First Nat'I Bank v.
Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1098
(Utah 1988) ("A principal may impliedly or
expressly ratify an agreement made by an
unauthorized agent. Ratification of an agent's
acts relates back to the time the unauthorized
act occurred and is sufficient to create the
relationship of principal and agent.... Under
some circumstances failure to disaffirm may
constitute ratification of the agent's acts.").
^ 2 9 Ockey ratified the contract under this characterization of the facts as well. Ockey owned his portion
of the ranch as a tenant in common with the rest of the
family, all of whom were interested in developing it.
In order to develop the land, specific actions were
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necessary For example, the family needed to make
annual payments on the State Lease, contract with
developers, and make improvements on the state
property
Tl 30 In light of these responsibilities, it makes sense
that an individual withm the family would take the
lead The district court found that "in accordance with
the family's usual business practice," Uncle Nick took
that role by acting as the "family communicator"
Between 1969 and 1995, business decisions concerning the development of the ranch "generally followed a common course of dealing " Uncle Nick
contacted members of the family, solicited their input,
generated a consensus, and acted as the family spokesperson for decisions that were made During this
time, Ockey was "obsessed"*59 with the ranch and
"read everything he could" about it When Ockey
asked Uncle Nick questions about the ranch, Uncle
Nick directed him to the relevant records concerning
the ranch, which were stored in an office that Ockey
and Uncle Nick shared
[161 H 31 As we stated in Btadshaw \ McBjide, a
principal "may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may he
purposely shut his eyes to means of information
withm his possession and control and thereby escape
ratification " ^ ^ Ockey was thirty-six when the 1994
conveyance took place He had access to all relevant
records concerning his ownership of the ranch and he
signed a document directing Uncle Nick and the other
trustees to transfer his real property interest to the
holding company Ockey's failure to object to the 1994
conveyance constitutes ratification-either consciously
or through willful ignorance-of the actions taken on
his behalf
FN27 649 P 2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted)
£12} H 32 The purpose of doctrines like ratification and
apparent authority is to avoid instances where a technicality can be used to evade a contract despite the
expectations of both parties It is well established in
our case law that an individual cannot go along with a
contract for the purpose of enjoying benefits that "although not directly conferred by the contract, are
nevertheless made possible as a result of the contract,
only to later claim a right to rescind when he discovers
the benefits will not be great enough to compensate
him for the loss he will sustain by reason of the fraud "

Ockey's entire argument regarding the illegality of
the 1994 conveyance rests on the premise that when
the trust terminated m 1986, ownership vested m him,
rendering the latter conveyance void But because the
1994 conveyance was merely voidable, it was capable
of ratification by Ockey Ockey ratified the conveyance by directing the trustees to convey his interest
to IMHG in exchange foi a partnership interest in
IMHG and by accepting the benefits of his family's
efforts to develop the ranch For these reasons, we
uphold the district court's determination that Ockey
ratified the 1994 conveyance and affirm the court's
summary dismissal of his quiet title and declaratory
relief claims
FN28 Frailer 211 P 2d at 845, see also
Swan Peek Vill Homeowneis Ass'n \_
Wame. 2006 UT 22 11 34, 134 P 3d 1122
(recognizing ratification as part of the
equitable principle that "helps to ensure that
justice is met and prevents parties lrom
avoiding valid obligations due to technicalities")
II OCKEY'S CONVERSION CLAIM IS BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
T181 ^(33 Ockey also alleged a conversion claim
against Lehmer and IMAI based on the 1993 stock
transfers in which Lehmer accepted the stock of IMAI
from two developers who defaulted on payments
owed to the family Rather than distributing the IMAI
stock to the family according to their proportionate
interest in the ranch property, Lehmer canceled the
original stock and reissued stock that he sold to family
members in order to raise the capital necessary for
furthering development The district court dismissed
Ockey's conversion claim against Lehmer and IMAI,
holding that it was barred by the statute of limitations
Because Ockey cannot invoke the equitable disco\ery
rule, and because his conversion claim was filed after
the three-year statute of limitations expired, we affirm
the district court's holding
jT9ir20ir211 K 34 The applicability of both the statute
of limitations and the equitable discovery rule are
questions of law, reviewed for correctness ^ ^ The
subsidiary factual determination of whether Ockey
knew or should have known about the alleged conversion is a question of fact that Ockey argues was not
supported by the evidence °^"Fmdings of fact
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shall not be set aside unless clearly *60 erroneous...."
-^i-L In determining the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the district court's findings, "[w]e review
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings and affirm if there is a reasonable
basis for doing so." ^^
i

FN29. Russell Packard Dew, Inc. v. Carson,
2005 UT 14.1118. 108 P.3d 741.
FN30. See id. 11 39 (stating that the point at
which a person reasonably should know that
he or she has suffered a legal injury is a
question of fact).
FN31. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
FN32. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850
P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct.App.1993); see also
Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson, 782
P.2d 467. 470 (Utah 1989) ("To successfully
attack a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings.. ").
11 35 The district court found that Ockey's conversion
claim accrued on July 1, 1993. The statute of limitations for conversion is three y e a r s . ^ ^ Ockey's complaint was not filed until June 19, 1997, several
months after the statute of limitations had run. But
Ockey argues that his late filing was excused because
the equitable discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations.
FN33. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(2)
(2008).
|"221[231 H 36 The equitable discovery rule operates to
"toll a statute of limitations until the time at which a
party discovered or reasonably should have discovered 'facts forming the basis for the cause of action.' "
^ ^ There are two versions of the rule: (1) the concealment version, requiring the plaintiff to show that
he did not know about the events giving rise to his
claim due to "the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct," and (2) the exceptional circumstances version, requiring the plaintiff to show the

^ ?not) Tlii'rr.s-.ii Reuters/West.

existence of exceptional circumstances such that application of the general statute of limitations would be
"irrational or unjust." * ^
FN34. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re iloppituma
Trust), 2006 UT 53. 1j 35, 144 P.3d 1129
(quoting Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14. r 21.
108 P.3d 741).
FN35. Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, 11 25,
108 P.3d 741 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
T[ 37 Because Ockey has not asserted the existence of
any exceptional circumstances, we evaluate Ockey's
claim only under the concealment version of the
equitable discovery rule. To prevail, Ockey must show
that he did not know, and could not have reasonably
known, about the events giving rise to his injury before the statute of limitations r a n . ^ ^ Ockey did not
raise the alternative argument that he "acted reasonably in failing to file suit before the limitations period
expired." ^ ^ Therefore, we do not address this argument.
I /-OP. See No/tin. 2<M^ L i . v . * ^\
P.3d 1129.

t -t4

FN37. Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, 1| 30.
108 P.3d 741.
TI 38 Ample evidence supports the district court's
conclusion that Ockey either knew, or had reason to
know, of the 1993 stock transfers within three years of
their occurrence. For example, the district court found
that as early as 1993 or 1994, Ockey knew that IMAI
stock had been issued to other family members because he had ready access to all relevant records
concerning the ranch and because Ockey asked Uncle
Nick if he could buy some of Uncle Nick's IMAI
k. Moreover. Ockey knew that family members
WL;C being compensated with IMAI stock for their
work on behalf of IMAI. And he was knowledgeable
regarding IMAI business affairs, such as the fact that
his mother was president of IMAI and his cousin was a
member of the IMAI board. Ockey had also seen an
,x T
M stock ledger, shown to him by his mother, that
cted who had shares in the corporation. Based on
these facts, the district court found, as a matter of fact,
that Ockey "either knew or had reason to know of the
events giving rise to a conversion claim within three
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years after any conversion of IMAI stock " Although
the district court did not clearly state when in 1993 or
1994 these events occurred, viewing the evidence m
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings we
must assume that the events occurred prior to June 19,
1994
lj 39 The evidence listed by the district court is sufficient to show that Ockey knew, or had reason to know,
of the events giving rise to his conversion claim before
the three-year statute of limitations expired in 1996
Thus, the equitable discovery rule is not applicable,
and the district court correctly dismissed*61 Ockey's
conversion claim as barred by the statute of limitations
III OCKEY'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
CLAIM FAILS FOR LACK OF A REMEDY
H 40 In the district court, Ockey expressly waived the
opportunity to prove damages and elected to proceed
solely in equity, arguing that he had no adequate remedy at law for his breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion claims As an equitable remedy, he requested the "return" of the stock canceled in the 1993
stock transfers
K 41 Ockey asserts that when Lehmer received the
IMAI stock as payment for the developer's default,
Lehmer should have distributed the stock to the family
members m proportion to their ownership interest in
the ranch Lehmer's decision to cancel the stock and
sell reissued stock m order to raise funds, according to
Ockey, amounted to conversion and a breach of
Lehmer's fiduciary duty As an equitable remedy,
Ockey requested the court to order that Lehmer convey to Ockey a portion of Lehmer's own stock in
IMAI-m other words Ockey requested a "return" of
the original IMAI stock Because Ockey's conversion
claim is barred by the statute of limitations, we address only his breach of fiduciary duty claim We
affirm the district court's conclusion that Ockey's
breach of fiduciary duty claim fails for lack of a remedy
[24]I25JI261 K 42 The availability of a remedy is a
legal conclusion that we review for correctness *-^
However, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude and discretion in applying and formulating an
equitable remedy, and [it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its discretion " £^JL- Moreover, on

appeal, we may affirm the district court "on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
[district] court" ^
FN38 Thwston \ Box Eldei Coitntx, 892
P2d 1034, 1040-41 (Utah 1995) (holding
that the availability of an equitable remedy is
reviewed for correctness but that the trial
court's application and formulation of an
equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse of
discretion)
FN39
US
Fuel Co \
Hunting
ton-Cle\elandbligation Co , 2003 UT 49 <j
9, 79 P 3d 945 (internal quotation marks
omitted)
FN40 State \ Robison, 2006 UT 65 <1 19
147 P 3d 448 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original)
^ 43 We affirm the district court's refusal to grant an
equitable remedy for two reasons that differ from
those relied on by the district court but that are, nevertheless, apparent from the record First, an adequate
remedy at law exists for the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, rendering an equitable remedy unavailable
as a matter of law Second, even if a legal remedy were
unavailable, the remedy requested by Ockey would
not be appropriate because it would overcompensate
him-grantmg him a windfall at the expense of the
defendants
A Ockey's Request for an Equitable Remedy Fails
Because an Adequate Remedy at Law Exists
£27][28]r291 H 44 By waiving his legal claim for
damages, Ockey chose to invoke only the equitable
jurisdiction of the court However, "[t]he right to an
equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent
statutory mandate, equitable relief should be granted
only when a court determines that damages are inadequate and that equitable relief will result in more
perfect and complete justice " ^ ^ The general rule
regarding equitable jurisdiction is that "equitable
jurisdiction is precluded if the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer substantial
irreparable injury " £M2-
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I:N41. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1040.
FN42. Buckncr v. Kennartl, 2004 UT 78, %
56. 99 P.3d 842; see also Belnap v. Blain,
575 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978) ("[A] resort to
equity for collection of a judgment is not
authorized in the absence of a showing of
unavailability of collection by legal process
...." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 27A
Am.Jur.2d Equity § 21 (2008) (u[T]he plaintiff must affirmatively show a lack of an
adequate remedy at law on the face of the
pleading and from the evidence, and if a
complaint on its face shows that adequate
legal remedies exist, equitable remedies are
not available.").
:;

62 1| 45 in Bitchier v. Kemuird, deputy sheriffs in the
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office sought to invoke
this court's equitable jurisdiction by requesting back
pay as compensation for past pay inequity they suffered in violation of a state civil service statute.^^We
declined to treat their claim as an equitable claim
because the deputies had an adequate remedy at law.
Furthermore, they did not argue that their injury was
substantial, irreparable, unconscionable, or caused by
duress.-"—
FN43. 2004 U F 78, ^ 55, 9v i\;,d M2.
FN44. Id. ^\ 57; see also Thurston, 892P.2dat
1042 (declining to order reinstatement as an
equitable remedy for wrongful termination
where injured party did not show that damages were inadequate or unascertainable).
II 46 Similarly, there is an adequate remedy at law for
Ockey's claimed injury. In Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, we acknowledged the difficulty of fashioning a remedy for conversion when the property
converted, such as stock, fluctuates in valueP^ 1 In
light of this difficulty, we adopted the "New York
rule, which sets the measure of damages as the highest
intermediate value of the stock between the time of
conversion and a reasonable time after the owner
receives notice of the conversion." - ^ This rule
"providers] the fairest measure of damages to all involved" by indemnifying the plaintiff, the rightful
owner of the converted stock, for his loss "without
affording a windfall at the expense of the defendant."
-^-L An alternative rule, allowing the measure of
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damages to be calculated at the time of trial or at the
highest value of the property between the date of
conversion and the date of trial, would allow the
plaintiff to "ride the stock market at the defendant's
risk and expense until trial." ^-^FN45. 854 P.2d 527. 531 (Utah 1993).
FN46. Id.
FN47. Id. at 532.
FN48.M at 531.
II 47 Although the New York rule was ioiinuu.i^. .;.
the context of a conversion claim, we find it to be
applicable to Ockey's claim for breach of fiduciary
duty because Ockey's breach of fiduciary duty claim
arises from Lehmer's alleged conversion of the stock.
Because the two claims share the same operative facts,
we apply the same standard to Ockey's breach of fiduciary duty claim that we would apply to Ockey's
conversion claim.
*| 48 In summary, Ockey had an adequate remedy at
law, and he waived the opportunity to pursue it because his preferred remedy would be far more lucrative. Because equitable relief is only available in those
cases where legal relief is unavailable, we affirm the
district court's refusal to fashion an equitable remedy
for Ockey.
j> / u ijit.: in^ a Return " oj the IMA I ^ • i *'
Overcompensate Ockey
[30 j \ 49 I he district court's refusal to order iiu u ;uni
of Ockey's IMAI stock is also supported on an independent basis. Requiring that Lehmer deliver IMAI
stock to Ockey would be inequitable because it would
overcompensate Ockey by awarding him almost
fourteen percent of IMAI's stock, which is worth millions today but was of negligible worth at the time of
the alleged conversion and breach of fiduciary a :>\.
II 50 When Lehmer took control of the IMAI stock
after the developers defaulted, the stock had minimal
value. IMAI's only asset was the State Lease, an asset
requiring an immediate $6,000 payment in order to
retain it. At that point, development of the ranch was
not assured, and maintaining the State Lease was an
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integral part of the envisioned development Even
Ockey believed that the IMAI stock had only nominal
value in 1993 The speculative investment m IMAI
made by other family members enabled the family to
keep the State Lease, which ultimately caused IMAI's
value to skyrocket Granting Ockey's request would
allow Ockey to enjoy the benefits of his family
members' speculative investment, while avoiding the
risks that they all undertook in 1993

K 53 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice
DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice NI HRING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion
Utah,2008
Ockey v Lehmer
189 P 3d 51, 2008 UT 37
END OF DOCUMENT

T] 51 This dynamic, where returning the allegedly
converted stock would overcompensate the plaintiff,
is the same dynamic that motivated our adoption of the
New York rule Under the New York rule, Ockey's
*63 damages would be the highest intermediate value
between the time of Lehmer's alleged conversion and
breach of fiduciary duty and a reasonable time after
Ockey learned about the alleged conversion and
breach Because the district court concluded that
Ockey learned about the conversion as early as 1993,
his remedy for Lehmer's breach under the New York
rule would be minimal because the value of the stock
in 1993 was minimal Had the district court granted
Ockey's requested remedy, it would have allowed him
to circumvent the New York rule, thereby reaping an
unjustified windfall Such a result would be inequitable because it would effectively allow Ockey to "ride
the stock market at the defendants'] risk and expense " ^ ^ Accordingly, the district court appropriately refused to fashion an equitable remedy for
Ockey that would allow him to receive a windfall at
the expense of his family members
FN49 Id , see also Lysenko \ Sa way a, 1999
UTApp31,H8, 973 P 2d 445 ("If allowing
the plaintiff to elect to recover the converted
property itself will over-compensate him for
his injury, then the election must be taken
away from the plaintiff "(internal quotation
marks omitted))
CONCLUSION
H 52 In summary, we affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment, holding that the 1994 conveyance
was voidable and capable of ratification by Ockey We
also affirm the district court's dismissal of Ockey's
conversion claim as barred by the statute of limitations Finally, the district court appropriately refused
to fashion an equitable remedy for Ockey's breach of
fiduciary duty claim
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c
Supreme Court of Utah,
frank CARNESECCA and Mary Carnesecca, his
wife, and Joseph Carnesecca, Jr., and Janet Carnesecca, his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Bernice D. CARNESECCA and the Land Title
Company, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 15051.
U-,

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKG) Presumptions
30k931 Findings of Court or Referee
30k931(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court will view evidence, including fair
inferences to be drawn therefrom and all of circumstances shown thereby, in light most favorable to successful party below.

-77.

131 Trusts 390 € ^ 9 2 . 5
Appeal was taken from a judgment of the Fourth
'" 'net Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J.,
JUcrmining ownership of 18 acres and well thereon.
The Supreme Court, Ilall, J., held that: (1) evidence
-stained trial court's determination that constructive
rust existed in favor of brother who orally purchased
one-third interest in acreage in 1950 and (2) widow of
one brother was equitably estopped from asserting
more than one-third interest in acreage where she
agreed to sale documents reflecting one-third interest
in property in each of two brothers and herself, all
parties, in reliance upon her conduct, bound themselves to sale and widow did not oppose the one-third
division of sale proceeds until three weeks after her
agreement to sell.
Afiirmcd.

West Headnotes
Hi 4j:»i >e; ti nid Ei i • 30 €=>1008.1(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVKD3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(3) k. Substituting Reviewing Court's Judgment. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court will defer to findings of fact finder
rather than substitute its judgment therefor unless it
can be determined as matter of law that no one could
reasonably find as did fact finder.
121 Appeal and Error 30 €==>931(1)

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k92.5 k. Statute of Frauds and Statutes
Prohibiting Parol Trusts. Most Cited Cases
*mierly390k921/2)
Lquiiy will impress a constructive trust upon property
in favor of a beneficiary of an oral trust under certain
circumstances and no writing evidencing an intention
to create a trust is required.
1£ Trusts 390 € ^ 9 2 . 5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k92.5 k. Statute of Frauds and Statutes
Prohibiting Parol Trusts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k921/2)
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy arising by
operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment and is
not within statute of frauds. U.C.A.1953. 25-5-2.
151 Trusts 390 €^=>l 10
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust
390kll0 k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most. Cited Cases
Fact that parol evidence is admitted to prove existence
of constructive trust necessarily requires a showing by
clear and convincing evidence,
•usts 390 €^>95
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U.C.A.1953, 25-5-2.
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k95 k. Fraud or Other Wrong in Acquisition of Property in General. Most Cited Cases
Trusts 390 € ^ 1 0 2 ( 1 )
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl02 Breach of Duty by Person in Fiduciary Relation in General
390kl02(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Trusts 390 € ^ 1 0 3 ( 1 )
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl03 Contracts and Transactions Between Persons in Confidential Relations
390kl03(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Usual circumstances giving rise to a constructive trust
involve one unjustly profiting through fraud or violation of duty imposed under fiduciary or confidential
relationship.
121 Trusts 390 €==>63.5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(B) Resulting Trusts
390k63.5 k. Effect of Statute of Frauds and
Statutes Prohibiting Parol Trusts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k631/2)
Trusts 390 €==>92.5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k92.5 k. Statute of Frauds and Statutes
Prohibiting Parol Trusts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k921/2)
Trusts arising by implication or operation of law are
excluded from effects of statute of frauds.

181 Limitation of Actions 241 €=^103(2)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl01 Existence of Trust
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of
Trust
241kl03(2) k. Necessity for Disclaimer or Repudiation. Most Cited Cases
Argument that oral contract for brother's purchase of
one-third interest in 18 acres owned by his two siblings was inadmissible in proceeding to determine
ownership of acreage by virtue of statute of limitations
had no application where there was no repudiation of
contract or hostile assertion.
121 Witnesses 410 €^>126
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
41011(C) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules
410kl26 k. Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions. Most Cited Cases
Purpose of dead man's statute is not to suppress truth
but to prevent proof of claims against an estate of a
deceased person by false testimony. U.C.A.1953,
78-24-2(3).
[101 Witnesses 410 €^>126
410 Witnesses
41 OH Competency
41011(C) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules
410kl26 k. Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions. Most Cited Cases
Dead man's statute, in limiting introduction of testimony bearing upon the ultimate truth, must be narrowly construed and applied strictly according to its
terms. U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3).
[Ill Witnesses 410 € ^ 1 4 0 ( 7 )
410 Witnesses
41 Oil Competency
410IKC) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules
410kl37 Parties and Other Persons Whose

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

572 P.2d 708
572 P.2d 708
(Cite as: 572 P.2d 708)

Testimony Is Excluded
410k 140 Persons Interested in Event
41 Ok 140(7) k. Heir, Distributee, or
Next of Kin. Most Cited Cases
Intent of dead man's statute is to disqualify only those
witnesses who have direct interest adverse to interests
of deceased and his estate and statute has no application to those witnesses who have a mere interest in the
estate when the controversy between them is only as to
their respective rights as heirs,, U.C.A.1953,
78-24-2(3).
i i l i Trusts 390 €=^110
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust
390kl 10 k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Evidence introduced in proceeding to determine
ownership of 18 acres which two brothers purchased
from their father in 1942 sustained trial court's determination that constructive trust existed in favor of
• .i-ii brother who orally purchased one-third interest
in acreage in 1950.
Estoppel 156 €^>55
.156 Estoppel
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k55 k. Reliance on Adverse Party. Most
Cited Cases
I si up pi i mi' in "

i

156 Estoppel
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k58 k. Prejudice to Person Setting Up
Estoppel. Most Cited Cases
"Equitable estoppel" is conduct by one party which
leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt
course of action resulting in detriment or damage if
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.

156 Estoppel
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156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(B) Grounds of Estoppel
156k78 Contracts
156k78(3) k. Contracts Relating to Real
Estate. Most Cited Cases
Widow of one brother was equitably estopped from
asserting more than one-third interest in acreage
where she agreed to sale documents reflecting
one-third interest in property in each of two brothers
and herself, all parties, in reliance upon her conduct,
bound themselves to sale and widow did not oppose
the one-third division of sale proceeds until three
weeks after her agreement to sell.
*709 Jackson Howard, Robert C. Fillerup, Provo, for
defendant and appellant.
Thomas T. Billings, Keith E. J aylor, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiffs and respondents.

This appeal concerns a dispute as to the ownership of
family property consisting of approximately 18 acres
of land and a well thereon, situate in Utah County.
The plaintiffs, Frank and Joseph Carnesecca are the
sons of Joseph Carnesecca, Sr., deceased, the remaining plaintiffs being their respective wives. Hereafter, all of said plaintiffs shall be referred to collectively as "Frank and Joe.'"
The defendant, Bernice D. Carnesecca, hereinafter
referred to as "Bernice," is the surviving wife of Egidio Carnesecca, deceased, hereinafter referred to as
"Jim," who also was a son of Joseph Carnesecca, Sr.,
hereinafter referred to as "father."
The father acquired the initial acreage which he operated as a farm with the primary assistance of Jim and
Joe. In 1942, while Joe was away in the Navy, Jim and
Frank purchased for $900 the 18 acres in question and
took title in their own names.
At th^ Pn,
iy:)0 harvest there was a family
;t
••••
•>-^
;
,
-edly,
all parties here were present,
0
t
although Bernice denies being there. Nevertheless, at
that meeting, father required Jim and Frank to permit
Joe to purchase a one-third interest in the 18 acres for
the SUIT) of $1,200. However, title remained, in the
name s o f Frank and J i m,
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In 1955 Jim and Joe determined a well was necessary
to irrigate some 53 acres of the farm acquired by deed
and inheritance from their father and the well was
sunk, out of proceeds from the farm, on the 18 *710
acres since it was the most advantageous site.
Jim died in 1966 and Bernice inherited all of his
property including one half of the 18 acres and one
half of the remainder of the farm which she continued
to operate with Joe until 1973 when they had a dispute.
Thereafter the farm, excepting the 18 acres, was sold
and the proceeds divided one half to each, Frank
making no claim thereto.
In 1975 a meeting was held at Bernice's home at her
instance and request since she had received an offer to
purchase the 18 acres. All parties were present, including the potential purchaser, Christensen, who
presented documents of sale reflecting the record title
of the well and land. It was ultimately agreed, however, that the sale must necessarily reflect a one-third
ownership of land and water in Frank, Joe and Bernice. The sale documents were modified accordingly
and were subsequently executed, binding them irrevocably to the sale, but at the time for closing Bernice
refused to sign, asserting a claim to one half of the net
proceeds of sale. By stipulation, the sale proceeds are
still being held in escrow pending the disposition of
this appeal.
The defendant Land Title Company was dismissed
from the suit at pre-trial and the only issue tried below
was the respective interests of the parties in the 18
acres and the well. The trial court declared Joe was the
purchaser of a one-third interest in the land in 1950
and that thereafter Bernice and Frank held in trust for
him. The court also declared Frank to be a one-third
owner in the well and that Joe and Bernice held the
same in trust for him. The court further found that
Bernice was estopped by her own conduct from asserting more than a one-third interest in the land and
well.
Bernice makes three claims of error, 1) the 1950
agreement was not admissible in evidence by virtue of
the provisions of the Deadman Statute, Statute of
Frauds and Statute of Limitations, 2) the evidence did
not support a finding of constructive trust, and 3) the
evidence did not support a finding of estoppel.

Frank and Joe contend the appeal merely reflects a
dissatisfaction with the facts as found by the trial
court.
[1] The long established rules of appellate review
require this court to defer to the findings of the fact
finder rather than substitute our judgment therefor,
and such holds true unless it can be determined as a
matter of law that no one could reasonably find as did
the fact finder. FFN11
FN1. Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568
P.2d751 (1977).
[21 The rules also require us to view the evidence,
including the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom,
and all of the circumstances shown thereby, in the
light most favorable to the successful party below.[FN21
FN2.Id.
F31f41[5] Equity will impress a constructive trust upon
property in favor of a beneficiary of an oral trust under
certain circumstances and no writing evidencing an
intention to create a trust is required. Such is an
equitable remedy arising by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment and is not within the statute of
frauds. [FN31 The fact that parol evidence is admitted
fFN41 to prove its existence necessarily requires a
showing by clear and convincing evidence. FFN51
FN3. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212,209 P.2d
299(1949).
FN4. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d
940(1933).
FN5. Nielson v. Rasmussen, Utah, 558 P.2d
511 (1976).
£6] The usual circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust would involve one unjustly profiting
through fraud or the violation of a duty imposed under
a fiduciary or confidential relationship.[FN6]
FN6. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253
P.2d 372 (1953).
The record is replete with evidence that the farm was a
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famtiy oriented operation from its beginning. Its considerable success*711 obviously resulted from the
combined industry of the whole family which chose to
operate in the nature of a partnership. Their relationship was one of trust, each relying upon the good faith
of the other, usually without the benefit of written
understandings. Father kept an abbreviated account of
the farm business which reflected annual profits and
the division thereof. There is a $1,200 entry in 1950
which is supportive of the oral contract for Joe's purchase of a one-third interest in the 18 acres. The
over-all conduct of Jim and Frank in the years following the purchase is indicative of their recognition
of Joe's joint ownership.
All of such evidence, coupled with the testimony of
Frank, Joe and their wives, is of the clear and convincing nature as has been previously recognized by
this court.[FN7]
FN7. Barrett v. Vickers, J00 Utah 534, ] J6
L2d 772 (1941).
[71 The effectiveness of Bernice's statute of frauds
argument is dispelled by the fact Joe has been in
possession of the land, redeemed it from tax sale,
expended considerable sums to improve it, (planting,
installing heating and irrigation systems and placing a
well thereon) all of which is substantial evidence of a
fully executed oral contract of purchase.[FN8] Also,
trusts arising by implication or operation of law are
expressly excluded from the effects of the statute. rFN91
FN8. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6
Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956), citing
various cases establishing the Utah doctrine
of part performance.
FN9.U.C.A.1953, 25-5-2.
[81 Similarly, the statute of limitations argument espoused by Bernice has no application since there was
no repudiation of contract nor hostile assertion by Jim
(and thereafter by Bernice), and it was not until 1975
that she took a position contrary to Joe's interesUFNlOl
FN 10. In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327,
259 P.2d 595 (1953).
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£91 In regard to the contention that the dead man statute [FNJJJ bars testimony relating to the 1950 contract of purchase, its application must be viewed in
light of the legislative purpose for its enactment. Its
purpose was not to suppress truth but to prevent the
proof of claims against an estate of a deceased person
by false testimony. [FN 121
FN11.U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3).
FN12. Maxfield v. Samsbury, 110 Utah 280,
172P.2d 122(1946).
riOiril] The statute, in limiting the introduction of
testimony bearing upon ultimate truth, must be narrowly construed [FN131 and applied strictly according
to its terms. [FN 141 I t s intent was to disqualify only
those witnesses who have a direct interest adverse to
the interests of a deceased person and his estate and it
has no application to those witnesses who have a mere
interest in the estate when the controversy between
them is only as to their respective rights as
heirs.£FN!51
FN13. Morrison v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 11 Utah 2d 416, 360 P.2d 1015 (1961).
FN14. Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 544 P.2d 481 (1975).
FN15. Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P.
677(1924).
[121 In the instant case there were four witnesses to the
transaction, and in addition, the trial court found Bernice herself was present. That, together with the other
evidence corroborates the trust agreement. Consequently, even if some of the evidence may have been
inadmissible there is substantial evidence to sustain
the determination of the trial court that a constructive
trust existed.rFN161
FN16. In re Estate of Sharp, Utah, 537 P.2d
1034(1975), citing Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah
2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963) and also citing
Del Porto v. Nicolo. 27 Utah 2d 286, 495
P.2d 811 (1972) as to the effect of inadmissible testimony because of dead man
statute.
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Turning now to the matter of estoppel, the evidence is
that Frank and Joe would not have agreed to the
Christensen sale except for the agreement reached in
1975 *712 with Bernice. That agreement was only
reached after all of the sale documents were modified
to reflect a one-third interest in Joe and to permit his
one-third participation in the proceeds of the sale. The
actual conveyance also was modified to reflect he and
his wife as grantors. In reliance upon Bernice's conduct all parties bound themselves to sell and thus gave
up a substantial legal right. It was not until some three
weeks later that Bernice opposed the equal, one-third
division of the sale proceeds, and such was the first
challenge or repudiation of Joe's interest.
[T311T41 These facts clearly meet the test of equitable
estoppel set forth in Koch, Inc. v. J. C. Penney
CoJFN171 which is: conduct by one party which leads
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of
action resulting in detriment or damage if the first
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.
FN17. Utah, 534 P.2d 903 (1975).
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and
WILKINS, JJ., concur.
Utah 1977.
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca
572 P.2d 708
END OF DOCUMENT
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
ONEIDA/SLIC, an Arizona Partnership, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
ONEIDA COLD STORAGE AND WAREHOUSE,
INC., a Colorado corporation, Defendant, Third-party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,
v.
METALCLAD INSULATION CORPORATION OF
CALIFORNIA, a California Corporation, Third-party
Defendant, Fourth-party Plaintiff, and Appellee.
No. 920434-CA.
April 1, 1994.
Rehearing Denied May 3, 1994.
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30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
3QXVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Once appellants who challenge trial court's factual
findings have established every pillar supporting their
adversary's position, they must ferret out a fatal flaw
in the evidence and show why those pillars fail to
support the findings.
131 Appeal and Error 30 €^>757(3)

Lessor appealed from order of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J.,
which dismissed claims against supplier. The Court of
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that lessor which merely
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial
testimony in support of its position did not properly
marshal the evidence as required to challenge trial
court's factual findings.

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Appellant which merely presented carefully selected
facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of its
position did not properly marshal the evidence as
required to challenge trial court's factual findings.

Affirmed.

HI Appeal and Error 30 €^>757(3)
West Headnotes

HI Appeal and Error 30 €^>1008.1(1)
30 Appeal and Error
3QXVI Review
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVKD3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual
findings lightly and, to successfully challenge trial
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play
the devil's advocate and must present every scrap of
evidence which supports those findings.
121 Appeal and Error 30 €^1008.1(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Strict requirement that appellant challenging trial
court's factual findings marshal all the evidence in
support of the findings grows from and nurtures court
objectives of fairness and efficiency.
*1051 Robert G. Gilchrist, Salt Lake City, Kermit A.
Brashear, II, Craig A. Knickrehm, and Donald J.
Straka, Omaha, NE, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jeffrey E. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellee.
*1052 Before DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ., and
REGNAL W. GARFF, Senior District Judge.—
FN1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting
pursuant to appointment under Utah Code
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Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1992).
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc. (Oneida)
challenges the trial court's dismissal of breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and negligence claims
against Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad).
Oneida specifically disputes the findings of fact upon
which the trial court based its dismissal. Because
Oneida has failed to marshal all the evidence in support of those findings, we refuse to consider its challenge and summarily affirm the trial court's dismissal.
BACKGROUND

m

FN2. The parties do not dispute the following
statement of the case.
In 1981 Roth Company (Roth) contracted to design
and build the shell of a cold storage warehouse in Salt
Lake City, Utah for Oneida/SLIC (SLIC). In connection with the development of the warehouse, SLIC
entered into a lease agreement with Oneida, under
which Oneida agreed to lease approximately 65,000
square feet of warehouse space. As part of the lease
agreement, Oneida agreed to supply all insulation and
vapor barrier materials necessary for construction of
the warehouse's insulated areas.
To fulfill its lease obligation, Oneida entered into two
separate contracts with Metalclad, under which Metalclad agreed to supply the insulation materials to be
used for the warehouse and to supervise the installation of those materials.
Oneida filed a third-party complaint against Metalclad
to recover damages resulting from defects in the
warehouse's insulated concrete floor slab system.—
The concrete floor cracked, buckled, and broke up,
both during and after construction. Oneida claimed
that Metalclad had breached express and implied
warranties relating to the floor insulation that Metalclad had supplied.
FN3. SLIC filed the original complaint
against Roth for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranties. At trial the

court entered a judgment against Roth for
$1,909,401.57 plus interest and costs. Roth
does not appeal that judgment.
The trial court found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad had breached either of the contracts or had
breached express and implied warranties relating to
the insulation products. The trial court also found that
Oneida failed to prove Metalclad was involved in
designing the floor slab system. Finally, the trial court
found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad negligently caused or contributed to the damages which
Oneida sustained. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed all of Oneida's claims against Metalclad.
Oneida now appeals that dismissal.
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE
Oneida presents six issues in its brief, four of which
are indisputably issues of fact and two of which
Oneida characterizes as issues of law. The first issue
that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the
trial court's denial of damages resulting from alleged
breaches of contract and warranties. The trial court's
denial of Oneida's claim for damages, however,
simply followed its finding that Metalclad did not
breach its contracts or warranties. The second issue
that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the
trial court's ruling that Metalclad was not jointly liable
with Roth. The trial court's determination that Metalclad was not jointly liable, once again, simply followed its finding that Metalclad was not negligent. In
other words, the trial court's dismissal of Metalclad's
damages and liability claims resulted from the trial
court's findings of fact and not from its application,
interpretation, or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida's
characterization, all the issues presented on appeal
dispute the trial court's findings of fact.
[1][2] Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts'
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth
the heavy burden appellants must bear when challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel *1053 must
play the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume
the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge
the [marshaling] duty ..., the challenger must present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
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the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley
City r. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App.1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell 116 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v.
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App.1993); Ohline
Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah
App.1993). Once appellants have established every
pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then
"must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show
why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must
show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.' " B artel I, 776
P.2dat886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted on
disputed facts." Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Accordingly,
"[w]hen the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges
to the findings and accept the findings as valid."
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d
551, 553 (Utah App.1989).
[31 Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings. Rather than
bearing its marshaling burden, Oneida has merely
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial
testimony in support of its position. Such selective
citation to the record does not begin to marshal the
evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue
the case before this court-a tactic that we reject.
Commercial Union, 863 P.2d at 36; Ohline, 849 P.2d
at 604. Because Oneida has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, we hold
that those findings are accurate and affirm the trial
court's dismissal based on those findings.
[41 As we decline to consider the merits of Oneida's
appeal, we take the occasion to further articulate our
rationale behind the marshaling requirement. We
recognize that requiring appellants who challenge trial
courts' factual findings first to marshal all the evidence
in support of those findings and second to demonstrate
why that evidence remains insufficient to support
those findings is a rigorous standard. Nonetheless, this
strict requirement both grows from and nurtures two
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness.
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The deference we afford to trial courts' findings is
based on and fosters the principle that traditional fact
finders, whether judges or juries, are better equipped
to consider, weigh, and assess the evidence that litigants bring before the courts. Efficient resolution of
disputes demands that, unless the facts found by the
trial court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld on
appeal. In short, "[w]e do not sit to retry the facts."
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789. 800 (Utah
1991). Successful challenges to findings of fact thus
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial
court found the facts from the evidence and second
why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence. These demonstrations in appellants' briefs not
only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in our
decision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing
our efficiency.
Additionally, the deference we afford to trial courts'
factual findings is based on and fosters the principle
that appellants rather than appellees bear the greater
burden on appeal. When appellants do not marshal the
evidence in support of disputed findings, they place
appellees or respondents in a precarious position.
Prudent appellees likely will not rely solely on an
assertion that the appellant has failed to marshal the
evidence; rather, appellees are compelled to perform
the marshaling process to protect their position. In
short, appellees are constrained to do the appellant's
work, usually at considerable time *1054 and expense.— When appellants challenge findings of fact,
fairness requires that they bear the costs of demonstrating how the trial court found those facts from the
evidence and why those findings contradict the weight
of the evidence. The marshaling requirement, therefore, enhances both fairness and efficiency as appellate courts hear appeals of trial court rulings.
FN4. In the instant case, Metalclad's attorneys admirably marshalled the evidence to
protect their client on appeal. That evidence
supports the trial court's findings.
CONCLUSION
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the factual findings which it disputes, we
decline to reach the merits of its appeal. We hold that
the trial court's findings of fact are accurate, and accordingly we affirm the trial court's dismissal of
Oneida's claims against Metalclad.
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DAVIS, J., and REGNAL W. GARFF, Senior District
Judge, concur.
Utah App., 1994.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse,
Inc.
872 P.2d 1051
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Henry S. PARKS, Plaintiff, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,
v.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, individually and
as Executor of the Estate of Lucile M. Parks, deceased, Intermountain Health Care, Inc. dba Primary
Children's Medical Center, and Joseph J. Taylor, Jr.,
Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents.
No. 18580.
Sept. 22, 1983.
Surviving husband brought action against executor of
his deceased wife's estate and others seeking imposition of a constructive trust upon real and personal
property included in estate of decedent. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J.,
imposed constructive trust, and appeal and cross appeal were taken. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held
that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support imposition
of constructive trust, and (2) surviving husband was
entitled to receive his share of income and profits
realized upon trust res as a result of its wrongful disposition.

Page 1

390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust.
Most Cited Cases
Most notable distinction between constructive trusts
and other types of trusts, such as express and resulting
trusts, is generally the intention element.
131 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust.
Most Cited Cases
Constructive trusts which may arise without proof of
the parties' intention to create a trust cannot and do not
require that some form of agreement be manifested.
HI Trusts 390 €^>110

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust.
Most Cited Cases
With certain exceptions, constructive trusts generally
are not based upon intention of parties.

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust
390kll0 k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Evidence showing that surviving husband was gainfully employed throughout entire course of marriage
and that deceased wife was only employed for a brief
period, evidence that at time each of the subject
properties was acquired, husband was employed and
had a substantial income, while wife had no outside
employment or separate income, and evidence showing that husband's income and individual labor were
responsible for improvements made on the properties,
as well as the maintenance of the properties, supported
finding that husband's labors and earnings were responsible for acquisition of a substantial portion of the
marital estate, so that it was appropriate to conclude
that husband had an equitable interest in the subject
property, and that the total inclusion of such property
in estate of wife constituted an unjust enrichment of
her estate, and thus imposition of constructive trust
upon estate of wife was justified, at least as to that
portion representing husband's proven interest therein.

12] Trusts 390 €>^>91

151 Trial 388 €^>395(1)

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts

388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
HI Trusts 390 €^>91
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Cases

388k396 Confoimity to Pleadings, Lsues,
and Proofs
388k396(3)k Scope of Issues Raised by
Pleadings Most Cited Cases

Trial 388 €^>397(1)

Trial 388 €^>396(4)

388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
388k397 Failure to Find on Particular
Questions
388k397(l) k In General Most Cited
Cases
Findings of fact required to be made by trial court in
all actions tried upon facts without a jury must clearly
indicate the mind of the court, and must resolve all
issues of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon Rules
Civ Proc Rule 52(a)

388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
388k396 Conformity to Pleadings Issues,
and Proofs
388k396(4) k Facts and Evidence in
General Most Cited Cases
Although trial court's findings with respect to elements of constructive trust and affirmative defenses of
estoppel and waiver in action tried without a jury were
not as full and complete as might be desired, they did
ascertain the ultimate facts and sufficiently conformed
to pleadings and evidencesupporting the judgment
Rules Civ Proc , Rule 52(a)

Law
388k395 Sufficiency in General
388k395(l) k In General Most Cited

161 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1177(8)
18] Trial 388 €^>391
30 Appeal and Error
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause
30XVIKD) Reversal
30kl 177 Necessity of New Trial
30kl 177(8) k Insufficiency of Verdict
or Findings Most Cited Cases
Failure of trial court in actions tried upon facts without
a jury to enter adequate findings requires judgment to
be vacated Rules Crv Pioc , Rule 52(a)
121 Trial 388 €^>395(5)
388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
388k395 Sufficiency m General
388k395(5) k Ultimate or Evidentiary
Facts Most Cited Cases
Trial 388 € ^ 3 9 6 ( 3 )
388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
388k391 k Facts and Conclusions to Be
Found Most Cited Cases
Substantial compliance with rule requiring that trial
court find facts specially m all actions tried upon facts
without a jury does not require that the trial court
negative every allegation contained in the pleadings,
rather, the rule is satisfied if, from the findings trial
court makes, there can be no reasonable inference
other than that it must have found against such allegations Rules Civ Pioc , Rule 52(a)
I£l Trusts 390 €^>103(3)
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl03 Contracts and Transactions Between Persons in Confidential Relations
390kl03(3) k Husband and Wife Most
Cited Cases
Deceased wife's testamentary disposition of trust
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property, with knowledge of her husband's interest
therein, constituted a breach of her responsibility as a
constructive trustee, earning her the status of a "conscious wrongdoer," and thus surviving husband was
entitled to receive his share of income and profits
realized upon trust res as a result of its wrongful disposition.
[101 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1177(8)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause
30XVIKD) Reversal
30kl 177 Necessity of New Trial
30kl 177(8) k. Insufficiency of Verdict
or Findings. Most Cited Cases
Requisite link between value of property subject to
constructive trust and award to surviving husband
proceeding from imposition of a constructive trust was
missing, so as to require reversal of judgment and
remand of case for making of adequate findings.
fill Trusts 390 €^>362
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKC) Actions
390k362 k. Defenses. Most Cited Cases
Even if averment that surviving husband's conduct,
i.e., acquiescence in administration of estate and failure to assert his claim of ownership for three years
following death of his wife, led executor of estate and
others to sell estate assets and invest the proceeds, sale
of assets and investment of proceeds was not detrimental to executor and others, or to the estate, and thus
surviving husband was not equitably estopped from
seeking imposition of constructive trust upon real and
personal property included in estate.
U21 Trusts 390 €^>362
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKC) Actions
390k362 k. Defenses. Most Cited Cases
Notwithstanding surviving husband's delay in asserting his claim and his acknowledgment of and compliance with provisions of will, he did not at any time
intentionally and distinctly relinquish his right to
assert claim of ownership against property, and thus
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he did not waive his right to seek imposition of constructive trust upon real and personal property included in estate of his deceased wife.
1131 Witnesses 410 €^>159(2)
410 Witnesses
41011 Competency
41011(C) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules
410kl57 Subject-Matter of Testimony
410kl59 Transactions or Communications Between Witness and Person Subsequently Deceased or Incompetent
410kl59(2) k. Nature of Testimony in
General. Most Cited Cases
In action brought against executor of deceased wife's
estate and others by surviving husband seeking imposition of constructive trust upon real and personal
property included in estate of deceased wife, trial
court's employment of the dead man's statute to exclude evidence which allegedly established an oral
trust between surviving husband and his deceased
wife in connection with the marital estate was proper.
*591 John A. Snow, Michael N. Emery, Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
Richard H. Thornley, Ogden, for respondent.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Defendants appeal a judgment imposing a constructive trust upon real and personal property included in
the estate of Lucile M. Parks. They raise the following
six points: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support
the imposition of a constructive trust; (2) the findings
of fact do not comply with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; (3) the award is not supported by the
evidence or the findings and conclusions of the trial
court; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings concerning purchase of the property; (5)
plaintiff is estopped from raising his claim of ownership; and (6) plaintiff has waived his claim of ownership.
Plaintiff Henry S. Parks, who was born February 17,
1909, and Lucile M. Parks, who was born November
25, 1904, were married September 1, 1927, and were
husband and wife at the time of the death of Lucile M.
Parks on October 25, 1974. Their marriage was described as congenial and happy.
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*592 During the marriage, plaintiff was continuously
and gainfully employed until September, 1974, at
which time he retired from his position as Chief of the
Chemical (Mechanical) Engineering Section and Base
Consulting Engineer at Hill Air Force Base. Plaintiff
testified that his retirement was necessitated by the
incapacitating illness of Mrs. Parks.

equipment, building equipment. See, as we were progressing in the size of our flock, the flock required
more and more equipment and the responsibilities
increased. As we acquired the property, our response-or my responsibility for the maintenance and
so on increased.
Q When did you eat supper?

Mrs. Parks, on the other hand, was not employed on a
regular basis during the marriage. At the time of the
marriage and for approximately four months thereafter, she worked for the telephone company. She later
worked at the Plantation Inn and Ambassador Club
Restaurants for approximately six months while
plaintiff was in the military service. After the conclusion of her restaurant employment, in November,
1932, Mrs. Parks was never again gainfully employed
outside of the home. She did, however, conduct
business from time to time with her mother, Elizabeth
Colemere, who was described as a business woman.

A I never ate supper before-I can't ever recall, ever in
my life, eating supper before 10:00 at night.

In 1943, Henry and Lucile Parks moved to a small
farm located on 9400 South Street in Salt Lake City,
where they commenced raising and selling turkeys.
They also developed an orchard on the farm and sold
the fruit. Although the income generated by this family operation was very meager, the labor required of
both plaintiff and his wife to maintain it was substantial.

A Well, that would be from then until I arose the next
morning.

During the time this farm was in operation, plaintiff
continued to work on a full-time basis at his outside
employment. He described a typical workday as follows:
I would get up at 4:30 a.m., do a few chores, get ready
to leave the house at 6:00, go to Ogden by a carpool,
arrived at 7:14, worked a normal 8-hour shift, came
back, make my rounds of the 21st South property, take
care of the lawns, water, mow, or whatever, and arrive
back at the farm, probably 7:00 at night.
Upon arriving back at the farm, plaintiff testified that
he typically did the following:
Q Now, I want to go over that a little more. You get
home at night and what do you do, say, from 6:00 to
10:00 in the evening?
A That was putting out feed for turkeys, repairing

Q And then after your meal at 10:00, you went out
with the turkeys?
A Yes.
Q For how long?

Mrs. Parks' brothers, George and Burgess Colemere,
testified that Mrs. Parks was the money and business
manager of the Parks family. She did all the banking,
kept the records, paid family expenses and signed the
checks. It was also shown that Henry and Lucile Parks
had a joint checking account.
During their years of marriage, the Parks acquired
various pieces of real property, all of which are located
in Salt Lake County. At the time of her death, the title
to each of these properties was vested in Mrs. Parks
alone. The evidence concerning the acquisition of
each parcel is different, and each parcel will hereafter
be discussed separately.
1. 21 st South Property
The 21st South property consisted often different lots
situated at 1427 and 1431 East 2100 South. These lots
were obtained by four separate conveyances.
The first conveyance consisted of four lots, which
were described as Lots 38 to 41. The only evidence
concerning the acquisition of title to these lots is a
deed from Salt Lake County dated March 4, 1940,
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which quitclaims these lots to Lucile M. Parks. Although the deed itself recites a consideration of
$352.72 for the purchase of the lots, *593 a tax sale
redemption certificate attached to the deed in the
record indicates that only $156.72 was actually paid,
and that such payment was made by Mrs. Parks. It is
noted that Mrs. Parks was not employed at the time
she made this payment.
Mr. Parks testified that he later constructed a fourplex
on Lots 38 to 41, which generated rental income over
the years.
The second conveyance occurred on December 3,
1945. A warranty deed conveying Lots 42 and 43 was
executed by O.P. Hendricksen and Kemilla Hendricksen, as grantors, in favor of Henry S. Parks and
Lucile M. Parks, as grantees. Mr. Parks testified that
he personally paid approximately $700 cash for this
purchase.
A second warranty deed conveying Lots 42 and 43
was executed in 1963 by Henry S. Parks, as grantor, in
favor of Lucile Parks, as grantee. There is no evidence
in the record as to why Mr. Parks made this conveyance.
Lots 46 and 47 were purchased on December 28,
1945, by tax deed from Salt Lake County for the sum
of $300, naming Mrs. Parks as the sole grantee. Again
it is noted that Mrs. Parks was not gainfully employed
in 1945, or anytime after 1932, while Mr. Parks was
employed full-time.
The only evidence concerning the acquisition of the
final two lots, Lots 48 and 49, is a warranty deed dated
March 9,1946, executed by "E. Rogers," as grantor, in
favor of Lucile Parks. E. Rogers, also known as
Elizabeth Rogers, Elizabeth Colemere Rogers and
Elizabeth Colemere, was Mrs. Parks' mother.
2. 33rd South Property
With respect to the 33rd South property, the only
evidence concerning the title to the property is a
warranty deed dated June 23, 1959, and executed by
W.H. Florence in favor of Mrs. Parks, as grantee. It
was also shown, however, that mortgages had been
placed upon this property in the names of both plaintiff (Mr. Parks) and Mrs. Parks, and that the mortgage
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money had been used to construct two fourplexes on
the same property.
3. 9800 South Property
A warranty deed was executed on this property by
Elizabeth Colemere, as grantor, in favor of Lucile
Parks in 1962. Mr. Parks testified that he was unaware
that this conveyance had occurred until Mrs. Parks'
will was read, and then, he was under the impression
that the property had been inherited by his wife. He
further testified, however, that he later found out that
this property had been purchased, and that the family's
only sources of income at that time were his salary and
the rents from the investment properties.
With respect to the purchase of this property, Burgess
Colemere (Mrs. Parks' brother) testified that his
mother, Elizabeth Colemere, had owned a 100-acre
parcel of land, which included the 9800 South property, and that she conveyed 25 acres to each of her four
children. The 9800 South property constituted Lucile's
25-acre portion. He further testified that each of the
children was to pay approximately $100 to $200 per
month for his or her 25-acre parcel, but that Lucile had
not made her payments.
4. Lincoln Street Property
Record title to the Lincoln Street property was evidenced by an executor's deed dated November 27,
1968, executed by George and Burgess Colemere,
co-executors of the estate of Elizabeth Colemere
Rogers, in favor of Lucile Parks.
Although the executor's deed recites payment of
$17,700 for this property, Burgess Colemere testified
that nothing was actually paid by Lucile Parks. According to Mr. Colemere, Mrs. Parks was awarded a
credit by her mother's estate in the amount of
$7,142.62 for improvements that she and her husband
(plaintiff) had made on the property while living
thereon. As to the remaining amount of the purchase
price, Mrs. Colemere testified that such amount was
deducted from Lucile's share of her mother's estate.
5. 9400 South Property
The 9400 South property consists of two parcels,
which are identified as parcels H and I. Parcel H,
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consisting of 4.83 net *594 acres, was inherited by
Mrs. Parks from her mother, while parcel I, which
consists of approximately 20 acres, was purchased
from Mrs. Parks' mother. Parcel I was known as the
family farm and was the Parks' residence from 1943
until the death of Mrs. Parks in 1974.

approximately one month after the execution of the
will, Mrs. Parks executed a codicil thereto declaring
that all household furniture and miscellaneous personal property, including carpets, books, pictures and
musical instruments were hers, and that plaintiff had
the right to use such property during his lifetime.

The purchase of parcel I was evidenced by a uniform
real estate contract dated June 5, 1943, executed by E.
Colemere, as seller, and Henry Parks and Lucile
Parks, as buyers. The contract indicated a purchase
price of $3,000. The property (parcel I) was later
(1951) conveyed by warranty deed from E. Colemere
to Tucile Parks as sole grantee.

At the time of the review of the will, plaintiff was
grieving for his wife and apparently continued to do so
for approximately two years. His sister-in-law, LaRue
Colemere, testified that he was in a state of shock and
"seemed like a man that was dazed ...." His brother-in-law, George Colemere, testified that plaintiff
u
[c]ame close to a breakdown ...."

Within a week after Lucile Parks' funeral services,
plaintiff contacted attorney Grant Macfarlane, Sr., and
inquired whether Mrs. Parks had executed a will. Mr.
Macfarlane told plaintiff that he had drawn a will for
Mrs. Parks some two or three years prior, and that the
will was being kept at Zions First National Bank.
Thereafter, plaintiff went to Zions Bank, where he met
with Mr. Macfarlane, and Jay Jeppson and Troy
Thornton of the Zions Bank Trust Department, and
read the will.

Plaintiffs recollection of his condition is as follows: "I
think I reacted much in the manner of a zombie. I
didn't know what was going on or how to raise any
verbal statements." Plaintiff testified, "I had very little
realization of any of the consequences."

The will of Lucile Parks, dated November 17, 1971,
provides that all real property in her estate, except
parcel I of the 9400 South property, should be sold and
the proceeds from such sale held in trust by Zions
Bank. As trustee, Zions Bank was directed to hold,
manage and distribute such funds in accordance with
the provisions of the will. The will also provided that
plaintiff was to retain a life estate in the farmhouse
used by himself and Mrs. Parks as their residence, and,
at the discretion of Zions Bank, Mr. Parks was to be
provided with support in an amount not exceeding
$200 a month and financial assistance in the event of
illness or emergency. However, all of the benefits
provided to plaintiff under the will would terminate if
he remarried, and, as to the life estate, such would also
terminate if he failed to occupy the farmhouse for one
year. Upon the death or remarriage of plaintiff, the
will dictated that a sum not exceeding $10,000 was to
be paid to Joseph J. Taylor, and the remainder paid to
Primary Children's Medical Center.
With respect to the personal property, the will declares
that the household furniture and miscellaneous personal property belong to plaintiff, having been purchased by him with his own separate funds. However,

As noted previously, Grant Macfarlane, Sr., was the
first attorney contacted by plaintiff after the death of
his wife. Mr. Macfarlane arranged for the reading of
the will at Zions Bank, but did not offer any legal
advice with respect thereto. In fact, he later appeared
as the attorney for the executor (Zions Bank) of the
estate.
LaRue Colemere, plaintiffs sister-in-law, testified that
she and her husband, George Colemere, suggested that
plaintiff see an attorney and finally took him to attorney Sam Bernstein. Plaintiff testified that Mr.
Bernstein read the will and told him that he could get
half of the estate without even going to court, but that
he would have to act quickly. Plaintiff did not, however, return to Mr. Bernstein.
*595 In January of 1976, plaintiff retained Leo Jardine
to handle his claim against his deceased wife's estate.
Mr. Jardine advised him that he would take care of the
matter. He later prepared and had plaintiff sign an
objection to petition for amendment of the last will
and testament, but failed to file the document or do
anything further in the case.
In November, 1977, plaintiff went to a third attorney,
David Stott, about the estate. Plaintiff was concerned
at that time with a petition he had received to close the
estate. Mr. Stott wrote a letter to Zions Bank discussing plaintiffs rights under the will, and gave the
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bank ten days to respond. Because Mr. Stott gave the
bank an extension on the ten-day period to respond to
the letter, plaintiff terminated Mr. Stott and engaged
the attorneys presently appearing in this matter on his
behalf.
In December, 1975, it was discovered that Mrs. Parks'
will did not conform to the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
and that as a consequence, the estate was going to
incur a substantial tax liability. In an effort to reduce
such liability, Mr. Macfarlane, acting on behalf of the
executor, Zions Bank, convinced plaintiff to agree to
an amendment of the trust to increase plaintiffs
monthly allowance from $200 to $500, and to relinquish the health and accident support provision.
As noted above, the will provided plaintiff a life estate
in the farmhouse, so long as he did not move out for
longer than one year, and did not remarry. In April,
1975, plaintiff decided to move from the farm to a
house on Lakeline Drive in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff
went to Mr. Thornton of Zions Bank and requested the
move. The court was petitioned and an order was
entered approving the move. The petition indicated
that the Lakeline Drive residence could be purchased
for $95,000 and the farmhouse and farm could be sold
for approximately $600,000, making an annual return
to the estate of $40,000 per year which it would not
otherwise have realized.
Plaintiff remained at the Lakeline Drive residence
until March, 1977. He thereafter moved to a condominium at Canyon Road Towers, Unit 415. The petition for such move was again prepared by representatives of Zions Bank and Primary Children's Medical
Center. It was indicated in the petition that the residence on Lakeline Drive could be sold for approximately $100,000 and the condominium unit could be
purchased for $72,250, and that the difference could
be invested, resulting in an $8,000 per year return to
the estate which would not otherwise be realized.—
FN1. Plaintiff later moved from Unit 415 to
Unit 709 of the same condominium complex,
Canyon Road Towers.
On December 3, 1977, plaintiff remarried. Shortly
thereafter, upon discovering his remarriage, Zions
Bank discontinued the $500 per month support check,
pursuant to the clause of the will conditioning such
support upon plaintiffs remaining unmarried. This
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monthly allowance was, however, reinstated by stipulation during the trial.
The beginning inventory in the Lucile Parks estate
listed the gross estate at $839,159.43. At the time the
petition for final settlement and distribution was filed,
the estate had earned $344,394.54, making a gross
estate of $1,183,553.97 before estate expenses and
deductions. At the time of trial, all real estate inventoried in the estate had been sold by the executor and
the estate assets at that time were $920,500.
Plaintiff initiated this action in response to the petition
to close the estate filed by Zions Bank, the executor,
on November 22, 1977. Plaintiff filed an objection in
the probate proceeding and filed the complaint in this
proceeding seeking to impose an oral, resulting or
constructive trust in his favor on certain household
furnishings and on the real property set forth above.
The lower court found that the real property was
subject to a constructive trust, and awarded judgment
in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $175,000. Additionally, the *596 court awarded plaintiff fee title to
the condominium in which he was then residing.
Appellants herein seek a reversal of the trial court's
judgment, or in the alternative, a new trial. Plaintiff
cross-appeals, seeking an increase in the damage
award and a finding of an oral trust.
I.
The first point defendants raise on appeal is that there
is no evidence in the record to justify the trial court's
imposition of a constructive trust upon the estate of
Lucile Parks. They argue that the circumstances or
elements which must be present in order to justify
imposing such a trust are a "confidential relationship"
between a transferor and transferee of property and a
breach by the transferee of an "oral or implicit
agreement" to hold the property in trust for the transferor.
The purported authority for defendants' argument
regarding constructive trusts is the case of Nielson v.
RasmussenP^ In Nielson, this Court affirmed the trial
court's decision not to impose a trust and made the
following statement with regard to the circumstances
under which a constructive trust could be imposed:
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FN2. Utah, 558 P.2d511 (1976).
The "certain circumstances" which the trial court ...
would have had to find were that the defendants at the
time of the transfer of property to them by plaintiffs
...orally agreed to hold said lots for Rasmussens |beneficiaries] and were in a confidential relationship to
the plaintiffs.^ [Emphasis added.]
FN3.M at 513.
The Court further noted in Nielson that these "certain
circumstances" must be shown to exist by "clear and
convincing evidence." —
FN4. Id. See also Matter of Estate of Hock,
Utah, 655 P.2d 1111 (1982).
As additional support for this argument, defendants
cite fr 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which
states:
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it
inter vivos to another in trust for the transferor, but no
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to
create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of
Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust,
the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive
trust for the transferor, if

(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a
confidential relation to the transferor....

Defendants further contend that under certain conditions the requisite promise or agreement between the
transferor and transferee need not be expressly stated
at the time of the conveyance. They cite Haws v.
Jensen,— wherein this Court affirmed the imposition
of a constructive trust despite the lack of an express
promise, and explained its decision by quoting the
following passage from a New York Court of Appeals
decision: "Though a promise in words was lacking,
the whole transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct
with an obligation' imperfectly expressed." — Based
upon these authorities, defendants draw the conclu-

sion that, universally, courts require an oral, or at least
implicit, agreement and a breach thereof before they
will impose a constructive trust.
FN5. 116 Utah 212. 209 P.2d 229 (1949).
FN6. Id. 209 P.2d at 232. quotmg Sinclair v
Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245. 139 N E. 255, 258
(1923).
Defendants point out that not one single witness testified to any conversation wherein Mrs. Parks promised or agreed to hold any of the subject parcels of
property in trust for plaintiff. Furthermore, defendants
argue that not one witness testified to any conversations wherein plaintiff and his wife made any statement which would indicate that either of them recognized that Mrs. Parks took said property subject \o an
obligation to hold it in trust for plaintiff.
Defendants argue that not only does the evidence fail
to demonstrate a promise or *597 obligation between
plaintiff and his wife, it suggests the opposite conclusion. During the three-year period between the death
of Mrs. Parks and the filing of this suit, plaintiff participated and acquiesced in the administration of the
estate in accordance with the provisions of the will. He
did not, during that period, make any claim of ownership as to the real property included in the estate.
We are unable to countenance defendants' narrow
construction of the law pertaining to constructive
trusts. Contrary to the implications of their position,
neither § 44 of the Restatement of Trusts nor this
Court's statement (above) in the Nielson decision
constitutes an exclusive definition of constructive
trusts and exhausts the possible circumstances under
which a trust such as this may be imposed. Ralher,
these authorities merely describe the circumstances
and requirements necessary to impose just one of the
numerous types of constructive trusts.
It has been said of constructive trusts:
[A]n attempt to define or describe a constructive trust
would be inadequate because such definition or description would be too narrow in its scope and fail to
include important types of constructive trusts.^
FN7. Winner v Brosuis' Estate, 184 Kan.
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273, 336 P.2d 455. 460 (1959).
And further, u[t]he forms and varieties of these trusts
... are practically without limit." —
FN8. Fitz-Gerald v. Hull 150 Tex. 39, 237
S.W.2d 256, 263 (1951).
The intended scope of § 44 (Restatement (Second) of
Trusts) is clearly identified by the following passage
from the Restatement of Restitution:
Constructive trusts are not dealt with in the Restatement of Trusts, except insofar as they arise out of
express trusts or attempts to create express trusts.
[Emphasis added.] —
FN9. Restatement of Restitution § 160
comment a (1937).
According to this statement, unless an "express trust"
has been established, or at least asserted, as the basis
of entitlement to property, this section does not apply.
In other words, § 44 applies to only one type of constructive trust, that which uarise[s] out of express
trusts or attempts to create express trusts."
That the scope of § 44 is thus limited is further revealed by the language of the section itself. Such
language describes the applicable situation as one in
which an express trust has been rendered unenforceable for failure to comply with the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds. In this situation, § 44 provides that
the intended trust may be imposed, notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds violation, under the guise of a
constructive t r u s t / ^ upon the condition that "the
transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to the transferor." Supra.
FN10. Restatement (Second) of Trusts g 44
comment a (1959).
The scope of this Court's statement in the Nielson
decision (quoted above) is likewise limited to that
particular type of constructive trust which arises from
an express trust. In Nielson, the original dispute arose
between plaintiffs and the Rasmussens. Defendants,
the Carters, were subsequently joined as third parties.
Plaintiffs and the Rasmussens eventually settled. By
the terms of the settlement agreement, plaintiffs were
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to transfer to the Rasmussens four building lots.
However, these same four building lots, along with
other real property, had previously been sold to the
Carters. Plaintiffs contended that they had not actually
sold these lots to the Carters, but that they had transferred them to the Carters subject to an oral agreement
that said lots would be held in trust (express trust) for
the benefit of plaintiffs and the Rasmussens. This is
precisely the situation to which § 44, as well as § 45,
of the Restatement of Trusts applies.
Inasmuch as the basis of plaintiffs claim of entitlement to the four lots was an unenforceable*598
trust, 1 ^ this Court held, citing § 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts ("Effect of Failure of Oral
Trust for a Third Person"),^ 2 that the intended express trust could be imposed as a constructive trust
upon proof of an oral agreement and a confidential
relationship.
FN11. The express trust was unenforceable
because there was no written memorandum
evidencing the intention to create it, as required by the Statute of Frauds.
FN12. Section 45 was applied in Nielson,
rather than Section 44 because Section 45
deals with third-party beneficiaries, and the
party holding the equitable interest in Nielson
(the Rasmussens) was a third party. Section
44, although very similar to Section 45 in
substance, applies where the settlor of the
alleged trust is also the beneficiary thereof. In
light of the similarities between the two sections, the previous discussion regarding Section 44 is wholly pertinent to Section 45.
The type of constructive trust described above is a
species of the express trust out of which it arises. It
therefore inherits certain fundamental characteristics
of the express trust, one of which is "intention." An
express trust is generally described as "a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, arising as a result
of a manifestation of an intention to create it and
subjecting the person in whom the title is vested to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others." ^-^ (Emphasis added.)
FN13. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462.1
(1967). See also supra n. 9.
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[U[21 Aside from the type of constructive trust described above, constructive trusts generally are not
based upon the "intention" of the parties.^1^ Indeed,
the most notable distinction between constructive
trusts and other types of trusts, such as express and
resulting trusts, is generally the "intention" element.
FN14. Id. See also Matter of Estate of Hock,
supra n. 4, at 1114.
[31 It is axiomatic that an essential element of any
agreement is the "intention" to create it. Accordingly,
those constructive trusts which may arise without
proof of the parties' "intention" to create a trust cannot
and do not require, as defendants propose, that some
form of agreement be manifested.
In the present case, plaintiffs claim against his deceased wife's estate was based upon theories of oral,
resulting and constructive trusts. In other words, he
was not relying solely upon the oral express trust
theory, as did the plaintiffs in the Nielson case, and as
occurs in most cases wherein §§ 44 and 45 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts are applied. The trial
court rejected his claims based on theories of oral and
resulting trusts, but found sufficient evidence to support his claim based on the theory of constructive
trusts.
In rejecting plaintiffs claim that a resulting trust
should be applied, the trial court commented: "[A]
resulting trust does not result merely because the
husband puts up the money to purchase property in his
wife's name." This statement was apparently based
upon the rule of law articulated in § 442 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which reads thus:
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and
the purchase price is paid by another and the transferee
is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the
person by whom the purchase price is paid, a resulting
trust does not arise unless the latter manifests an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the property. [Emphasis added.]
This rule, like the rule referred to above governing the
imposition of an oral express trust, requires a "manifestation of intent," i.e., intent to retain the beneficial
interest in the property. The trial court apparently
concluded that the element of intent necessary to give
rise to a resulting trust was absent.

While we acknowledge that the resulting trust theory
set forth in § 442, supra, is commonly applied under
circumstances as herein presented (i.e., where a husband pays the purchase price for real property and
places the title thereto in either his wife's *599 name
solely,^^ or in both his and his wife's name jointly
^ ^ ) , we are not aware of any rule of law that would
inhibit or discourage the application of the constructive trust theory advanced in $ 160 of the Restatement
of Restitution under such circumstances.
FN15. See Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah
345, 180 P. 586 (1919); Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6
I11.2d 224, 127 N.E.2d 435 (1955).
FN 16. SeeS9 C.J.S. Trusts S 127 (1955);
Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 569 P.2d
397(1977).
Section 160 presents the broadest possible application
of a constructive trust. It provides that a constructive
trust may arise "where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to
another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it...." ^-^ Such
breadth has also been described as follows:
FN17. Restatement of Restitution § 160
(1937). See also Matter of Estate of Hock,
supra n. 4; Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra n. 8; G
& MMotor Co. v. Thompson, Okl„ 567 P.2d
SO (1977); Huberr. Coast Investment Co., 30
Wash.App. 804, 638 P.2d 609 (1981).
Constructive trusts include all those instances in
which a trust is raised by the doctrines of equity for the
purpose of working out justice in the most efficient
manner, where there is no intention of the parties to
create such a relation, and in most cases contrary to the
intention of the one holding the legal title, and where
there is no express or implied, written or verbal, declaration of the trust. 1 ^ 1
FN18. J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §
1044(1941).
The recent pronouncements of Pennsylvania courts
are particularly apt on the question of whether § 160
may be applicable under circumstances outlined in £
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442. In Kohr v. Kohrp^- under circumstances
somewhat similar to those before us now, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, applying § 442, held that a
resulting trust could not be imposed because no "intent
to retain a beneficial interest" had been shown. The
court then resorted to the § 160 constructive trust
theory. However, a constructive trust was not imposed
in that case for the reason that the plaintiff failed to
prove "unjust enrichment" to the transferee of the
disputed property. Similarly, in the case of Yoke v.
Yoke ^^ where the plaintiff/husband had conveyed
his one-half interest in the family residence (which
had been purchased by both spouses) to his wife, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered both the £
160 and § 442 trust theories and determined that a &
160 constructive trust was the most appropriate remedy. In both these cases, the Pennsylvania courts
considered and applied the provisions of § 160 under
circumstances described in § 442.
FN19. 271 Pa.Super. 321, 413 A.2d 687
(1979).
FN20. 466 Pa. 405, 353 A.2d 417 (1976).
Yet another jurisdiction to apply § 160 under the specific circumstances posed in § 442 is Delaware. In a
very recent decision, Adams v. Jankouskas,—=- the
Delaware Supreme Court held that it was appropriate,
not only to apply both theories under such circumstances, but to actually impose both types of trusts,
provided, of course, the elements of such trusts were
proven. The factual situation in the Adams case is
remarkably similar to the present case. There, as here,
the toils and labors of a husband and wife over the
course of their marriage resulted in the accumulation
of a substantial estate. The wife, who was considered
the dominant spouse, managed the financial affairs.
As a result of her management, most of the accumulated properties and assets were held in her name.
Upon her death, it was discovered, much to her husband's surprise, that she had devised the majority of
the estate to a niece and left little to her husband. Some
two years after her death, the husband brought suit to
have a constructive or resulting trust imposed upon his
share of the estate. The lower court granted his request, imposing a resulting and constructive trust upon
what it determined to be the husband's share of the
estate, and on the subsequent appeal brought by the
deceased wife's estate, the *600 Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed with the following observation:
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FN21. Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 148(1982).
It is important to note that this is not a case where a
party was disappointed with what he received under a
will. Rather, it is one in which joint funds were
committed in obvious trust to one partner and then
pooled to purchase property and make investments for
the mutual benefit of both. Under these circumstances
Chancery may impose this trust upon the accumulated
assets in whatever form they now take.^^
FN22.A/. at 153.
In light of the foregoing authority, as well as the inherent broad scope of the § 160 constructive trust, we
conclude that the facts and circumstances of the instant case warrant application of the provision of £
160. The question remaining is whether the record
contains clear and convincing evidence to satisfy even
the broad requirements of § 160 for the imposition of a
constructive trust.
The evidence clearly shows that the title to each of the
subject parcels of property was in the name of Mrs.
Parks alone. The question as to whether Mrs. Parks
(her estate) would be "unjustly enriched" by retaining
sole ownership of these properties depends upon
whether plaintiff actually had an "equitable interest"
in such properties.
With respect to the question of plaintiffs "equitable
interest" in the properties, the trial court found that
during the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Parks, Mr. Parks
(plaintiff) "was continuously employed and a substantial part of the marital estate was acquired from his
earnings." Defendants contend, however, that this
finding is not supported by the evidence. They contend that the evidence shows that plaintiff had no part
in the acquisition or ownership of the subject property
and that Mrs. Parks alone acquired and owned it all.
They conclude that inasmuch as the property was
exclusively owned by Mrs. Parks, plaintiff had no
"equitable interest" therein, and therefore its inclusion
in her estate did not constitute an "unjust enrichment."
Our survey of the record reveals that it contains much
conflicting evidence regarding the acquisition and
ownership of the property included in Mrs. Parks'
estate. Our review of conflicting evidence in equity
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cases is governed by the following well-settled rule:
The findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence
will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that
the court has misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence.^^FN23. 209 P.2d at 233, quoting Olivero v.
Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313. 315
(1923). See also 655 P.2d at 1114.
The evidence clearly shows that plaintiff was gainfully employed throughout the entire course of the
marriage, and that Mrs. Parks was only employed for a
brief period (approximately ten months). It shows that
at the time each of the subject properties was acquired,
plaintiff was employed and had a substantial income,
while Mrs. Parks had no outside employment or separate income. It further shows that plaintiffs income
and individual labor were responsible for improvements made on many of the properties, as well as the
maintenance of the properties.
[4] This evidence clearly and adequately supports the
trial court's finding that plaintiffs labors and earnings
were responsible for the acquisition of a substantial
portion of the marital estate. It is therefore appropriate
to conclude that plaintiff had an "equitable interest" in
the subject property, and that the total inclusion of
such property in the estate of Mrs. Parks constituted an
"unjust enrichment" of her estate. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court's imposition of a constructive
trust upon the estate of Mrs. Parks was justified, at
least as to that portion representing plaintiffs proven
interest therein.
II.
Defendants next contend that the trial court's findings
of fact do not comply with *601 Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore the judgment
entered pursuant to such findings must be vacated.
[51F61 Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts
specially in all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the
"mind of the court," ^ ^ and must resolve all issues of
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of
law and judgment entered thereon.^^ Furthermore,
failure of a trial court to enter adequate findings re-

quires the judgment to be vacated. 1 ^
FN24. State ex rel K.D.S., Utah. 578 P.2d 9,
11 (1978).
FN25. Rom rel I v. Zions First National Bank,
Utah, 611 P.2d 392. 394-95 (1980); Boxer
Company v. Lignell, Utah. 567 P.2d 1112.
1113(1977).
FN26. Kinkella v. Baugh, Utah. 660 P.2d
233, 236 (1983); Anderson v. Utah County
Board of Com'rs, Utah, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216
(1979).
Defendants allege that the trial court's findings of fact
do not address any of the issues germane to the causes
of action and defenses raised in the pleadings. Specifically, they allege that no findings were made with
respect to the elements of a constructive trust, and
further, that none were entered regarding defendants'
affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver. (Additional deficiencies in the trial court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law are alleged under subsequent
points of the appeal.)
In addition to the rules set forth above regarding the
sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact, this
Court has observed:
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to
the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law.
To that end the findings should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached.^ 1 [Citations omitted.]
FN27. Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d
1336.1338(1979).
[7] Upon reviewing the pleadings, the evidence and
the findings of fact in this matter, we conclude that,
although the findings with respect to the issues delineated under this particular point are not as full and
complete as might be desired, they do ascertain the
ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence supporting the judgment.
As noted above in our discussion of constructive
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trusts, the trial court's findings that the title to the
property had been held solely by Mrs Parks that
plaintiff had worked continuously during the marriage
and that a substantial part of the marital estate had
been acquired with his efforts and earnings adequately
established the elements necessary to justify the lm
position of a constructive trust
£8] It is true that the findings do not specifically negative defendants' allegations of estoppel and waiver
Substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) does not
however, require that the trial court negative every
allegation contained in the pleadings, rather, the Rule
is satisfied if, from the findings it (the trial court)
makes, there can be no reasonable inference other than
that it must have found against such allegations
In
our view, the findings herein clearly infer the trial
court's denial of these allegations
FN28 Patton\ Kukman, 109 Utah 487 167
P 2d 282, 283 (1946)
III
Next, defendants argue that, even assuming a constructive trust was properly imposed, the award proceeding from the judgment was not supported by the
evidence or the findings and conclusions
Defendants allege that they occupy the status of a
"gratuitous transferee" ^ ^ with *602 respect to the
property subject to the constructive trust They allege
further that, inasmuch as they have already sold the
real property originally included m the estate, the
measure of recovery against them, pursuant to the
constructive trust, is determined as follows
FN29 A "gratuitous transferee" is defined m
the Restatement of Restitution fr 204 (1937)
as one who "receives the title to property of
which another has the beneficial interest
without notice of the other's interest but
without paying value "
Where a person receives the title to property of which
another has the beneficial interest without notice of the
other's interest but without paying value, and being
still without such notice exchanges it for other property, he is under a duty either
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(a) to surrender the property which he acquired m
exchange, or, at his option,
(b) to pay the value of the property which he originally
received, the property which he acquired in exchange
being subject to an equitable lien for such payment
FN30 Restatement of Restitution fr 204
(1937)
And further,
[The transferee] is liable to the claimant to the extent, but only to the extent, to which he is unjustly
enriched at the expense of the claimant If the
[transferee] makes a profit, he can keep the profit, if he
incurs a loss, he need not make it good ^-^
FN31 Restatement of Restitution ft 204
comment a (1937)
Based upon these authorities, defendants suggest that
their liability is limited to the value of the property
subject to the trust, and further, that there must be a
link between said value and the amount awarded to
plaintiff
Defendants argue that the requisite "link" is missing m
the present case They point out that the property
subjected to the constructive trust consisted of the
entire estate, while the amount awarded plaintiff was a
sum of $175,000 and a condominium They argue that
there are no findings or conclusions which even remotely explain, justify or link this award to the value
of the estate Accordingly, they contend that the
judgment should be vacated
The propriety of the damages award in this case is also
challenged by plaintiff He contends that, given the
size of the estate ($920,500), his award should be
substantially increased to more closely reflect his
contribution to the marital estate
Plaintiffs position is that Mrs Parks herself, not the
defendants, is the party whose status, with respect to
the property subject to the constructive trust, is relevant to the determination of liability He contends that
Mrs Parks, as the original trustee under the constructive trust, wrongfully disposed of the trust property
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through her undisclosed (secret) will and thereby
incurred liability as a "conscious wrongdoer " Plaintiff points out that the major distinction between this
classification and the classification to which defendants allegedly belong ("gratuitous transferee") is that
a 'conscious wrongdoer' is liable, not only for the
value of the property wrongfully transferred, but also
for the value of whatever/?/ ofits are realized as a result
of such transfer
[91 We are in agreement with plaintiffs position insofar as it classifies Mrs Parks as a "conscious
wrongdoer" and holds her estate accountable and
liable to plaintiff for his share of any profits realized
on the res of the constructive trust Under the constructive trust theory, Mrs Parks, as transferee of the
property, assumed the role of a "constructive trustee "
^-^ Although her role as a "constructive trustee" did
not entail the numerous fiduciary obligations which
are imposed upon a trustee of an express trust, it did
require that she respect and account for the equitable
interest held by plaintiff in his beneficiary capacity ^ ^ Mrs Parks' testamentary disposition of the trust
property, with knowledge of her husband's interest
therein, constituted a breach of her responsibility as
constructive trustee, earning her the status of a "conscious wrongdoer "
FN32 5 A Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462
(1967)

The liability of a "conscious wrongdoer" may e >ctend
beyond the mere restoration of the status quo We
acknowledge with approval the following principle of
law and consider it dispositive herein
Where a person by the consciously wrongful disposition of the property of another acquires other property,
the person whose property is so used is not only entitled to hold the wrongdoer personally liable for the
value of the property wrongfully disposed of but he is
entitled as an alternative to the property so acquired If
the property so acquired is or becomes more valuable
than the property used in acquiring it, the profit thus
made by the wrongdoer cannot be retained by him, the
person whose property was used in making the profit
is entitled to it ^ ^
FN36 Restatement of Restitution fr 202
comment c (1937)
The reasoning behind this rule has been stated thus
If, however, the wrongdoer were permitted to keep the
profit, there would be an incentive to wrongdoing,
which is removed if he is compelled to surrender the
profit The rule which compels the wrongdoer to bear
any losses and to surrender any profits operates as a
deterrent upon the wrongful disposition of the property of others ^ ^
FN37 Id

FN33 Id
*603 A "conscious wrongdoer" is one who "wrongfully disposes of property of another knowing that the
disposition is wrongful and acquires in exchange other
property " ^^ Under the circumstances as here presented, Mrs Parks herself did not receive property m
exchange for the original property in the constructive
trust, however, her estate, and more specifically her
personal representative (Zions Bank/executor), who
stands in the same position of the decedent had she
lived,^^2 did receive exchange property, as well as a
substantial profit therewith
FN34 Restatement of Restitution fc 202
(1937)
FN35 Supra n 7, 336 P 2d at 463

The record shows that the value of the estate of Lucile
Parks has increased substantially since her death The
petition for final settlement and distribution listed
gross income at $344,394 54, for a total gross estate of
$1,183,553 97 At the time of the trial (July 6,1982), it
was stipulated that the net value of the estate was
$920,500
In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, we hold
that plaintiff is entitled to receive his share of the
income and profits realized upon the trust res as a
result of its wrongful disposition
riOl We also consider meritorious defendants' argument that the requisite link between the value of the
property subject to the constructive trust and the award
is missing Although the net value of the estate was
stipulated at $920,500, there was no indication m the
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findings as to what portion of the net estate
represented plaintiffs share (taking into account income and profits as indicated above), and thus, there
was no support for the amount of the award as set forth
in the conclusions
In light of the insufficiency of the findings with respect to the award, we must vacate the judgment and
remand the case for the purpose of making adequate
findings as to the value of plaintiff s equitable interest
in the estate Em
FN38 It is noted that plaintiff did not have
any interest in the property denominated as
parcel H of the 9400 South property due to
the fact that it was inherited by plaintiffs
wife from her mother's estate Nor did plaintiffs interest in the Lincoln Street property
exceed his share of the credit extended by his
wife's mother's estate on the purchase price
of the property for work and improvements
made on said property by plaintiff and his
wife And further, inasmuch as no payment
or improvements were ever made by plaintiff
on the 9800 South property or lots 48 and 49
of the 21st South property, which properties
were conveyed to plaintiffs wife by her
mother, plaintiff should have no interest
therein
IV
Defendants' fourth point on appeal is that the findings
concerning the purchase of the property are not supported by the *604 evidence The particular findings
referred to by defendants are as follows
6 During the course of said marriage, plaintiff and
decedent purchased real and personal property
8 During said marriage, plaintiff was continuously
employed and a substantial part of the marital estate
was acquired from his earnings
Under Point I of this opinion, we discussed the sufficiency of the evidence and the findings with regard to
plaintiffs participation in the acquisition of the property included m Mrs Parks' estate We determined that
the evidence and the findings on this particular point
adequately supported the judgment We now, there-

Page 15

fore, defer to that previous determination
V and VI
Under defendants' final two points of contention, they
allege that plaintiff is precluded on theories of estoppel and waiver from asserting ownership of the subject
property
In order to prevail in their estoppel claims, defendants
must satisfy the test of equitable estoppel set forth in
Koch, Inc \ J C Penney Co, which is
[WJhether there is conduct, by act or omission, by
which one party knowingly leads another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take some course of action,
which will result in his detriment or damage if the first
party is permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct or
FN39

representation
FN39 Utah, 534 P 2d 903, 905 (1975) See
also Carnesecca i Camesetca, Utah, 572
P 2d 708 (1977)
fill We have reviewed the evidence alleged by defendants as supportive of this claim and find that it is
insufficient to satisfy the test articulated in the Koch
decision, supra Even if we were to concede to their
averment that plaintiffs conduct, I e , acquiescence m
the administration of the estate and failure to assert his
claim of ownership for three years following the death
of his wife, led them to sell the estate's assets and
invest the proceeds, we could not also concede that the
course of action (sale of assets and investment of
proceeds) taken by defendants was detrimental to
them or to the estate
The evidence shows that when plaintiff moved from
the farmhouse and farm, the estate received an additional $40,000 per year because of the ability to sell
the farm and the farmhouse and invest the proceeds
The estate also received the benefit from plaintiffs
move from Lakelme Drive to the condominium since
the residence on Lakelme Drive was sold for more
money than was paid for the condominium, and the
estate received an additional benefit of approximately
$8,000 annually Clearly, there was no detriment realized from these or any of the transactions which occurred during the three-year administration of the
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FN40 At the conclusion of the trial, the
judge made the following observation with
regard to the claim of equitable estoppel
Again, I might say this I don't think there's
an estoppel The bank-there is no detriment
to the hospital by anything that he did I
can't see any detriment at all And they still
got the money It's presumably still drawing interest
Defendants claim that the test for establishing a waiver
of rights is less demanding than the test for equitable
estoppel They rely upon the following statement
made by this Court m Sullivan v Beneficial Life Insurance Co
FN41 91 Utah405, 64 P 2d 351,361 (1937)

and distinctly relinquish his right to assert a claim of
ownership against the property Furthermore, it is
noted that plaintiffs actions herein were accomplished
well withm the appiopnate statute of limitations
Plaintiff has raised two points of contention on
cross-appeal, one of which has been dealt with and
resolved previously in this opinion under defendants'
Point III [ ~^ The remaining contention raised by
plaintiff is that evidence improperly excluded under
the dead man's statute *-^ established an oral trust
between plaintiff and his deceased wife in connection
with the marital estate
FN44 Under defendants' Point III, we resolved plaintiffs assertion of entitlement to
increased damages
FN45 U C A

1953 ^78-24-2(3)

[A] waiver operates as an estoppel upon the party who
waives, but it is not essential to a waiver that a party in
whose favor it is made must prove all the elements of
an estoppel m pais before he is entitled to avail himself
of the waiver

Plaintiffs challenge to the propriety of the trial court's
employment of the dead man's statute is grounded
upon two arguments 1) defendants waived their right
to the provisions of said statute, and 2) the statute is
inapplicable to this case

In Amencan Savings & Loan Association v Blomquist ^^ this Court held that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right and there must be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish *605 it, and it
must be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied

[131 With respect to the first argument (waiver), it is
plaintiffs position that defendants' failure to enter an
objection when he first took the witness stand and
before he gave any testimony, resulted in a waiver of
their right to invoke the dead man's statute In other
words, he claims that once he testified, the dead man's
statute was waived This position allegedly rests upon
the following rule stated by this Court in the case of
Obradovich \ Walker Brothei s Bankers ^^

FN42 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P 2d 1 (1968)
Similar language is found in Bjork v April Industries,
Inc p^ where this Court held that waiver must be
intentional relinquishment of a known right
FN43 Utah, 547 P 2d 219 (1976)
[T2] Defendants' claim of waiver is based upon the
same facts alleged as supportive of their estoppel
argument Again, we do not find adequate support in
these facts, or elsewhere in the record, for the imposition of the doctrine of waiver Notwithstanding
plaintiffs delay m asserting his claim and his acknowledgement of and compliance with the provisions of the will, he did not at any time intentionally

FN46 80 Utah 587 16 P 2d 212 (1932)
The rule is well settled that a party desiring the protection of the statute here invoked by the appellant
must make a propei and seasonable objection to the
competency of the witness Under the statute it is the
witness and not the proffered testimony which is incompetent Therefoie, the objection must be specifically directed to the incompetency of the witness and
not to the proffered testimony
We do not agree with this argument, nor do we view
the Obradovich case as supportive thereof It is well
settled in this jurisdiction that a witness who is m-
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competent to testify to some matters because of the
dead man's statute may properly testify concerning
other matters We so held mDallof\ Robinson
FN47 Utah, 520 P 2d 191 193(1974)
This [dead man's] statute does not mean that a party
may not be called to testify to matters not pertaining to
transactions with the deceased without opening up the
matter so that the survivor may testify to forbidden
transactions
Furthermore, m the case of Burk \ Petei ^^ the
Court held that a party may testify concerning some
transactions with the decedent, where as to such
transactions the dead man's statute had been previously waived, yet the same witness could be excluded from testifying to other transactions with the
decedent which were not subject to the waiver Obviously, under the Burk decision, a witness is competent to testify to transactions not covered by the dead
man's statute, and yet can be excluded from testifying
to matters covered by the statute
FN48 115 Utah 58, 202 P 2d 543 544-45
(1949)
Plaintiffs reliance upon the Obradovich decision for
the proposition that one must object to a witness's
competency prior to *606 any testimony is misplaced
In Obradovich, an objection was made against certain
testimony on grounds that it was "irrelevant and immaterial, self-serving declarations on the part of the
deceased " ^ ^ The trial court overruled the objection
on those grounds and allowed the testimony The dead
man's statute was raised for the first time on appeal
FN49 16 P 2d at 218
In view of these particular circumstances, the Court
made the statement (above) relied upon by plaintiff,
and further observed
It will be observed that the objection made only goes
to the testimony which might be responsive to the
question to which the objection was made In this
connection it should also be noted that no objection
was interposed to the competency of the witness The
objection being overruled, the appellant is entitled to a
review of the ruling only upon the grounds stated and
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pointed out by his objection, which were irrelevancy
and immateriality and "self serving statements on the
part of the deceased " The objection was properly
overruled, for the proffered evidence was both relevant and material ——
FN50 Id
It is the opinion of the Court that the language from the
Obiado\ich decision relied upon by plaintiff, when
considered in its true context, is not supportive of
plaintiffs position
As noted above, plaintiff also argues that the dead
man's statute is not applicable to this case Again, we
must disagree The statute provides, in pertinent part
The following persons cannot be witnesses

(3) a party to any civil action
and any person directly interested in the event thereof when the adverse party in such action claims or opposes, sues or
defends as the executor of any deceased person,
as to any statement by or transaction with, such
deceased person which must have been equally
within the knowledge of both the witness and such
deceased person unless called to testify thereto by
[the executor] E ^ i
FN51 Supra n 45
Its scope of application has been described by this
Court as follows
When an executor, etc , sues or defends m an action to
protect or recover assets of the estate, neither the other
party to the action, nor the person through whom he
claims or deraigns his title, nor any other person
having a direct interest in the claim of the party opposing the executor, etc , that is, an interest in the
cause of action, adverse to the claims of the executor,
can testify as to any transaction had with the deceased,
which is involved in the lawsuit, nor as to any statement made by the deceased relative to the transactions, matters and claims involved in the lawsuit,
unless such person is called to so testify by the executor, etc ^ ^
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FN52. Maxfield v. Sainsbun, 110 Utah 280,
172P.2d 122. 125(1946).
Clearly, therefore, its employment in the present case
is proper.
In light of our disposition of the foregoing issues, we
affirm the trial court's judgment in all aspects, with the
exception of the amount of the award to plaintiff. We
therefore vacate that particular aspect of the judgment
and remand for the purpose of making a redetermination of the award and adequate findings in support
thereof.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., and PETER F.
LEARY, District Judge, concur.
OAKS, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein; LEARY, District Judge, sat.
HOWE, Justice (dissenting):
This case is controlled by the rule of law stated in
Section 442 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d (1959),
which reads as follows at p. 402:
*607 Where a transfer of property is made to one
person and the purchase price is paid by another and
the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of
bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is
paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter
manifests an intention that the transferee should not
have the beneficial interest in the property.
We recognized and applied the rule in Anderson v.
Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P. 586 (1919). In Comment A to Section 443 at p. 404, it is stated that it is the
intention of the payor at the time of the transfer, and
not at a later time, which determines whether a resulting trust arises. "The conduct of the payor and of
the transferee subsequent to the transfer, however,
may be such as to show that at the time of the transfer
the payor did not intend to make a gift to the transferee."
The plaintiffs case must rise or fall by the application
of the foregoing rule of law. If the evidence does not
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence
that the plaintiff manifested an intention that his wife
should not have the beneficial interest in each piece of
property as it was acquired, thereby rebutting the
inference of a gift, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief.
A constructive trust does not arise under those circumstances and the majority opinion is in error in so
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holding. The law presumes that a gift was intended
and unless that inference is rebutted, a resulting trust
does not arise because the payor gave the transferee
the full beneficial interest. That being so, a constructive trust cannot arise either since the payor reserved
no equitable interest to himself as the majority opinion
maintains.
In the recent case of In the Matter of the Estate of Ruth
M. Hock, Deceased, v. Fennemore, Utah, 655 P.2d
1111 (1982), Jack Fennemore brought suit against the
personal representative of his sister's estate to impress
a purchase money resulting trust upon certain real
estate to the purchase of which he claimed to have
contributed. Although title had been taken in the name
of the deceased, the trial court impressed a constructive trust upon the property. On appeal to this Court
we held that a purchase money resulting trust arose
under those circumstances and not a constructive trust.
Since the payor and the transferee were siblings (and
not husband and wife as in the instant case), Section
442 was not applicable. Instead, Sections 440 and 441
controlled, raising a rebuttable inference that no gift
was intended and thus a resulting trust arose in favor
of the payor (Jack). We affirmed the trial court's
finding by clear and convincing evidence that a resulting trust arose in favor of Jack. The Supreme Court
of California refused to impress a constructive trust in
Altramano v. Swan, 20 Cal.2d 622, 128 P.2d 353
(1942), where it stated "a constructive trust does not
arise upon the transfer of property from a husband to a
wife without consideration." The court held that the
rule found in Section 442 of the Restatement of Trusts
was controlling, citing many earlier decisions of that
court.
The rule stated in Section 442 that a donative intent is
presumed has universally been followed by the courts
in the country, both prior to and since the promulgation of the Restatement of Trusts. For cases relying on
the rule in husband to wife transfers (and sometimes
broadening the rule to wife to husband transfers) see
Anderson v. Cercone, supra; Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz.
100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Peterson v. Massev, 155
Neb. 829, 53 N.W.2d 912 (1952); Nussbacher v.
Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548 (1947); Tarkington v. Tarkington, 45 N.C.App. 476, 263 S.E.2d
294 (1980); Walter v. Home National Bank & Trust
Co. ofMeriden, 148 Conn. 635, 173 A.2d 503 (1961);
Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6 I11.2d 224. 127 N.E.2d 435
(1955); Norman v. Kernan, 226 Wis. 78. 276 N.W.
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127 (1937), &?o/M Cume, 7 Wash 2d 301 109 P 2d
526 (1941), Altramano v Swan supra See Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees, 2d Ed , § 459 (1977), Scott on
Trusts, Vol 5 ^442(1967)
The same rule that infers a gift likewise applies to the
improvements made to the several properties by the
labor and money of the plaintiff *6084)<:o<s/v ^ got
toms, 201 Ark 104 144 S W 2d 43 (1940), Hoef \
Hoef, 323 111 170 153 N E 658 (1926), Lewis \
Bowman, 113 Mont 68 121 P 2d 162 (1942), overruled on another ground, Mont 495 P 2d 591 (1972)
The majority opinion grants relief to the plaintiff under Section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution
(1937), which states at p 640
Where a person holding title to property is subject to
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground
that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises
That rule of law does not here apply because the law
infers that a gift was intended by the plaintiff when he
placed title to the property in his wife's name Unless
he can rebut that inference, which he failed to do here,
he has no equitable or beneficial interest because he
reserved none His wife's estate is under no equitable
duty to convey it to him, nor is her estate unjustly
enriched by retaining it The donee of a gift is always
enriched thereby but no one would claim that he is
unjustly enriched See Koh v Kohi 111 Pa Super
321,413 A 2d 687 (1979), where the court rejected the
application of Section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution when the evidence did not rebut the inference
of a gift from mother to son, and establish that a resulting trust was intended by her
At the trial the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs case on several grounds, including that the evidence did not establish a resulting trust The trial court
apparently granted the motion as to a resulting trust,
but made no written finding of fact as to whether the
inference of a gift had been overcome In his bench
ruling, which apparently granted the defendant's motion to dismiss as regards a resulting trust, the court
said
but a resulting trust does not result merely because
the husband puts up the money to purchase property in
his wife's name Mr Park's testimony, as I recall it,
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with regard to why this was done, even when they
were younger and first started to acquire property,
apparently the decision was made by the two of them
that he was going to die first And therefore, they
ought to put all of the property in her name I think that
I paid some attention to that because to me it's quite
important as to the reason that it was done
I interpiet that statement of the trial judge to mean that
he concluded that Mr Park intended that his wife
should have the full beneficial interest in the several
properties, since both he and she believed that he
would die first This assumption was based on the fact
that he was in poor and frail health Having so ruled,
and having failed to make a finding of fact that the
inference of a gift was rebutted, the trial court should
have dismissed the plaintiffs complaint and not
granted him relief under inapplicable rules governing
constructive trusts
The majority opinion cites two cases in support of
imposing a constructive trust but those cases are distinguishable \ohex Yoke, 466 Pa 405,353 A 2d 417
(1976) involved a husband suing his wife to set aside a
deed which he signed conveying to her his interest in
their jointly held residence He claimed that he signed
the deed believing it was a new deed they were getting
as a consequence of their paying the mortgage in full
The court held that it was a question of fact whether a
confidential relationship between husband and wife
existed which would have required her to disclose
material facts concerning the deed The court remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing on that
question Obviously, the case dealt with an entirely
different problem than we have m the instant case
Adams \ Jankouskas, Del Supr , 452 A 2d 148 (1982)
involved a similar fact situation to our case The court
affirmed a lower court finding that the husband turned
over his earnings to his wife "m obvious trust" because they had agreed that the survivor of them should
have everything The rule of Section 442 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d was not mentioned, but the
lower court's finding that a trust was intended supported its imposition of a "constructive or resulting
*609 trust" (without deciding which) A similar finding m the instant case that a trust was intended is
completely lacking In fact, the trial court's bench
ruling is to the contrary-that no trust was intended
There was no agreement here between Mr and Mrs
Parks that the survivor was to have everything
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If this case is to be remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of making adequate findings as to the value of
plaintiffs equitable interest in his wife's estate as directed m the majority opinion, two important considerations should be observed upon remand:

673 P.2d 590
END OF DOCUMENT

First, the trial court should segregate those properties
which were purchased with funds contributed either
wholly or in part by Mr. Park from those properties
which were acquired by inheritance or gift from Mrs.
Parks' mother or her estate. As to the latter properties,
there is no basis in the law whatever for imposing any
kind of a trust on them, even under plaintiffs theory.
Furthermore, as to the property which they originally
took title to in their names as joint tenants but which
Mr. Parks afterwards quitclaimed to her, no constructive trust would arise except under the circumstances
stated in Section 44 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d
where the transferee agrees to hold the property, or an
interest therein, for the benefit of the transferor.
Secondly, in any property in which a constructive or
resulting trust has arisen, the trial court should determine the extent of the interest which is subject to the
trust. Although Mrs. Parks did not work outside of the
home and had no income from employment, she contributed her full time and labor to the maintenance of
the home and the small orchard and farm surrounding
it. If Mr. Parks did not intend that she have the full
beneficial interest in the properties to which he provided the purchase money, it is difficult for me to
believe that he intended that she was not to have at
least a half interest therein. Under that view of the
evidence, a trust should not be imposed on more than
one-half of the property. Her one-half should be free
for her to dispose of by will as she saw fit. Comment B
to Section 443 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d (1954)
states at p. 404:
Where one person pays the purchase price for property
which is transferred at his direction to another who is a
natural object of his bounty, and it is shown that the
payor intended to have a partial interest in the property, a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor as to
such interest but only as to such interest.
Accord: Dougherty v. Duckworth, Mo., 388 S.W.2d
870(1965).
Utah, 1983.
Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank
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c
Supreme Court of Utah.
HAWS et al.
v.
JENSEN.
No. 7267.
Aug. 18, 1949.
Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Cache
County; M. M. Morrison, Judge.
Action by Edwin N. Haws, and others, against John P.
Jensen to impress a trust upon certain realty standing
on the record in the name of defendant. From the
judgment, defendant appeals.
Judgment modified, and as modified affirmed.
FN1. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25
P.2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah
133, 141P.2d882.
FN2. Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116
P.2d772.
FN3. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94
P.2d 465, 466; Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah
475,214P.313,315.
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3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k96 k. Breach of Oral Agreement to
Hold in Trust or Reconvey Land Voluntarily Conveyed. Most Cited Cases
Where owner of interest in land transfers it inter vivos
to another in trust for a third person, but no memorandum properly evidencing intention to create a trust
is signed, and transferee refuses to perform, transferee
holds interest upon a constructive trust for third person
if transferee at time of transfer was in a confidential
relation to transferor.
131 Trusts 390 € ^ 1 0 2 ( 1 )
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl02 Breach of Duty by Person in Fiduciary Relation in General
390kl02(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
A constructive trust may be imposed even if there is
no fiduciary relationship, and it is sufficient that there
is a family relationship or other personal relationship
of such a character that transferor is justified in believing that transferee will act in his interest, and such
a trust will be imposed even though at time of transfer,
transferee intended to perform agreement, and even
though he was not guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance.
HI Trusts 390 €^>371(2)

West Headnotes
HI Trusts 390 €==^92.5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k92.5 k. Statute of Frauds and Statutes
Prohibiting Parol Trusts. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k921/2)
A constructive trust, being an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law
and is not within the statute of frauds.

390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKC) Actions
390k371 Pleading
390k371(2) k. Allegations as to Creation
and Existence of Trust. Most Cited Cases
Complaint alleging that mother conveyed realty to
daughter by warranty deed, intending that daughter
hold realty in trust for benefit of whole family, which
did not allege that daughter made promise to mother to
hold property in trust as condition of conveyance to
her, sufficiently alleged a confidential relation to
permit court of equity to impress trust on the realty.
U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1.

121 Trusts 390 €^>96
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity

151 Trusts 390 €^>109
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390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust
390kl09 k. Parol Evidence. Most Cited
Cases
If owner of property transfers it inter vivos to another
person by a written instrument in which it is not declared that transferee is to take property for his own
benefit, or that he is to hold it in trust, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that he was intended
to hold property in trust either for transferor or for a
third party.

Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl009 Effect in Equitable Actions
30kl009(3) k. On Conflicting Evidence. Most Cited Cases
In equity cases, findings of trial courts on conflicting
evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly
appears that court has misapplied proven facts or made
findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.
121 Trusts 390 € ^ 4 4 ( 2 )

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390k40 Evidence to Establish Trust
390k43 Parol Evidence
390k43(3) k. Intention of Parties to
Absolute Conveyance, Transfer, or Devise. Most
Cited Cases
A deed absolute on its face can be shown to have been
intended to be in trust.

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390k40 Evidence to Establish Trust
390k44 Weight and Sufficiency
390k44(2) k. Evidence to Charge
Grantee or Assignee as Trustee. Most Cited Cases
Evidence established that daughter took warranty deed
to home property from mother subject to oral trust to
maintain it as a family home to be used by mother and
either her children or grandchildren for so long as any
person should need the home, with discretion in trustee as to the time, and as to which of the persons
should use the realty. U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1.

121 Trusts 390 €^>43(3)

[101 Appeal and Error 30 €^>205

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390k40 Evidence to Establish Trust
390k43 Parol Evidence
390k43(3) k. Intention of Parties to
Absolute Conveyance, Transfer, or Devise. Most
Cited Cases
Where mother conveyed home to daughter by warranty deed, parol testimony was admissible to show
that conveyance was subject to oral trust providing
that daughter should maintain property as a family
home to be used by grantor and either her children or
grandchildren for so long as such persons should need
a home. U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1.

30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings
Thereon
30k202 Evidence and Witnesses
30k205 k. Exclusion of Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Where there was ample evidence to sustain court's
findings, complaints as to exclusion of testimony were
not required to be considered especially in absence of
objections to the testimony.

1 £ Trusts 390 €^>43(3)

181 Appeal and Error 30 €>^>1009(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and

[Ill Trusts 390 €=^348
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKA) Rights of Cestui Que Trust as
Against Trustee
390k348 k. Persons Against Whom Trust
May Be Enforced. Most Cited Cases
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Where mother conveyed realty to daughter by warranty deed on oral trust to maintain realty as a family
home to be used by mother and either her children or
grandchildren, and thereafter daughter died, daughter's husband as her sole heir at law held an undivided
equitable interest in the property and would be required to convey title to trustee named by the court to
hold for benefit of living heirs of the grantor and
successors in interest of her deceased heirs.
U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1.
[12] Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 3 7 ( 2 )
241 Limitation of Actions
2411 Statutes of Limitation
2411(B) Limitations Applicable to Particular
Actions
241k37 Relief on Ground of Fraud or Mistake
241k37(2) k. Actions to Which Statute
Applies. Most Cited Cases
Action by grantor's heirs against grantee's husband as
record owner of realty to impress oral trust for their
benefit, begun more than three years after the conveyance, was not barred by three year statute of limitations affecting actions for relief on ground of fraud
or mistake, in absence of allegations of fraud or mistake in the complaint, or of allegations that grantee
fraudulently procured conveyance of property to her
upon promise to hold it for use and benefit of the
beneficiaries. U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1, 104-2-24(3).
**230 *214 Newell G. Daines, Logan, L. Delos
Daines, Salt Lake City, Clinton D. Vernon, Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
Bullen & Bell, Logan, LeRoy B. Young, Ogden, for
respondents.
WOLFE, Justice.
Action by the respondents, plaintiffs below, to impress
a trust upon certain real property situated in Hyrum,
Cache County, Utah, standing on the record in the
name of John P. Jensen, defendant below. The parties
will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court.
**231 Mrs. Maria A. Haws on August 18, 1927, executed a warranty deed to her home in Hyrum, the
property here in question, to Amber Haws, her
daughter. Mrs. Haws was then residing upon the
property; Amber was unmarried and living in Los

Page 3

Angeles, California. On December 2, 1933, the deed
was recorded in Cache County by Lucinda Haws
Ballam, a daughter of Mrs. Haws and a sister of
Amber, at *215 the direction of Mrs. Haws. There is
no evidence that Amber had any knowledge of the
existence of the deed until sometime after its recordation. Mrs. Haws continued to live upon the premises
until her death on March 24, 1939. Fifteen days thereafter, Amber married the defendant Jensen and they
took up residence in the Haws home. On March 16,
1945, Amber died. The defendant continued to reside
upon the property and in his petition for letters of
administration of the estate of his deceased wife, he
listed the property as an asset of the estate. He alleged
that he was the sole heir at law of his wife. On March
19, 1947, the property was distributed to him in fee
simple. The same day, the plaintiffs, four of whom are
brothers and sisters of Amber, and two of whom are
children of Noble Haws, a brother of Amber who died
in 1940, instituted the present action against the defendant. They alleged in their complaint that while the
deed executed by Mrs. Haws to Amber in 1927 was in
form a warranty deed, it was intended to create an oral
trust; that the terms of the oral trust provided that
Amber should maintain the property as a family home
to be used by Mrs. Haws and/or by the children of
Mrs. Haws, or children of said children for so long as
any of the said persons should need a home with
complete discretion in the trustee as to the time and as
to which of the said persons should use the property;
that shortly after the recordation of the deed, Amber
accepted the trust and proceeded to perform and carry
out the terms thereof in accordance with the intention
of Mrs. Haws until the death of Amber; that the defendant knew of the existence of the trust at the time of
his marriage with Amber, but that the defendant now
refuses to recognize the existence of the trust, but
claims the property for himself by right of succession
free of any equities owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that
there were not facts stated sufficient to consitute a
cause of action and that the plaintiffs' action was
barred by the statute of frauds. The demurrer was
overruled. On August 17, 1948, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of *216 law in favor of the
plaintiffs and entered a decree directing the defendant
to convey the property to Verba Haws, the wife of
Garland Haws, one of the plaintiffs, as successor
trustee to hold the property for the use and benefit of
the heirs at law of Mrs. Maria A. Haws.
It is first contended by the defendant that the lower

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 4

209P.2d229
116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229
(Cite as: 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229)

court erred in overruling his demurrer because the
complaint on its face showed that the plaintiffs were
suing upon an oral express trust which is within the
statute of frauds. In this state a trust in real property
can be created in two ways: (1) by act or operation of
law (2) by deed or conveyance in writing.Sec. 33-5-1.
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:
'No estate or interest in real property, other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.'
[11F21 Admittedly there is no writing evidencing Mrs.
Haws' intention that the property conveyed by her be
held in trust by Amber. However, under certain circumstances existing at the time a conveyance in trust
is made, no writing evidencing an intent to create a
trust is required. In those instances, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the property in favor of
the person or persons designated by the grantor as the
beneficiary or benefiaries of the oral trust. A constructive trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent
unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law and is
not within the statute of frauds. Section**232
45(1 )(b), of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts is
applicable to the facts of the instant case:
'(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers in
inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but no
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to
create a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to
perform the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon
a *217 constructive trust for the third person, if, but
only if, (a) * * * (b) the transferee at the time of the
transfer was in a confidential relation to the transferor, or (c) * * *' (Italics added.)
[31T41 The defendant contends that there is no allegation of a confidential relation between Amber and
Mrs. Haws. True, it is not specifically alleged that
there was a confidential relation. However, in the
complaint it is alleged that Mrs. Haws conveyed the
property to Amber intending that the latter hold the
property in trust for the benefit of the whole family.
Implicit in this allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed

confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs. Haws would
have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation
along with the fact that the grantor and grantee were
mother and daughter, which appears on the face of the
complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a confidential
relation. Scott on Trust, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2, states: CA
constructive trust is imposed even if there is no fiduciary relationship sueh as rhat be\\veer\ attorney and
client, principal and agent, trustee and beneficiary; it is
sufficient that there is a family relationship or other
personal relationship of such a character thai the
transferor is justified in believing that the transferee
will act in his interest.'Restatement of the Law of
Trust, Sec. 44, comment (c), accord. A constructive
trust will be imposed even though at the time of the
transfer the transferee intended to perform the
agreement, and even though he was not guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse
of the confidential relation consists merely in the
failure of the transferee to perform his promise. Scott
on Trusts, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding
formula, but is free to effect justice according to the
equities peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure
to perform a duty to convey property would result in
unjust enrichment. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
Parti, 1946 Ed., §471.
Nor is it necessary, as argued by the defendant, that
the complaint contain an allegation that the grantee
made a *218 promise to the grantor to hold the property in trust as a condition of the conveyance of the
property to her. In Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245,
139 N.E. 255,258, the grantor, a court clerk, owned an
interest in certain real property. His ownership subjected him to constant importunities to go bail for
persons in trouble. In order to escape these importunities, he executed a deed conveying his interest in the
property to his sister. After his death litigation arose as
to whether the conveyance had been made in trust for
him. Said the New York Court of Appeals, speaking
through Justice Caruozo, 'Even if we were to aeeept
her [the sister's] statement that there was no distinct
promise to hold it for his [the grantor's] benefit, the
exaction of such a promise, in view of the relation,
might well have seemed to be superfluous. * * *
Though a promise in words was lacking, the whole
transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct with an
obligation' imperfectly expressed. Wood v. Lucy,
Tady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214. It
was to be interpreted, not literally or irrespective of its
setting, but sensibly and broadly with all human im-
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plications.'
[51[61[71 The defendant's second contention that the
lower court erred in admitting parol testimony tending
to establish an oral trust must also fail.Restatement of
the Taw of Trusts. Sec. 38(3) states:
Tf the owner of property transfers it inter vivos to
another person by a written instrument in which it is
not declared that the transferee is to take the property
for his own benefit or that he is to hold it in trust,
extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that he
was intended to hold the property in trust either for the
transferor or for a third party.'
**233 We similarly held in Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah
445, 25 P.2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Uath 133.
141P.2d882; and in Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534.
116 P.2d 772, that a deed absolute on its face can be
shown to have been intended to be in trust.
\8]\9] The third contention of the defendant is that the
plaintiffs failed to prove by clear, unequivocal and
conclusive *219 evidence that Amber took the property subject to the condition that she hold it for the use
and benefit of the grantor's heirs. With this contention
we cannot agree. The scope of the review of facts in
equity cases has long been settled in this jurisdiction.
In Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465, 466,
we quoted with approval from Olivero v. Eleganti, 61
Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315, where we stated that in
equity cases, 'the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the court has misapplied proven
facts or made findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence.'
The plaintiffs produced ten witnesses who testified as
to statements made either by Mrs. Haws or Amber in
support of the plaintiffs' contention that the property
was conveyed in trust. Only some of that testimony
need be here detailed. Anna Gardner, a neighbor of
Mrs. Haws who visited with her frequently, testified
that 'directly after she made her deed,' Mrs. Haws told
the witness that 'she had made the deed to Amber, her
daughter, because she figured Amber would be the
most fair. And after her death Amber was going to
divide it equally among all of the children.'Again, a
'couple of months' before Mrs. Haws' death in 1939,
Mrs. Gardner testified, Mrs. Haws 'was glad she had
her property fixed, because now she knew it would be
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equally divided after she was gone,' and that Mrs.
Haws 'didn't want to have it probated. She figured
there wasn't much and what little there was she wanted
it divided the way it should be and Amber would do
it.'
Christina Jensen, another neighbor of Mrs. Haws,
testified that sometime either in 1936 or 1937, she
called in at the Haws home to see Mrs. Haws. The
witness told Mrs. Haws, *220 T had just had a deed
made out on my property to my children so that there
wouldn't be any trouble if I passed away and she [Mrs.
Haws] said, 'Well, that's fine.' And she says T hope I
got mine fixed all right.'Says, T wanted it divided
equally between my children', and she said, T hope
I've got it fixed right.'But she didn't say whether there
was a deed or not. Then her daughter, Amber, was
there and she went over and said, 'Ma, don't worry
about that. It will be taken care of."
W. F. Ballam, the husband of Lucinda Haws Ballam,
one of the plaintiffs, testified that in the fall of 1928 or
1929, Mrs. Haws told him 'she had the deed fixed on
the property * * * and she said she had them fixed in
Amber's name because Amber was single. All the rest
of them were married. And she felt certain that Amber
would keep the property there for a place for any of the
children to use if they wanted to come home for any
reason. And if it was decided that the property should
be disposed of after her death that she knew that
Amber would make a fair distribution to all the
children.'He testified that in 1934, he and his wife
were visiting with Mrs. Haws and Amber in the Haws
home. A discussion arose concerning the 'fact that the
property had been left-or recorded in Amber's name
here, and that Ma (meaning Mrs. Haws) wanted the
property to be left there in case any of the children
ever would want to come back and use the place for
vacation headquarters or have a temporary home,' and
that Amber said, 'Well, that's just the way it's going to
be left.'The witness claimed to have heard Amber on
numerous occasions affirm that the property was for
the benefit of all the family. Mr. Ballam further testified that after Amber's funeral some of the family were
discussing what was to be done with the property and
who should care for it. Only one of the plaintiffs lived
in Utah at that time. The defendant offered to move
out of the house because *221 'he said he knew he had
no right to the property; that he knew what Mrs. Haws'
wishes were, and he knew Amber's wishes were the
same as her mother's. '**234 But, Mr. Ballam testified,
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the family agreed that the defendant could stay in the
house so long as he wanted to, provided he pay the
taxes and maintain the property. The witness's testimony as to this agreement of the family to allow the
defendant to continue to reside upon the property was
corroborated by Lawrence Rose, Hermoine Haws
Rose, Garland Haws, and Lucinda Haws Ballam.
Mrs. Ballam testified that in 1927, just before she was
married, Mrs. Haws, her mother, told her that 'she had
had the place made into Amber's name. But she says,
T don't want you to feel bad about it, because it's put in
her name so that you can all have an equal share."
Later in 1933, Mrs. Ballam recorded the deed at the
request of her mother, the latter declaring that 'she
didn't want us to have our feelings hurt because she
wanted to be fair with all of us, and she said the home
would always be there for us if any of us wanted to
come back; that we were welcome; and that after her
death it should be divided equally among all of us and
she wasn't leaving it for Amber. It was for all of the
family.'
Lawrence Rose, husband of Hermoine Haws Rose,
one of the plaintiffs testified that Amber and the defendant visited in his home in California in 1939 while
they were on their honeymoon, and that Amber at that
time mentioned that the family home had been conveyed to her to take care of for the rest of the family,
and that she would 'see everything was done that was
all right with them.'Mr. Rose further testified that in
1945 the defendant and Amber were again visitors in
his home. Amber was ill and had to return to Salt Lake
City for medical treatment. Mrs. Ballam and Mrs.
Rose, who were present, asked Amber why she didn't
sell the old home in Hyrum and move to California.
Amber answered, *222 "no', that she'd never sell the
property; that her mother didn't want it that way. And
as long as there was any of them living there would
always be a home for them. And Mr. Jensen, why he
said something, I don't remember what it was, and she
told him that it was none of his business what happened to that property; that he'd never get anything out
of it.'
It would serve no useful purpose to detail the evidence
relied upon by the defendant to support his contention
that the property was conveyed unconditionally to
Amber. There is testimony in the record that Mrs.
Haws 'had given' or was 'going to give' the property
to Amber; that Amber and the defendant had made

improvements upon the property; and that Amber had
told the defendant and others that the property belonged to her. The lower court evidently did not believe this testimony, but believed the plaintiffs who
were closer to Mrs. Haws and with the exception of
the defendant, closer to Amber than were the defendant's witnesses. It is to be noted that the defendant
admitted that the plaintiffs asserted their rights to the
property shortly after Amber's funeral.
The defendant points out that there is no evidence that
Amber, prior to the delivery of the deed on December
2, 1933, promised to hold the property in trust, bul that
the earliest occasion appearing in the record upon
which Amber expressed even having knowledge of
the conveyance was in 1934 when she was visiting
with her mother. (See the testimony of W. P. Ballam,
supra). Admittedly, the defendant is correct in his
contention that an oral promise to hold real property in
trust after the acquisition of title falls before the statute
of frauds. However, it can fairly be inferred from all
the evidence that Amber, prior to December 2, 1933,
knew of her mother's intention to convey to her
(Amber) the property in trust. It was testified that Mrs.
Haws, in 1927 when she signed the deed and in 1933
when she directed that it be recorded, remarked to her
son-in-law and daughter, Mr. and Mrs. Ballam, that
the property was for the use and benefit of the whole
family. Mrs. Gardner *223 testified that about in 1927,
Mrs. Haws stated that she had conveyed the property
in trust to Amber. While Amber may not have known
just when her mother would make the conveyance, it
can fairly be inferred that when Amber first learned
that the conveyance had been made, she knew of the
condition attached to it, and that by her silence she
acquiesed**235 in the conveyance with that condition
imposed. It is not necessary that it be proved that
Amber expressly agreed to hold the property in trust.
Here as in Sinclair v. Purdy, supra, in view of the
confidential relation between the grantor and the
grantee, the exaction of an express promise would be
superfluous. Amber was the oldest in the family and
the only one unmarried. It was testified that Mrs.
Haws had the utmost confidence that Amber would
deal fairly with her brothers and sisters.
[10] The defendant's fourth contention is that the
lower court erred in allowing two of the plaintiffs'
witnesses to testify as to self-serving declarations
made by the grantor after the execution and delivery of
the deed, and also m allowing Mrs. Rose and Mrs.
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Ballam to testify as to conversations had with Amber
regarding the property. Assuming that the court did err
in not excluding this testimony, there is ample evidence to sustain its findings irrespective of this testimony. None of the evidence which has been detailed
in this opinion was objected to on either of the above
grounds.

Utah 1949
Haws v. Jensen
116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229
END OF DOCUMENT

[111 As his fifth contention, the defendant contends
that assuming the existance of a trust, the lower court
erred in ordering the defendant to convey all of his
right, title, and interest in the property to a trustee
named by the court because as an heir of his wife, he is
entitled to a one-sixth interest in the property. The
plaintiffs admit that the defendant has succeeded to the
interest of Amber and that as such he is the holder of
an undivided equitable interest in the property. But the
plaintiffs urge that since the probate division of the
court had decreed legal title to the entire property to be
in the defendant, the subsequent*224 decree made by
the court below was necessary to nullify the original
decree. In order that the defendant's interest in the
property be protected, the lower court's decree ordering the defendant to convey the property to Verba
Haws who should hold the property as trustee for the
use and benefit of the heirs at law of Mrs. Haws is
modified to provide that the defendant convey the
property to Verba Haws who should hold the property
as trustee for the use and benefit of the living heirs of
Mrs. Haws and the successors in interest of the deceased heirs of Mrs. Haws.
ri21 The defendant's final contention is that plaintiffs'
cause of action, if any, is barred by 104-2-24(3),
U.C.A.1943, which provides that an action for relief
on the ground of fraud or mistake must be commenced
within three years. This contention too must fail.
There is no allegation of fraud or mistake in the complaint. The plaintiffs do not rely upon either ground
for recovery in this action. It is not contended that
Amber fraudulently procured the conveyance of the
property to her upon a promise to hold it for the use
and benefit of the plaintiffs. Clearly the statute relied
upon by the defendant is not here applicable.
The judgment below as modified is affirmed. Costs to
the respondents.
PRATT, C. J., and WADE, LATIMER,
MCDONOUGH, JJ., concur.

and
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HI Appeal and Error 30 €^?216(1)

H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual; Eaglebrook Corporation, a Utah corporation; and Lava Bluff Water
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, Plaintiffs, Appellant, and Cross-appellees,
v.
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-appellant.
No. 930761-CA.
Feb. 23, 1996.
Subdivision developer and developer's companies
brought action against subdivision water company for
damages for water company's use of developer's
company's one-third interest in water company's water
system. Water company counterclaimed for return of
developer's company's one-third interest, transfer of
water from developer as result of alleged shortfall at
time of his termination of business relations with other
developer, and attorney fees from developer resulting
from water company's defense of developer's company's claims. After granting directed verdict against
water company on its claim against developer for
water shortfall, the District Court, Washington
County, J. Philip Eves, J., entered judgment for water
company and awarded water company attorney fees
against developer under third-party attorney fees rule,
and imposed constructive trust on developer's company's title to one-third interest in water system for
benefit of water company. Developer appealed and
water company cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) it would refuse to consider
issue, raised by developer for first time on appeal, as
to whether third-party attorney fees rule was inapplicable because of alleged privity between developer's company and developer; (2) neither developer nor
his company owed alleged water shortfall to water
company; and (3) trial court reasonably imposed
constructive trust on developer's company's title to
one-third interest in water system for benefit of water
company according to terms of water agreement between parties, despite contention that court should
have required developer's company to transfer
one-third interest directly to water company.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings
Thereon
30k214 Instructions
30k216 Requests and Failure to Give
Instructions
30k216(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 2 3 1 ( 9 )
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings
Thereon
30k231 Necessity of Specific Objection
30k231(9) k. Instructions. Most Cited
Cases
Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 2 3 9
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings
Thereon
30k234 Necessity of Motion Presenting
Objection
30k239 k. As to Costs. Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would refuse to consider issue,
raised by subdivision developer for first time on appeal, as to whether third-party attorney fees rule was
inapplicable and thus did not allow attorney fee award
against developer because of alleged privity between
developer's company and developer, in action brought
by developer and his companies against subdivision
water company; developer failed to object specifically
to jury instructions on privity grounds, failed to submit
instructions on privity to refute application of
third-party attorney fees rule, and failed to argue
privity exception in any motions to court. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 51.
121 Damages 115 € ^ ? 7 3
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115 Damages
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory
Damages
115111(D) Expenses of Litigation
115k70 Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses
of Litigation
115k73 k. Litigation with Third Persons.
Most Cited Cases
Under "third-party tort rule," when natural consequence of one's negligence is another's involvement in
dispute with third party, attorney fees reasonably
incurred m resolving dispute are recoverable from
negligent party as element of damages.
131 Trial 388 €^>278
388 Trial
38 8 VII Instructions to Jury
388VIKF) Objections and Exceptions
388k276 Sufficiency and Scope of Objections or Exceptions to Instructions Given
388k278 k. General or Specific. Most
Cited Cases
Although rule requiring specificity in objection to
giving of instruction serves purpose of preserving
objection for appeal, its primary purpose is to direct
attention of court to claimed errors in instruction so
that court might have opportunity to correct them if
court deems it proper. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 51.
141 Appeal and Error 30 €^>179(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl79 Sufficiency of Presentation of
Questions
30kl79(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Subdivision water company did not waive its challenge on appeal to directed verdict ruling that subdivision developer did not owe water company water
shortfall upon his separation of business relations with
another developer, despite contention that water
company made its claim at trial against developer and
not developer's company; water company properly
raised claim against developer's company at trial, in its
bench ruling trial court concluded that neither developer nor his company were liable for water shortfall,
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and court's subsequent written ruling, which specified
only developer, should not restrict water company's
right to appeal issue that was properly argued before
trial court.
151 Appeal and Error 30 €>^>927(7)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKG) Presumptions
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most
Cited Cases
On appeal from directed verdict, Court of Appeals
must examine evidence in light most favorable to
losing party, and if there is reasonable basis in evidence and in inferences to be drawn therefrom that
would support judgment in favor of losing party, directed verdict cannot be sustained.
161 Trial 388 €=>139.1(3)
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VKA) Questions of Law or of Fact in
General
388kl39.1 Evidence
388kl39.1(l) Province of Court and
Jury
388kl39.1(3) k. Weight of Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
Trial 388 €=^142
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VI(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in
General
388kl42 k. Inferences from Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
In directing verdict, court is not free to weigh evidence
and thus invade province of jury; rather, directed
verdict is only appropriate when court is able to conclude as a matter of law that reasonable minds would
not differ on facts to be determined from evidence
presented.
121 Waters and Water Courses 405 €^>190
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405IX Public Water Supply
405IX(A) Domestic and Municipal Purposes
405kl90 k Acquisition of Water Sources
and Rights Incident Thereto or Arising Therefrom
Most Cited Cases
Waters and Water Courses Subdivision water company agreed to be bound by water agreement entered
into between subdivision developers upon termination
of their business relationship, under which agreement
water company agreed that it owned sufficient water
to service developed lots of subdivision and, thus,
neither developer nor his separate company were
responsible for making sure that water company had
adequate water, nor did they owe alleged water
shortfall to water company, despite contention that
there were discussions about shortfall between developers at time of their separation, water company
did not advance legal theory sufficient to circumvent
applicability of agreement
18] Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 1 7 9 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl79 Sufficiency of Presentation of
Questions
30kl79(l) k In General Most Cited
Cases
Mere mention of issue without introducing supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve
that issue for appeal
121 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k Nature of Constructive Trust
Most Cited Cases
Trial court reasonably imposed constructive trust on
subdivision developer's company's title to one-third
interest in subdivision water company's water system
for benefit of water company according to terms of
water agreement between parties, despite contention
that court should have required developer's company
to transfer its one-third interest directly to water
company, in action in which water company sought
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return of one-third interest, that had been transferred
from developer's company to another of developer's
companies, under agreement, water company would
have received its interest in water proportionally as
developer's company developed more lots in subdivision, and water company could not expect to be placed
in better position than it agreed to under agreement
Restatement of Restitution fr 160 comment
[101 Appeal and Error 30 €^>949
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKH) Discretion of Lower Court
30k949 k Allowance of Remedy and Matters of Procedure in General Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals can reverse trial court's imposition
of constructive trust only for abuse of discretion
[111 Appeal and Error 30 €>^>946
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKH) Discretion of Lower Court
30k944 Power to Review
30k946 k Abuse of Discretion Most
Cited Cases
Court of Appeals will only conclude the trial court
abused its discretion if ruling was beyond limits of
reasonability
[121 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k Nature of Constructive Trust
Most Cited Cases
"Constructive trust" is equitable remedy to prevent
unjust enrichment in absence of any express or implied intention to form trust Restatement of Restitution fr 160 comment
[131 Trusts 390 €^>91
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(C) Constructive Trusts
390k91 k Nature of Constructive Trust
Most Cited Cases
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In decreeing constructive trust, court of equity is
bound by no unyielding formula, but is free to effect
justice according to equities peculiar to each transaction wherever failure to perform duty to convey
property would result in unjust enrichment.
114] Contracts 95 €>^>1
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95kl k. Nature and Grounds of Contractual
Obligation. Most Cited Cases
It is not prerogative of Court of Appeals to prevent
enforcement of contracts that party subsequently regrets.
*459 Appeal from Fifth District, Washington County;
The Honorable J. Philip Eves.Gary L. Paxton and
Susannah E. Kesler, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Tolman.
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, St. George, for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and WILKINS, JJ.
AMENDED OPINION

m

FN1. This Amended Opinion replaces the
Opinion in Case No. 930761-CA issued on
February 8, 1996.
BILLINGS, Judge:
R.C. Tolman appeals the trial court's award of attorney
fees. Winchester Hills Water Company (WHWC)
cross-appeals the trial court's water rights rulings. We
affirm.
FACTS
In 1979, a group of individuals organized Shad Investment and Development Company (SIDCO) to
develop the Winchester Hills subdivision in Washington County, Utah. In 1980, this group organized
WHWC to provide water service to the subdivision.
By the mid-1980s, Russell Walter and R.C. Tolman
remained as the only owners and director-officers of
both corporations.
In 1989, Tolman and Walter, in order to terminate

their business relationship, entered into a Water
Agreement and a Settlement Agreement which were
retroactively effective to December 31, 1988. Under
the Settlement Agreement, Tolman and Walter agreed
that SIDCO would transfer one-half of its assets and
liabilities to Eaglebrook Corporation, and that Tolman
would own 100 percent of the Eaglebrook stock.
Tolman would then surrender his SIDCO stock and
Walter would own 100 percent of SIDCO. As part of
the separation of assets, each party received undeveloped lots in Winchester Hills. Under the Water
Agreement, the parties also agreed that Winchester
Hills' water production, storage, and delivery system
would be divided and assigned one-third to WHWC,
one-third to SIDCO, and one-third to Eaglebrook.
SIDCO and Eaglebrook agreed they would turn over
their respective one-third interests in WHWC's water
system to WHWC proportionally when and if they
developed lots.
Many post-agreement disputes arose between Tolman
and the other entities. In July 1989, Tolman attempted
to circumvent a WHWC building moratorium by
forming Lava Bluff Water Company and transferring
Eaglebrook's one-third interest in WHWC's water
system to that company.
Disputes between WHWC and Tolman continued and
this lawsuit was eventually filed. Tolman and his
companies, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, as plaintiffs,
sued WHWC for damages for WHWC's use of Lava
Bluffs one-third interest in WHWC's water system.
WHWC, as defendant, counterclaimed for a return of
Lava Bluffs one-third interest in WHWC's v/ater
system, a transfer of twenty-five acre feet of v/ater
from Tolman as a result of the alleged shortfall at the
time of his separation of business relations with Walter, damages for Tolman's unauthorized use of
WHWC water and unpaid WHWC water-stock assessments, and attorney fees from Tolman resulting
from WHWC's defense of Lava Bluffs claims.
The parties' claims were tried to a jury. At the close of
plaintiffs' case, the trial court granted WHWC's motion for a directed verdict on the claim that WHWC
damaged Lava Bluff by its use of Lava Bluffs
one-third interest in WHWC's water system. A1 the
close of WHWC's case, the trial court granted Tolman's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
Tolman's transfer of twenty-five acre feet of water to
WHWC. Also, Lava Bluff stipulated that it would
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reconvey its one-third interest in WHWC's water
system back to Eaglebrook, and the court imposed a
constructive trust on Eaglebrook's title to that interest
for the benefit of WHWC The issues of damages and
attorney fees were submitted to the jury
The jury found that Tolman damaged WHWC as a
result of his unauthorized use of WHWC water and
that he was responsible for WHWC's attorney fees
under the third-party attorney fees rule Tolman appeals the award of attorney fees
*460 WHWC cross-appeals the trial court's directed
verdict as to the twenty-five acre feet shortfall it
claims Tolman owes it and the trial court's imposition
of a constructive trust on the other disputed water
shares
I ATTORNEY FEES
mr21 On appeal, Tolman argues the award of attorney
fees to WHWC was error — Tolman claims there was
privity of interest between himself and Lava Bluff,
and thus the trial court erred by allowing the
third-party tort attorney fees issues to go to the jury or,
at the least, by improperly instructing the jury on this
issue WHWC responds that Tolman did not raise the
privity issue nor object to the attorney fees instructions
at trial and thus cannot raise this issue for the first time
on appeal
FN2 Tolman admits that Utah recognizes
attorney fees under the "third-party tort rule "
Under this rule, "it is settled that when the
natural consequence of one's negligence is
another's involvement m a dispute with a
third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred
in resolving the dispute are recoverable from
the negligent party as an element of damages " South Sanpitch Co \ Pack, 765 P 2d
1279, 1282-83 (Utah App 1988) WHWC
seeks only those fees incurred m litigation
against entities to undo the problems that
Tolman negligently caused by his breach of
fiduciary duty
[3] Rule 51 of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure states
"[i]n objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds for his objection " Utah R Ci\ P 51, see
Godesky v Provo City Coiy , 690 P 2d 541 546 (Utah
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1984) Utah courts have repeatedly held that an objection must "be specific enough to give the trial court
notice of the very error complained of and that an
objection couched in language such as 'the instruction
is not suggested by and is contrary to the law,' or like
terms, lacks the specificity required by the rule"
Beehne Medical Elecs , Inc \ Squate D Co , 669
P2d 859 860 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted), see
Moigan ^ Quailbiook Condo Co , 704 P 2d 573, 579
(Utah 1985), Godesfo, 690 P 2d at 546-47, Redevelopment Agenc\ \ Banutia, 526 P 2d 47, 51 (Utah
1974) Although this rule "serves the purpose of preserving the objection for appeal," Nielsen \ Pioneer
\alle\ Hosp, 830 P 2d 270 271 (Utah 1992), see
Moigan, 704 P 2d at 579, its primary purpose "is to
direct the attention of the court to the claimed errors in
the instruction so that [the court] might have an opportunity to correct them if [the court] deems it proper " Banutia, 526 P 2d at 51 accord Nielsen, 830
P 2d at 271, Godesfo, 690 P 2d at 547, Beehne Medical 669 P 2d at 861
Tolman's attorney made a blanket objection that he did
not believe the law allowed attorney fees "in any way
m this particular case" and somewhat more specifically objected that the law did not allow attorney fees
as damages m breach of fiduciary duty situations
Tolman did not alert the court to the claim he now
makes on appeal that the third-party attorney fees rule
was inapplicable because of privity between Lava
Bluff and himself Therefore, the trial court never
determined whether privity of parties existed under
the facts in this case
WHWC contends and we agree that Tolman's actions
at trial were similar to those of the plaintiff in Colhei
\ Fienchs, 626 P 2d 476 (Utah 1981) In Collier, the
plaintiff tried to argue on appeal that failure to drive at
a prudent speed constituted negligence as a matter of
law Id at 477 The supreme court noted, "He neither
objected to the stock instruction on negligence nor
proposed an instruction that Defendant was negligent
as a matter of law No motion was made for a directed
verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
Nor did Plaintiff propose an instruction directing the jury to find negligence " Id (citations
omitted) The court thus refused to address the issue
on appeal
As in Collier, Tolman failed to object specifically to
the jury instructions on privity grounds, failed to
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submit instructions on privity to refute the application
of the third-party attorney fees rule, and also failed to
argue the privity exception in any motions to the
court.— We therefore refuse to consider *461 this
issue for the first time on appeal. —
FN3. We note that Tolman has retained new
counsel for this appeal.
FN4. As a result of the outcome we reach
today, we also dispose of WHWC's Rule 23
motion and conclude all costs incurred in this
action should be released to WHWC.
II. WATER SHORTFALL
[41 WHWC cross-appeals the trial court's directed
verdict ruling that Tolman did not owe WHWC
twenty-five acre feet of water upon his separation of
business relations with Walter.—
FN5. Tolman argues that WHWC waived its
challenge to the directed verdict on appeal
because WHWC made its claim at trial
against Tolman and not Eaglebrook. We
disagree.
WHWC's claim at trial was against "Tolman, through Eaglebrook." Eaglebrook
was a party to the litigation. The trial
transcript shows both parties and the court
used Tolman and Eaglebrook interchangeably concerning the return of the water
shares. More importantly, the trial judge,
in his bench ruling on the directed verdict,
stated "there is nothing in that [Water]
[A]greement that says that Mr. Tolman or
Eaglebrook or Lava Bluffs is responsible
for making sure that [WHWC] has adequate water." (Emphasis added.)
WHWC properly raised a claim against
Eaglebrook at trial. In its bench ruling, the
court concluded that neither Tolman nor
Eaglebrook were liable to WHWC for the
water shortfall. The court's subsequent
written ruling, which specified only Tolman, should not restrict WHWC's right to
appeal an issue that was properly argued
before the trial court. We therefore reach
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the merits of WHWC's claim that the trial
court improperly directed a verdict in favor
of Tolman and Eaglebrook.
[5][61 On appeal from a directed verdict, u[w]e must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained."
Management Comm. v Graystone Pines, Inc., 652
P.2d 896. 898 (Utah 1982). "In directing a verdict, the
court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade
the province of the jury." Id at 897. Rather, "[a] directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is
able to conclude as a matter of law, that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined
from the evidence presented." Id at 897-98.
The trial court ruled "WHWC agreed to be bound by
the [Water] Agreement. Pursuant to the [Wrater]
Agreement, WHWC agreed that it owned sufficient
water to service [the developed lots] in the Winchester
Hills area." The court stated from the bench "there is
nothing in that agreement that says that Mr. Tolman or
Eaglebrook or Lava Bluffs is responsible for making
sure that [WHWC] had adequate water.... That responsibility, under all the agreements, falls squarely
on the shoulders of SIDCO. They're the ones who
agreed to provide the water."
[7][8] We agree with the trial court that WHWC did
not advance a legal theory to the court to circumvent
the applicability of the Water Agreement. Although
WHWC submitted testimony that there were discussions about the shortfall between Walter and Tolman
at the time of their separation and Walter testified that
the Water Agreement contained a calculation error,
WHWC never argued or proved there was a mistake
that legally voided the agreement. "The 'mere mention' of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that
issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel
Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App.1991)).
WHWC failed to provide the court with a legal theory
to prevent enforcement of the clear language of the
Water Agreement. Therefore, the trial court properly
directed a verdict in favor of Tolman and Eaglebrook.
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III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
[9] Finally, the trial court required Lava Bluff to return
the one-third interest in WHWC's water system to
Eaglebrook, and required Eaglebrook to hold the interest in a constructive trust for the benefit of WHWC
according to the terms of the Water Agreement.
WHWC appeals the trial court's imposition of the
constructive trust on Eaglebrook, contending the trial
court should have required Eaglebrook to transfer its
one-third *462 interest in the water system directly to
WHWC.
[IQIfin We can reverse the trial court's imposition of
a constructive trust only for an abuse of discretion.
Thurston v. Box Elder Count]', 892 P.2d 1034. 1041
(Utah 1995). This court will only conclude the trial
court abused its discretion if the ruling was "beyond
the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).
F12HT31 A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of any express or implied intention to form a trust. In re Estate
of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); ^Restatement
of Restitution § 160 cmt. c (1937). "A court of equity
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according
to the equities peculiar to each transaction wherever a
failure to perform a duty to convey property would
result in unjust enrichment." Haws v. Jensen, 116
Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (1949).
WHWC relies on the Restatement's pronouncement
that a constructive trust should restore the property to
the party who has been "unjustly deprived" and take
property from the party who has been "unjustly
enriched." "[I]n other words[,] the effect is to ... put
each of them in the position in which he was before the
defendant acquired the property." Restatement of
Restitution^ 160 cmt. d (1937).
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Water Agreement states, to transfer the interest to
WHWC proportionally as it develops further in the
Winchester Hills area. Thus, the constructive trust is a
temporary vehicle to carry out the terms of the parties'
agreement, and the court has returned WHWC to the
position it would have been in had Eaglebrook properly carried out the terms of the Water Agreement.
Therefore, we find the terms of the court's ruling
reasonable.
FN6. WHWC now claims the terms of the
Water Agreement are unfair and are
one-sided. However, it is not the prerogative
of this court to prevent the enforcement of
contracts that a party subsequently regrets.
Ted R. Brown and Assocs. v. Carries Corp.,
753 P.2d 964. 970-71 (Utah App.1988) (
"[A] court may not make a better contract for
the parties than they have made for themselves ....").
CONCLUSION
We hold Tolman cannot raise the issue of privity
before this court, having not raised the issue before the
trial court. We therefore affirm the attorney fees
award. In addition, we hold the trial court's directed
verdict regarding the alleged water shortfall was correct under the clear language of the Water Agreement.
Also, we conclude the trial court reasonably imposed a
constructive trust on Eaglebrook for the benefit of
WHWC according to the terms of the Water Agreement. We therefore affirm.
JACKSON and WILKINS, JL, concur.
Utah App., 1996.
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc.
912P.2d457
END OF DOCUMENT

|T41 WHWC cannot expect to be placed in a better
position than it agreed to under the Water Agreement.— Under the Water Agreement, WHWC would
have received its interest in the water proportionally as
Eaglebrook developed more lots in the Winchester
Hills subdivision. The trust required Eaglebrook to
hold legal title to the one-third interest for the benefit
of WHWC according to the terms of the Water
Agreement. As such, Eaglebrook is required, as the
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Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and ORME, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION)
DAVIS.
*1 "On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings...." Lake Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust
Co., 845 P.2d 951, 953 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1993).
Further, it is well settled that "[w]e do not reverse a
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous," and "[w]e review a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness." Young v. Young, 979
P.2d338, 342 (Utah 1999). Moreover, "[w]hen challenging a trial court's findings, '[a]n appellant must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
"against the clear weight of the evidence." ' " Id.
(citations omitted; second alteration in original).
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in determining the amount Robin owes for past due child
support and alimony. The trial court determined that
Robin owed Laree a total of $76,137.99.—This
amount included $11,616.44 for incomplete payment
of Laree's share of Robin's retirement funds and
$64,521.55 for child support and alimony arrearages.
The court based the $11,616.44 retirement funds figure on a May 15, 1987 judgment (1987 judgment) of
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$13,815.74,— less a payment made by Rod on Robin's behalf totaling $10,288.93, plus post-judgment
interest on the remaining balance of $3,526.81 at the
rate of 12% per annum, which interest totaled
$8,089.63 as of February 1998. The court based the
$64,521.55 amount for child support and alimony
arrearages on a February 1, 1988 judgment (1988
judgment) of $8,000: —1 amounts accruing as of December 1987 at $100 per month for alimony and $100
per month per child (until each child reached the age
of eighteen); plus interest on the total unpaid balance
each month at a rate of 7.23% per annum.
FN1. The court found that Robin had made
no payments for child support or alimony
since November 1987.
FN2. Laree obtained this judgment when she
successfully petitioned to modify the divorce
decree, based on the changed circumstances
that Robin was incarcerated. The judgment
for the retirement funds was ordered because
Robin had liquidated the fund of which Laree
was entitled to one-half. The modification
also awarded Laree custody of the children,
lowered Robin's child support obligations to
$100 per month per child ($400), and lowered his alimony obligation to $100 per
month.
FN3. The court found that Robin made no
objection to this judgment at the time it was
rendered. This judgment represented $6,400
for child support due from August 1986 to
November 1987 at $400 per month-i.e., $100
per child per month-and $ 1,600 alimony due
during the same period at $ 100 per month.
Defendants first contend the court made mathematical
errors in calculating the amount of child support and
alimony in arrears. Defendants point to their illustration which shows that the total alimony and child
support due from July 1984 to July 1998 was
$44,000-i.e., $17,600 for alimony and $26,400 for
child support-in contradistinction to the $64,521.55
determined by the trial court. This discrepancy,
however, is partially accounted for. First, defendants
examine only the obligation as determined in the divorce decree and the May 1987 decree modification as
of the date the modification was entered. The court's
findings, however, take into account the 1988 judg-
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ment when the court found that Robin owed $8,000
alimony and child support for the period from August
1986 to November 1987. The discrepancy occurs
because, according to defendants' illustration, the
change of his child support obligation (from $200 to
$400 per month) began on June 1, 1987, whereas
under the decree modification, the change was actually effective July 18, 1986. The 1988 judgment and
the trial court's determination here both account for
the correct effective date of the modified decree. Defendants' illustration is simply inaccurate.
*2 Second, defendants' illustration also differs from
the trial court's determination because the illustration
does not account for interest on the unpaid alimony
and child support. This interest has accrued since
December 1987 and partially accounts for the discrepancy between the trial court's determination and
the principal alone in defendants' illustration. SeeUtah
Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1999) (authorizing interest on
judgments); id. § 30-3-10.6(l)(a) (1998) (providing
that "[e]ach payment or installment of child or spousal
support under any child support order ... is, on and
after the date it is due ... a judgment"); Stroud v.
Stroud, 758 P.2d 905, 906 (Utah 1988) (holding that
interest accrues on child support arrearages until
paid); Hoazland v. Hoazland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029
(Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that interest accrues on
unpaid alimony arrearages).
Nonetheless, it appears that although interest is appropriate, the method by which the court calculated
the interest is in error. Regarding the 1987 judgment,
the court correctly applied the 12% interest rate that
was effective at the time the judgment was entered m SeeUtah_Coo^_An^^
("The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time
of the judgment shall remain the interest rate for the
duration of the judgment."). Regarding both the 1987
and 1988 judgments, however, the court erred by
compounding the interest. See Estate Landscape &
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States
Tel & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah
Ct.App.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 844 P.2d 322
(Utah 1992). Accordingly, although the court made no
mathematical errors, we conclude the methodology it
employed in arriving at the $76,137.99 total judgment
was flawed and reverse the judgment in this respect.
On remand, the court should recalculate the total
judgment without compounding the interest.
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FN4. The record is unclear as to how Laree
arrived at the 7.23% per annum interest rate
in preparing the exhibit on which the court
relied. On remand the court should verify
whether this rate correctly applies to the 1988
judgment and the child support and alimony
arrearages accruing during the years thereafter.
Defendants next argue that the 1987 and 1988 judgments had expired and therefore the court erred by
including them in its determination of the amount
Robin owes Laree. We conclude the 1987 and 1988
judgments were properly renewed. This action was
commenced March 7, 1995, at which time the statute
of limitations on the 1987 and 1988 judgments had not
expired. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-12-22(1) (1996)
(providing that an action may be brought upon a
judgment or decree within eight years). Assuming the
complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action to
renew the 1987 and 1988 judgments, the court granted
Laree's motion to amend the complaint to renew the
judgments at trial February 9, 1998.—SeeUtah
R.Civ.P. 15(b). Although this was done after expiration of the limitations period, such amendment relates
back to the filing of the original complaint. SeeUtah
R.Civ.P. 15(c); Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501
(Utah Ct.App.1999). Consequently, the 1987 and
1988 judgments were renewed and the court did not
err in including the amounts Robin owed to Laree
from those judgments as part of the judgment in this
case.
FN5. Defendants argue the court abused its
discretion in allowing amendment under
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
because amendment would prejudice defendants, who were unprepared to argue items of
payment or set-off or show that the judgments were in error. However, the court
specifically found that defendants were not
prejudiced by the amendment. See Fibro
Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin ., Inc., 974 P.2d
288, 292 (Utah 1999). Although the pretrial
order was not signed by the trial court, it was
signed by counsel for plaintiff and defendants and put Robin on notice of Laree's intention to pursue the judgments, especially
by listing such judgments both as part of
Laree's claims and as uncontested facts.
Consequently, the court acted within its dis-
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c ret ion in permitting the amendment.
3 We also reject defendants1 argument that the tnai
court erred in finding that Robin did not prove an
entitlement to the $3,500 insurance proceeds which
would be offset against his arrearages. We review for
clear error the trial court's rejection of defendants'
claim because it was not persuaded by the evidence.
See Sorenson v. Kennecott Utah Copper Cory., 873
P.2d 1141. 1144 (Utah Ct.App.1994). The trial court
found there was insufficient evidence that Robin
owned the car when the accident occurred. Although
title to the automobile remained in Robin's name, this
finding is supported by the divorce decree that
awarded ownership to Laree and testimony that indicated Robin was sent the check by the insurance
company only because the name on the title had not
been changed. See Lake Philgas Sen>., 845 P.2d at 957
(holding that name on registration and title "establishes only a presumption of ownership, rebutted by
legally relevant evidence presented at trial and
deemed credible by the court"). Because the court's
finding is supported by the evidence, and it is not
clearly erroneous, we will not disturb it on appeal.—
FN6. We further reject defendants' contention that the unsigned pretrial order bound
the court to conclude that Robin owned the
vehicle and was therefore entitled to an offset
for the insurance proceeds. The language in
the order indicates only that Laree received
the insurance proceeds; it does not stand for
the proposition that Robin owned the vehicle
or was otherwise entitled to the proceeds.
Defendants also challenge the court's determination
that the original decree's intent was that the household
items accompany the house for the childrens' benefit
and thus Robin was not entitled to an offset for the
value of such personal property retained by Laree.
This court reviews the trial court's interpretation of a
prior judicial decision for correctness. See State v.
Montova, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994).
In awarding personal property, the divorce decree
provided with respect to Robin, "Defendant is
awarded all household furniture and furnishings,
personal effects and clothing and personal effects and
clothing of the minor children residing immediately
with him and all other personal property in his possession/This paragraph awards four categories of
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property to Robin: (1) the household furniture and
furnishings; (2) his personal effects and clothing; (3)
the childrens' personal effects and clothing; and (4)
other property in his possession. By its plain language,
the decree places no conditions or restrictions on
Robin's right to the personal property. The modified
divorce decree provided only that Laree may occupy
the home and did not transfer title of the household
furniture and furnishings to Laree. It cannot be said
that based on the decree and modification Robin held
title to the household furniture and furnishings only so
long as he resided in the house and had custody of the
children. The trial court, however, made no findings as
to the value of the property at the time Laree received
it. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings to determine the value of the household
goods when received by Laree to be credited against
the arrearages owed Laree.—
FN7. We reject Laree's contention that
Robin's offset claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. Even if Robin would be barred
from asserting such claims as a plaintiff in a
separate action, under Rule 13(i), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, he may nonetheless
"utilize a counterclaim, normally barred by
the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiffs
claim, but only to the extent the claims equal
each other," so long as the claims coexisted.
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072
(Utah Ct.App. 1996); see Jacohsen v. Bunker,
699 P.2d 1208. 1210 (Utah 1985).
Finally, we turn to defendants' argument that the court
erred in imposing a constructive trust, determining
that Rod thus held only a legal interest for Robin's
benefit, and quieting title to the home in Laree. This
court reviews the imposition of a constructive trust for
an abuse of discretion and "will only conclude the trial
court abused its discretion if the ruling was 'beyond
the limits of reasonability.' " Tolman v. Winchester
Hills Co., 912 P.2d 457. 462 (Utah Ct.App.1996)
(citation omitted). U A constructive trust is an equitable
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of
any express or implied intention to form a trust." Id .
First, defendants have not demonstrated that because
Laree was not a party to the quitclaim deed, she may
not enforce a constructive trust. "[A] constructive trust
may arise 'where a person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it ro another on
the ground that he would be unjustly enriched ' he
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were permitted to retain it....' " Parks v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590. 599 (Utah 1983) (quoting
Restatement of Restitution S 160 (1937)) (omission in
original). In Parks, the court relied on a Delaware case
in which the court found there was a constructive trust
in favor of a husband when his wife transferred property in which the husband had an interest to her relative before her death. See id.(citing Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148 (Del. 1982)). Notwithstanding
that the husband in Adams, like Laree, was not a party
to the transfer, the Parks court agreed that the trial
court properly imposed a constructive trust where
equity required. See id. at 599-600.We conclude that
the trial court here did not abuse its broad discretion in
determining that equity required the imposition of a
constructive trust transferring title from Rod to Rob-

FN8. Defendants did not appeal the propriety
of the implementation of the trust which in
effect transferred his interest in the home
back to Robin and then awarded Robin's interest to Laree by quieting title, essentially
relieving Laree from the need to execute on
her judgment. Notwithstanding, should recalculation of amounts due Laree show
Robin's entitlement to net affirmative relief,
the same should be ordered.
*4 Further, defendants incorrectly assert that Laree's
action for constructive trust is barred by the three year
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)
(1996), as an action based on fraud. Unlike Laree's
claim based on fraudulent conveyance, for which the
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
defendants, her claim for constructive trust sounds in
equity and therefore falls within the catch-all, four
year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25(3) (\996).See American Tierra Cory, v. City
ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 761 (Utah 1992). The trial
court found that Laree first discovered the conveyance
to Rod on May 15, 1991, pursuant to her application
for a loan, a factual finding that defendants do not
dispute on appeal. See Sew v. Security Title Co., 902
P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) ("We hold that the issue of
when a claimant discovered or should have discovered
the facts forming the basis of a cause of action is a
question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous."). Although the record shows Laree may have
had constructive notice of the deed when it was rec-
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orded, defendants have failed to marshal any evidence
that she had actual or constructive notice of the facts
which would justify imposing the constructive trust
before May 15, 1991. See zc/.("The discovery rule is an
exception to the general rule, and it delays the running
of the limitation period ' "until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action." ' ") (citations omitted); see also Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d
1118, 1195-97 (Utah 1993) (holding that although
deed was recorded, limitations period commenced
when claimant should have acquired knowledge that
transfer was fradulent). Because defendants have not
shown the limitations period commenced before May
15, 1991, we cannot say that Laree's claim for constructive trust, filed within four years on March 7,
1995, was barred.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's judgment except to
the extent that it incorrectly calculated the interest and
failed to properly value Robin's household furniture
and furnishings, on which points we reverse and remand. On remand, the court should recalculate the
total owed to Laree, make factual findings as to the
value of said personal property when received by
Laree, offset the same against amounts due Laree, and
recalculate its judgment accordingly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
further proceedings.
GREENWOOD, P.J., and ORME, J., concur.
Utah App.,2000.
Nielsen v. Nielsen
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249399 (Utah
App.), 2000 UT App 37
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Dennis MOLER, an individual; and Marilynn Moler,
an individual, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CW MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation; and Christopher McCandless, an individual, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20070048.
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.MIII Privileged Communications and i. 'niuentiality
311H1I1 Attorney-Client Privilege
31IIIk 120 Parties and Interests Represented
- \Ltorney
31 !Hkl21 k. In General Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 4lOkl99(2))

Jul, 1 ' '(
B ac kgro un d: Purchasers o f new hom e b ro ught ac t io n
against vendor and other defendants involved in development of gated community or sale of the home,
alleging plaintiffs did not learn, until after closing on
the sale, that amended covenants, conditions, and
restrictions (CC&R), removing the restriction on occupancy to households with at least one person 55
years of age or older, had been recorded. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone E.
Medley, J., granted defendants' motion to compel
plaintiffs to answer questions, at deposition, regarding
their conversations with their daughter, a
non-practicing attorney. Plaintiffs appealed.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Purr ant, Associate
Chief Justice, held that a representative of the client,
for purposes of attorney-client privilege, can be a
natural person.
!\L-maii(k o.

West Headnotes
If!( Appuil JIIHI I .ii i i 30 €=>HL!ii!i|in
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In Gen.-. M^t u t c J
Cases
The existence of a privilege is a question oflaw for the
court, which the appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determi-

Privileged Communications and Confidentiality
311H€==>123
3111-1 Privileged Communications and < • *KK -.
311HIII Attorney-Client Privilege
31 !Hkl20 Parties and Interests Repress.ned
by Attorney
31 !Hkl23 k. Corporations, Partnerships,
Associations, and Other Entities. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 4 lOkl 99(2))
"Client," within meaning of rule of evidence defining
a representative of the client, for purposes of attorney-client privilege, as one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one
specifically authorized to communicate with the
lawyer concerning a legal matter, is not restricted to a
corporate entity or other legally recognized entity that
must act through a natural person to conduct its affairs; it also encompasses a natural person. Rules of
EvkL Rule 504(a)(K 4), (b).
131 Piixikued Communications .tnd

r

?nfidi rrnil-

311H Privileged Communications and Confidentiality
311HIII Attorney-Client Privilege
31 1 Ilkl20 Parties and Interests Repre>e»ited
by Attorney.
31 lllki_ i JV. in I K • .L i ai. MOM V. tii-a I a^cs
(Formerly 4 lOkl 99(2))
For a person to qualify as a representative of the client,
for purposes of attorney-client privilege, there is no
requirement that the person must be retained to give
legal advice or that the person's services must be essential to legal representation of the client. Rules of
Evid., Rule 504(a)(4), (b).
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HI Estoppel 156 €^52.10(2)
156 Estoppel
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k52.10 Waiver Distinguished
156k52.10(2) k. Nature and Elements of
Waiver. Most Cited Cases
"Waiver" is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.
151 Estoppel 156 €^52.10(2)
156 Estoppel
156II1 Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k52.10 Waiver Distinguished
156k52.10(2) k. Nature and Elements of
Waiver. Most Cited Cases
To establish waiver, a defendant must show that the
plaintiff had: (1) an existing right; (2) knowledge of its
existence; and (3) an intent to relinquish the right.
[61 Privileged Communications and Confidentiality 311H €^>168
311H Privileged Communications and Confidentiality
311HIII Attorney-Client Privilege
311Hkl68 k. Waiver of Privilege. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 410k219(3))
In order to waive the attorney-client privilege as to any
given communication, the attorney-client privilege
must exist when the communication at issue occurred,
and the holder of the privilege must consent to the
disclosure. Rules of Evid., Rules 504(b), 507(a).
*1251 Richard F. Ensor, Evan S. Strassberg, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs.
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Lisa M. McGarrv, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

Page 2

that client is an individual and not a corporation or
other business entity. We hold that such communications may be privileged regardless of whether the
client is a corporation or a natural person so long as the
requirements of rule 504 are met. Under rule
504(a)(4), a client's representative is "one having
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act
on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the
client, or one specifically authorized to communicate
with the lawyer concerning a legal matter."
BACKGROUND
H 2 The parties to this case dispute whether communications between Dennis and Marilynn Moler (the
"Molers") and their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis,
are protected by the lawyer-client privilege. In 2002,
the Molers contracted to purchase a new home from
Franklin Homes in a new gated community named
Redfeather Estates in Sandy, Utah. At the time the
Molers first met with Redfeather Estates' real estate
agent, Christopher McCandless, the homes in Redfeather Estates were burdened with covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC & Rs") that limited occupancy to households with at least one person fifty-five years of age or older. But before the Molers
closed on their purchase, the sellers executed and
recorded amended CC & Rs removing the age restriction from Redfeather Estates. The Molers learned
of the restriction's removal only after they closed on
the purchase of their residence. They eventually filed
this lawsuit against McCandless, Franklin Homes, and
other entities involved in Redfeather Estates' development and sale (collectively, the "Sellers").— The
lawsuit alleged several causes of action related to the
sale of the property and the removal of the restriction.
FN1. Several of the original defendants
named in this lawsuit settled with the Molers
and are no longer parties. For convenience
and because which of the defendants sought
to compel Mr. Moler's testimony is irrelevant
to the issue before us, we refer throughout
this opinion to any and all defendants as the
"Sellers."

INTRODUCTION
TI1 This case requires us to decide whether rule 504 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which delineates the
lawyer-client privilege, protects communications
between a lawyer and a client's representative, even if

K 3 Before filing suit, the Molers enlisted their
daughter, Moler-Lewis, to help them with various
aspects of the dispute. Although Moler-Lewis graduated from law school and was at one time a practicing
attorney, she has never represented the Molers in this
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action. She did, however, assist the Molers in identifying and retaining a law firm to represent them. In
addition, Moler-Lewis was present and participated in
some conversations between the Molers and
McCandless. Therefore, Moler-Lewis is also a witness
to some of the facts underlying the lawsuit.
II 4 rhere are two sets of communications between the
Molers and Moler-Lewis at issue in this case. The first
set occurred before the Molers retained counsel in
anticipation of litigation. The second set occurred after
the Molers retained counsel. After the Molers filed
suit, counsel for the Sellers deposed Mr. Moler. Mr.
Moler was asked to describe in detail all communications he and Mrs. Moler had with Moler-Lewis concerning the lawsuit, including those where the Molers'
counsel was present. Counsel for the Molers objected
and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer, invoking the
lawyer-client *1252 privilege. But later in the same
deposition, Mr. Moler recounted some conversations
he and Mrs. Moler had with Moler-Lewis prior to
retaining counsel.
j | 5 The Sellers moved the district court to compel Mr.
Moler to answer the questions that he had refused to
answer about those conversations, and the district
court granted the motion, holding that the lawyer-client privilege did not apply. The court reasoned
that the conversations with Moler-Lewis could not be
privileged because Moler-Lewis was neither the Molers' attorney nor their representative as contemplated
by rule 504(a)(4) in that she was not retained for legal
advice and her services were not "essential to [the
Molers'] representation." In addition, the district court
held that even if Moler-Lewis was the Molers' representative, Mr. Moler had waived the privilege by
testifying as to other conversations between himself
and Moler-Lewis that occurred before the Molers
retained counsel in anticipation of litigation.
H 6 The Molers filed this interlocutory appeal, and we
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008).
STANDARD O F REVIEW
III *\\ 7"The existence of a privilege is a question of
law for the court, which we review for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court's determination.*1
FN2
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FN2. Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251. 1254
(Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
*\\ 8 We begin and end our analysis with a
plain-language review of Utah Rule of Evidence 504:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client between the client and the client's
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives,
and lawyers representing others in matters of
common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination.—
FN3. Utah R. L\id. 504(b) (emplui.so .Hided).
!orc. in oruer to determine whether each comn.-.i: cation at issue was privileged, the district court
was required to answer two questions: First, was
Moler-Lewis a representative of the Molers as defined
in rule 504(a)(4)? Second, was each communication at
issue a "confidential communication" as defined in
rule 504(a)(5) and (6)? We will first discuss whether
the district court correctly applied rule 504 to the
communications at issue. Then we will review the
district court's ruling that Mr. Moler waived the privilege by testifying as to conversations between the
Molers and Moler-Lewis that occurred before the
Molers retained counsel in anticipation of litigation.
I. WAS MOLER-LEWIS A "REPRESENTA 1 \\ H
OF THE CI IENT"?
121 11 9Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4) defines a
"representative of the client" as "one having authority
to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client,
or one specifically authorized to communicate with
the lawyer concerning a legal matter." Whether Moler-Lewis qualified as such a representative depends,
in part, on whether the Molers qualified as "clients."
The Sellers contend that the Molers could not have
been "clients" as that term is used in the definitional
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subsection (a)(4) because "client" in that subsection is
limited to corporate entities and other legally recognized entities that must act through human beings to
conduct their affairs. In support of this argument, the
Sellers point to the advisory committee note to rule
504: "The committee revised the proposed rule .. to
address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United
States as to when communications involving representatives of a corporation are protected by privilege."
(Citation omitted.) They argue that because the rule
was revised in response to Upjohn, which resolved the
issue of who may represent a corporate entity, only
corporations,* 1253 and not natural persons, can have
representatives.—The Sellers urge us to adopt a rule
restricting to corporations and other business entities
the right to have representatives with whom communications might be confidential.
FN4. 449 U.S. 383. 101 S.Ct. 677, 66
L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).
H 10 We disagree with the Sellers' reasoning as to the
meaning of the term "client" in rule 504. In our view,
the term "client" as used throughout the rule refers not
just to corporations or other business entities, but to
natural persons as well. Indeed, "client" is specifically
defined in subsection (a)(1) to include "a person."
T| 11 Further, the fact that this rule was revised in
response to the Upjohn case does not lead to the conclusion that "client" in rule 504(b) should be read to
exclude individuals. In Upjohn, the United States
Supreme Court held that low-level and mid-level
employees-not just those in the "control group"-could
potentially be protected by the attorney-client privilege.— While this holding defines the potential scope
of the federal privilege in the corporate context, it does
not purport to limit the term "representative of a
client" to that context. The Sellers would read "client"
as used in the first line of subsection (b) to be different
from the same term as used subsequently in the same
subsection and throughout the rule. That is, in the first
line of subsection (b), under the Sellers' interpretation,
"client" refers only to corporate entities, but in every
other usage throughout the rule, "client" includes
natural persons as well. Such a reading is contrary to
the plain language of the rule and without justification.
The plain language of the rule, which explicitly defines client to include a person, leads us to reject the
inference the Sellers draw from the Upjohn case.
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FN5.M at 391-92. 101 S.Ct. 677.
K 12 We recognize that some jurisdictions have
adopted the contrary rule that only corporate clients or
similar entities may have representatives.— We also
recognize the concern that allowing individuals to
have representatives could extend the privilege to a
limitless number of third parties, potentially subverting the truth-finding function of courts. But in our
view, this concern is adequately addressed bv the
language of the rule, which carefully limits a "representative" to "one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer
concerning a legal matter." Because the rule so limits
who may be a representative, our holding will not
unduly expand the privilege.
FN6. See, e.g., State v. Jancsek, 302 Or. 270,
730 P.2d 14, 21 (1986) (holding thai the
"client" to which the definition of "representative" applies must be a business entity).
K 13 Moreover, from a policy perspective, we find it
salutary that natural persons should be afforded the
same level of protection when communicating with
their representatives as corporations now enjoy. In
many cases, an individual's need to consult with an
advisor regarding the facilitation of legal services may
be every bit as acute as the need of a corporation to do
so, often more so.
[31 T| 14 In this case, however, the district court found
that such protection did not extend to the Molers because Moler-Lewis did not qualify as their representative. The district court drew this conclusion because
Moler-Lewis was not retained to give legal advice and
her services were not "essential to [the Molers'] representation." In so concluding, the district court
imposed a requirement not found in rule 504. In order
to resolve whether Moler-Lewis was a representative
of the client, the district court need make only the
following factual determination: Was Moler-Lewis
"one having authority to obtain professional legal
services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized
to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal
matter"? Because the district court applied the wrong
standard, it did not make the findings necessary for us
to conduct a review using the correct standard.
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Therefore, we remand for the district court to make
factual determinations and apply the *1254 correct
standard to resolve whether Moler-Lewis qualified as
ihe Molers' representative.

are unable to reach a conclusion as to whether Mr.
Moler waived the lawyer-client privilege.

IT DID EACH COMMUNICATION AT ISSUE
CONSTITUTE A "CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION"' SI JCH THAT IT MIGHT QUAI IFY AS
PRIVILEGED?
TJ 15 The second question that must be resolved is
whether each communication at issue is a "confidential communication" such that it might qualify as
privileged. Subsection (a)(5) of rule 504 defines a
"communication" to include "advice given by the
lawyer in the course of representing the client and
includes disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the professional relationship." And
under subsection (a)(6), a communication is confidential if it is (1) "confidential" and (2) made for the
purpose of "facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client." To satisfy the confidentiality requirement under subsection (a)(6), the comication must "not [be] intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication." -1— Because
the district court concluded that Moler-Lewis was not
the Molers' representative, it did not reach this question. Thus, we remand for the district court to determine as to each communication in dispute whether the
communication was (1) confidential and (2) made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client.
FN7. Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(6).
ITT

M \ PRIVILEGE DID ATTACH TO EACH
LUMAIUNICATION AT ISSUE, DID MR. MOLER
WAIVE IT BY ANSWERING CERTAIN DEPOSITION OT T^TTONS?
1 16 The resolution of the final is sue-whether Mr.
Moler waived the privilege-is dependent upon the
district court's resolution on remand of when, if at all,
the lawyer-client privilege came into existence. Because the district court used the wrong legal standard
in holding that Moler-Lewis was not the Molers' representative and that question remains unresolved, we

r4~l[5T[6] 11 17 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right.— To establish waiver, a defendant
must show that the plaintiff had (1) an existing right,
(2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent to
relinquish the right.— Therefore, in order to waive the
privilege as to any given communication, the lawyer-client privilege must exist when the communication at issue occurred, and the holder of the privilege
must consent to the disclosure. A plain-language
reading of rule 507(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
confirms this principle:
FN8. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Saw &
Loan Ass'ih 857 P.2d 935, 939-42 (Utah
1993).
FN9.M at 940.
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege
against disclosure of the confidential matter or
communication waives the privilege if the person or
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication.
(Emphasis added.)
The language of the rule suggests that there are two
temporal requirements for waiver. First, the communication must be privileged at the time it occurred. Second, the disclosure that constitutes
waiver of the privilege must be made while the
person disclosing holds the privilege.
1| 18 The district court, although concluding that the
privilege never existed, nevertheless concluded that
the privilege, if it did exist, had been waived. Understandably, the district court failed to make findings
of fact as to when the privilege came into existence.
Furthermore, the record provided to us on this appeal
(and which, presumably, is the same record that was
before the district court) does not contain a full transcript of the *1255 deposition at which Mr. Moler
apparently testified about discussions between the
Molers and Moler-Lewis. We therefore are unable to
determine when the privilege attached and, without
the benefit of a complete record, are also uncertain on
what basis the district court concluded that Mr, Moler
waived the privilege.
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^ 19 Furthermore, it is apparent from the record we do
have that Moler-Lewis was present on numerous occasions both before and after the Molers retained
counsel m anticipation of litigation. Even if Mr. Moler
voluntarily testified regarding one or more confidential matters, it does not follow that he waived all
lawyer-client privileges for all communications. Rule
507(a) restricts the scope of each waiver to a communication about which "any significant part of the
matter or communication" has been disclosed.
Therefore, Mr. Moler did not waive the privilege for a
particular communication if he did not disclose any
significant part of the particular matter or communication at issue.
Tj 20 We therefore remand to the district court for an
assessment of whether a privilege arose under the
framework we have described and, if so, when it
arose. Only when these questions are resolved may the
district court properly determine whether Mr. Moler
waived the privilege during his deposition.
CONCLUSION
TI 21 We conclude that communications between
clients and their representatives may be privileged
regardless of whether the client is a corporation or a
natural person. Rule 504(a)(4) defines a representative
as "one having authority to obtain professional legal
services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized
to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal
matter." We remand to the district court to make a
determination as to each communication at issue in
this case using the framework we have described.
1| 22 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS,
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT'S opinion.
Utah,2008.
Moler v. CW Management Corp
190 P.3d 1250, 608 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 2008 UT 46
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
R. E. WALKER et al., heirs of the Estate of John A.
Walker, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
J. B. WALKER, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 10286.
July 19, 1965.
Suit by heirs of decedent, the probate of whose estate
had not been completed, against decedent's oldest son
for distributive shares of two parcels of land which
plaintiffs claimed to be family property. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J., held
that defendant held property as trustee and that plaintiffs should have their respective shares conditioned
upon plaintiffs repaying to defendant amount of lien
he had on property for moneys he had advanced to
keep family from losing the property. Plaintiffs appealed and defendant filed cross-appeal. The Supreme
Court, Crockett, J., held that evidence sustained
finding that oldest son in whose name deeds to property previously owned by his parents had been taken
had been acting as trustee for family in regard to that
property, and that he was entitled to reimbursement
for moneys advanced to protect the family property.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
HI Appeal and Error 30 €==>931(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKG) Presumptions
30k931 Findings of Court or Referee
30k931(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Where there is a dispute in evidence, Supreme Court
views it in light most favorable to trial court's findings.
121 Tenancy in Common 373 €==>38(8)
373 Tenancy in Common
373II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of
Cotenants
373k38 Actions Between Cotenants

Page 1

373k38(8) k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Where one co-owner does something for protection of
owners' common property, it is presumed that his
action was to preserve it for benefit of all owners
unless some indication to contrary plainly appears.
]31 Trusts 390 €^>44(2)
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390k40 Evidence to Establish Trust
390k44 Weight and Sufficiency
390k44(2) k. Evidence to Charge
Grantee or Assignee as Trustee. Most Cited Cases
Evidence sustained finding that one son in whose
name deeds to property previously owned by his
parents had been taken had been acting as trustee for
family in regard to that property, in suit by other
children for their distributive shares in property on
ground that it was family property.
1 £ Equity 150 €==>88
150 Equity
150II Laches and Stale Demands
150k88 k. Waiver of Objections. Most Cited
Cases
Burden of taking some affirmative action should be on
him who accuses the other of delay and unless he has
taken such action or in some manner put other party on
notice that action is required, he cannot take advantage
of the delay.
151 Limitation of Actions 241 €=>103(4)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl01 Existence of Trust
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of
Trust
241kl03(4) k. Notice of Repudiation.
Most Cited Cases
Trusts 390 €^>365(3)
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
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390VIKC) Actions
390k365 Time to Sue, Limitations, and
Laches
390k365(3) k. Repudiation or Violation
of Trust, and Knowledge of Beneficiary as Affecting
Laches. Most Cited Cases
Defense of statute of limitations and laches are not
available to trustee as against his beneficiaries until
something has occurred to give clear indication to
them that he has repudiated his trust or circumstances
are such that they must be charged with knowledge of
such repudiation.
161 Trusts 390 € ^ 3 6 5 ( 2 )
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKC) Actions
390k365 Time to Sue, Limitations, and
Laches
390k365(2) k. Laches in General. Most
Cited Cases
Where oldest son undertook to raise money to save
family property which had been sold at sheriffs sale
and execution sale and received deeds to property and
held property to provide home for his mother and her
family, some of whom remained on property, other
members of family were not precluded from claiming
interest in property on ground of laches although they
did not assert interest until after death of mother 42
years after oldest son took property. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 8, 18, 54(c) and (1), 83; U.C.A.1953,
78-37-6.
121 Trusts 390 €^>236
390 Trusts
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Property
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to
Trustee. Most Cited Cases
Inasmuch as agreement whereby oldest son took title
to family property making him a trustee was binding
upon that son, agreement was binding upon other
children and required them to recognize lien provided
for therein and to reimburse oldest son for money he
expended to protect the family property.
181 Contracts 95 € ^ 2 4 5 ( 1 )

95 Contracts
95III Modification and Merger
95k245 Merger in Subsequent Contract
95k245(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Court's refusal to go back of agreement entered into
more than 40 years before making one son trustee of
family property and providing lien for sums he expended to save property and court's assumption that all
prior mutual claims and demands were merged into
that agreement was proper.
121 Descent and Distribution 124 € ^ 8 2
124 Descent and Distribution
124III Rights and Liabilities of Heirs and Distributees
124111(A) Nature and Establishment of Rights
in General
124k82 k. Conveyances and Other Transactions Between Heirs and Distributees. Most Cited
Cases
Agreement whereby all of assets of corporation operated by two sons were assigned to one son reserving to
the other only rights which he had in estate of his
father did not reserve any share in rights to reimbursement for money used to protect family property
as provided by prior agreement whereby such rights
were to belong to son who acquired corporate assets.
[101 Trusts 390 €=^236
390 Trusts
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Property
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to
Trustee. Most Cited Cases
Where whatever money may have been expended by
corporation to protect family property was paid at
instance of oldest son who had undertaken responsibility of protecting family property and assets of
corporation were assigned to him, he was entitled to
reimbursement for any advancements corporation had
made for that purpose.
[Ill Trusts 390 €^>236
390 Trusts
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Property
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to
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Trustee. Most Cited Cases
Trustee is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses
properly incurred in discharging responsibilities of his
trust.
[12] Trusts 390 €^>289
390 Trusts
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee
390k289 k. Duty to Account in General. Most
Cited Cases
Trusts 390 €^>325
390 Trusts
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee
390k325 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
It is duty of trustee to keep full, accurate and orderly
records and when any question arises as to their sufficiency or accuracy, burden is upon him to show
correctness of his accounts and doubts may be resolved adversely to him.
[131 Trusts 390 €=^325
390 Trusts
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee
390k325 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Evidence sustained trial court's findings as to amount
to be allowed to trustee for moneys he advanced including taxes paid on family property, in suit wherein
trustee claimed sums due for advancements to keep
family from losing family property.
[141 Trusts 390 €==^374
390 Trusts
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust
390VIKC) Actions
390k374 k. Scope and Extent of Relief.
Most Cited Cases
Where parties were afforded opportunity for presentation and adjudication of all their claims relating to
family property and all claims were adjudicated, refusal to resort to special procedure for foreclosure of
oldest son's lien on property and adjudication that
others should have their respective interests in property, subject to their reimbursing oldest son for moneys he had advanced to protect it was proper and
others should be given reasonable time, 60 days after
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remittitur, to raise money and perform condition.
**254 *55 Thomas C. Cuthbert, Frank J. Allen, Salt
Lake City, for appellants.
H. Arnold Rich, Max K. Mangum, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Plaintiffs are heirs of the estate of John A. Walker
who died in 1912 and the probate of whose estate has
not been completed. They join in suing the oldest son,
John B. Walker, for their respective distributive shares
in two parcels of land in Union, in southeast Salt Lake
County, which they claim to be family property. Title
to the land in question has stood in the name of the
defendant for over 40 years. After a plenary trial of the
issues, the court found in accordance with the contention of the plaintiffs: that the defendant held this
property as trustee for the family and that **255 the
plaintiff should have their respective shares therein,
provided, however, that the defendant has a lien on
such property for moneys he had advanced to keep the
family from losing the property. The decree conditioned plaintiffs recovery upon repayment to the defendant of the amount of the lien in the sum of
$5,614.00 principal and $16,143.36 interest, within 30
days after demand by the defendant.
HI Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant appear to
have been satisfied with the determination made by
the trial court. The plaintiffs appeal challenging: (a)
the amount of the lien; (b) the refusal to apply the
statute of limitations and/or laches; (c) the period for
which interest was allowed; and (d) the provision of
the decree which would peremptorily divest them of
their interest if the amount of the lien was not paid
within 30 days after demand. On cross appeal defendant urges: that he owns the property absolutely so the
plaintiffs should be precluded from any recovery
whatsoever; and that in any event the trial court did
not allow him sufficient credits for money paid out to
protect the family's interest in the lands. Where there
is a *56 dispute in the evidence we view it in the light
most favorable to the trial court's findings.—
FN1. See Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company,
7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712, 714 (1958);
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah
2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520(1957).
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When the father of this family died in 1912, he left his
widow Mmnetta Walker and six children John B
Walker, age 20, Robert E Walker, age 18, Alta F
Walker, age 14, Ila M Walker, age 11, Austin L
Walker, age 9, and Roma Walker, age 7 His widow
was appointed administratrix of his estate, and published notice to creditors No further proceedings were
had until after Mmnetta Walker died in 1959 A successor administrator was appointed in 1960
Mmnetta Walker appears to have been a woman of
considerable resourcefulness in mothering and managing for her family They continued to operate the
family store, the Union Co-Operative Mercantile
Company, and the farm The two older sons, John B
and Robert E were sent to college In 1915 a family
enterprise of hauling ore by team and wagon from the
Cardiff Mine in Cottonwood Canyon was initiated
The horses and equipment were owned by the family
and the work was done by the two older sons, John B
and Robert E Walker This hauling business was
continued and became known as the J B Walker and
R E Walker Trucking Company and was ostensibly a
partnership between them In succeeding years the
mother and the boys both borrowed money on the
family property to obtain trucks and equipment for this
purpose In 1920 a mortgage was given on part of the
family property to secure a loan of $4,000 00 some of
which was to pay off a prior mortgage these boys had
signed On default in paying the mortgage, it was
foreclosed and on February 10, 1922 the property was
sold at Sheriffs Sale to a Mr Dayton Meanwhile the
store had not prospered sufficiently to meet expenses
and support the family, and pursuant to judgments
taken against it, was sold on execution sale
In this setting, after the period of redemption on both
of the sales just referred to had expired, the oldest son,
defendant J B Walker, undertook to raise the money
to save the family property and on October 9, 1922 a
written agreement between members of the family
was executed It states in part
' 1 That second party [J B Walker] is hereby authorized and directed to diligently attempt to pay any and
all of the obligations hereinbefore referred to in so far
as he is able to pay the same
4

2 That the first parties [Walker heirs] agree to pay
upon demand to second party * * * eight ninths of all
the money which he shall advance and pay on account

of the claims, * * * with interest thereon at the rale of
eight per cent per annum from the date of any and all
of said payments, it being *57 understood that the
remaining onenmth**256 of said payments is the
share which second party is required to pay of said
obligations * * *
'3 The first parties [Walker heirs] do hereby give and
grant to the second party [defendant J B Walker] a
lien upon all of the real estate in this contract specifically described, together with said water rights, for
the purpose of securing the payment of first partie s to
second party of any and all payments which shall be
made by second party, pursuant to the terms of this
agreement'
J B Walker did arrange finances to pay off the debts,
and on October 19, 1922 received a deed from Mr
Dayton for the mortgage foreclosed property, and on
August 24, 1923 received a deed of the store property
from the Association of Credit Men Members of the
family have since continued to reside on the property
including the mother until her death in 1959 The
youngest brother, Austin Walker, has lived there and
farmed the land with the understanding that he could
do so for the payment of taxes, which he has done,
except for some taxes which have been paid by J B
Walker
Meanwhile J B and R E Walker had incorporated
their business in 1931 and jointly continued its operation until shortly after the death of their mother On
June 6, 1959, after dissension between them, ihey
arrived at a settlement in which R E conveyed to r B
all of his interest in the corporation and any interest in
the old partnership property, but reserved his interest
in the estate of his father John A Walker
It was upon the refusal of J B Walker to recognize
the interests of the plaintiffs in the family property
subsequent to the mother's death in 1959 that this
action was commenced m 1962 to impose a trust upon
the theory that in taking title to these properties J B
Walker was acting tor his mother and brothers and
sisters, the heirs of his father's estate
The primary issues, to which other issues in this case
are subordinate, are the contentions of the defendant
that he owns the property in question absolutely and
that the plaintiffs ha\e no interest whatsoever therein,
and that in any event, their rights are barred by the
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statute of limitations and/or laches. It is obvious that if
the position of the defendant were correct in that regard, other issues in the case would become moot.
r21T3] We perceive nothing in the fact situation which
would justify reversing the finding that J. B. Walker
was acting as trustee for the family in regard to this
property. In addition to the written agreement, which
is entirely consistent with such a finding, there is the
fact of the family relationship and their previous
co-ownership*58 of the property. It is generally recognized that where one co-owner does something for
the protection of their common property, it is presumed that his action was to preserve it for the benefit
of all unless some indication to the contrary plainly
appears.— That the trial court correctly regarded J. B.
Walker as a trustee is pointed up by this recital in his
own brief:
FN2. See Sperry v. Tollev, 114 Utah 303,
199 P.2d 542, 546 (1948); McCreadv v.
Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316
(1912); and Heiselt v. Heiselt 10 Utah 2d
126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960).
'The primary objective of defendant was to provide a
home for his mother and her family and this was accomplished by defendant. For 42 years the family has
lived in the home rent free, without even so much as
payment of taxes, * * * and in his claims for credit
defendant has asked no accounting for rentals or occupancy, by other members of the family, since he left
the parental home in 1931.'
[41 The problem of the statute of limitations and/or
laches as involved here is somewhat unusual in that
each side accuses the other of delay and invokes that
defense. Defendant contends that inasmuch as he
**257 took deeds to the property in his own name over
40 years ago, if the plaintiffs ever had any rights
therein, they have slept on those rights for so long that
laches should prevent them from now attacking his
ownership. On the other hand the plaintiff interpose
the same objection to the defendant's claim to reimbursement for funds advanced many years since and
for which the defendant has never heretofore made
any demand for payment. This situation reminds one
of a chess game in which the players each insist that
the other has the next move. The question is posed:
was it up to the heirs to make the first move by demanding the property from the defendant? Or was it
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the latter's duty to demand from the heirs the money
advanced to protect the property? The answer to such
a stalemate seems to be that the burden of taking some
affirmative action should be upon him who accuses
the other of delay; and unless he has taken such action,
or in some manner put the other party on notice that
action is required, he cannot take advantage of the
delay.
[5] Defendant's invocation of the statute of limitations
and laches runs counter to the rule that such a defense
is not available to a trustee as against his beneficiaries
until something has occurred to give a clear indication
to them that he has repudiated his trust;— or the circumstances are such that they must be charged with
knowledge of such repudiation.— No such situation*59 existed here. But there are several factors
which tend to support the trial court's determination.
Where a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to find a repudiation. This is so because of the
greater likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed
confidence in him; and also, they would have a natural
reluctance to sue him unless circumstances forced
them to do so.
FN3. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332
P.2d981 (1958).
FN4. See Acott v. Tomlmson, 9 Utah 2d 71,
337P.2d720, 721 (1959).
£6] Under the facts shown there wouldn't be anything
strange or unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming,
as they say they did, that the defendant was holding
the property for the family until after the death of their
mother, so that she would be provided with a home;
and that after her death, their father's estate would be
settled and each would receive his share. These considerations, together with the fact that some members
of the family remained in the property, make the refusal of the trial court to apply laches against the
plaintiffs harmonize with reason.
[7] The reasons stated above which militate against the
defendant asserting laches against the plaintiffs also
apply in principle to the plaintiffs' charge that the
defendant J. B. Walker should be barred from claiming reimbursement for the moneys advanced to protect
the family property. In that connection it should be
kept in mind that after he took title to the property in
his own name, somewhere along the line he formed
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the intention of claiming it for his own. Therefore
from his point of view it is neither unnatural nor illogical that he made no demand for reimbursement for
the moneys he had advanced. Where this impasse
existed and both parties seemed satisfied with the
statuts quo, and neither took any affirmative action to
change it, neither is in a position to blame the other for
delay and invoke laches against him. We think the trial
court was patently correct in ruling that inasmuch as
the 1922 agreement is binding upon the defendant,
making him a trustee, by the same token it should be
binding upon the plaintiffs and require them to recognize the lien provided for therein and reimburse him
for the money he expended to protect the family
property.
[8] The plaintiffs also make several contentions attacking the amount of reimbursement allowed defendant. They assert that the trial court should have taken
into account the fact that some of the money raised to
pay off the family debts was used to discharge debts
incurred by J. B. Walker **258 and his brother R. E.
Walker prior to 1922. It will be recalled that at that
time these two older brothers were working in connection with the family enterprise and to support them
all. We think the court wisely and correctly refused to
go back of the 1922 agreement and to assume that all
prior *60 mutual claims and demands were merged

FN5. See Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7
Utah 2d 163,321 P.2d 221.
r9iri01 Plaintiffs advance another argument that the
money used to protect the family property was actually paid by the J. B. and R. E. Walker partnership
and/or later by the corporation and that this was a
family enterprise, so defendant J. B. Walker is not
personally entitled to reimbursement. As to that argument, it is difficult to see how the other heirs
[plaintiffs] could claim any benefit from payment
from this business which was carried on by the defendant and R. E. Walker. But beyond this, and in
regard to the rights of all of the heirs, including R. E.
Walker, in connection with the settlement of their
affairs in 1959 all of the assets of the corporation were
assigned to the defendant J. B. Walker, reserving to R.
E. Walker only rights which he had in the estate of his
father John A. Walker. The trial court correctly regarded this as not reserving any share in rights to
reimbursement for money used to protect the family

property, which right was by the 1922 agreement
agreed to belong to J. B. Walker. Whatever money
may have been so expended was paid at the instance of
J. B. Walker who had undertaken the responsibility of
protecting the family property and he was entitled to
reimbursement for any advancements the first parly or
corporation had made for that purpose.
Tl nri2iri31 The defendant also takes his turn at criticizing the accounting. He avers that he was not allowed sufficient credit for moneys advanced, including particularly for taxes paid on family property
which stood in his mother's name. We do not doubt the
validity of his argument that a trustee is entitled to
reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in
discharging the responsibilities of his trust.— But it is
his duty to keep full, accurate and orderly records.
When any question arises as to their sufficiency or
accuracy, the burden is upon him to show the correctness of his accounts; and doubts may be resolved
adversly to him.— In regard to the non-allowanc e of
other expenses claimed, the trial judge made this observation which characterizes his view of the records
kept:
FN6. See Restatement (Second), Lav/ of
Trusts, Section 244.
FN7. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
(Second Edition), Section 962; Wood v.
Honevman. 178 Or. 484, 169 P.2d 131, 162,
171 A.L.R. 587(1946).
'Oh, I don't think I'm going to allow that. These accounts kept with each other [J. B. and R. E.] here are
inconclusive, impossible of reconcilement, kept for
what I suppose was their own purposes * * *.'
It is apparent that the trial court was not persuaded of
the correctness of defendant's claims; and this court is
not convinced that the evidence so preponderates
against the *61 trial court's findings that they should
be reversed.— On the contrary, we take occasion to
observe that the trial judge appears to have done quite
a commendable job in dealing with the multifarious
activities of this family over a period of 40 years and
in arriving at what impresses us as a just and equitable
result.
FN8. See Gibbons v. Brimm, 119 Utah 621,
230P.2d983.
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[141 The final point worthy of note is plaintiffs' contention that the judgment was in error in providing that
if they failed to reimburse defendant withm 30 days
after demand they would lose their interest in the
property They urged that if they so fail the defendant
should only be entitled to foreclose his hen which
would afford them some advantage in giving them
time to **259 obtain finances and if necessary to
redeem — This might be true if this were simply a
hen foreclosure action But it is not It is a plenary suit
in equity which, in harmony with the purposes of our
new rules of civil procedure, in permitting the trial and
settlement of all issues germane to the subject matter
of a controversy and to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits, ^ ^ afforded the parties an opportunity for the
presentation and adjudication of all of their claims
relating to the family property ^ ^ They availed
themselves of that opportunity and the claims have
been adjudicated It was consistent with that purpose
for the trial court to not require resort to a special
procedure for the foreclosure of defendant's lien, but
to adjudicate that the plaintiff should have their respective interests in the property, subject to their
reimbursement of the defendant for the moneys he had
advanced to protect it, and that they be given a reasonable time to raise the money and perform that
condition The court acted within its equitable powers
providing a procedure which would deal fairly with
and protect the rights of both parties ^ ^ We suggest
that a reasonable time for meeting the condition would
be 60 days after the remittitur of this case
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tutes of this state '
Affirmed The parties to bear their own costs
HENRIOD, C J , and McDONOUGH, WADE, and
CALLISTER, JJ , concur
Utah 1965
Walker v Walker
17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P 2d 253
END OF DOCUMENT

FN9 As to right of redemption upon foreclosure of mortgages and hens see Section
78-37-6, U C A 1953
FN1Q See Rule 54(c)(1) U R C P , See also
Taylor v E M Royle Corp , 1 Utah 2d 175,
264 P 2d 279 (1953), and Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association v Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co , 7 Utah 2d 366,
325 P 2d 899 (1958)
FN11 See Rules 8 and 1 8 , U R C P
FN12Rule54(c)URCP provides that '* *
* [E]very final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party * * * is entitled * * *' and
Rule 83 provides that the District Courts ' * *
* may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules and the sta-
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H
Supreme Court of Utah.
Lynda SNOW, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gloria RUDD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 981419.
Jan. 21,2000.
Rehearing Denied March 29, 2000.
Beneficiary brought action against her sister, who was
successor trustee of their mother's trust, to impose
constructive trust on family home that was sold by
father to sister at time father was trustee. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, Glenn Iwasaki, J., granted
partial summary judgment in favor of sister, and jury
submitted special verdict in favor of beneficiary. Sister appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
held that: (1) beneficiary's cause of action accrued
when beneficiary received documents from estate
planning attorney concerning mother's trust and father's transfer of family home to sister, and (2) statute
of limitations was not tolled by concealment version
of disco very rule.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
i l l Appeal and Error 30 €>^>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness.
121 Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 9 5 ( 1 )
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) k. In General; What Consti-

Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 1 0 4 ( 1 )
241 Limitation of Actions
24111 Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action
241kl04(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In certain circumstances, discovery rule applies which
benefits plaintiff by operating to toll period of limitations until the discovery of facts forming basis of
cause of action; discovery rule is applied only when
required by statute, when a defendant has affirmatively concealed plaintiffs cause of action, or when
exceptional circumstances exist.
131 Limitation of Actions 241 €^>103(4)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl01 Existence of Trust
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of
Trust
241kl03(4) k. Notice of Repudiation.
Most Cited Cases
A statute of limitations period will not begin to run
until the trust beneficiary knows or through reasonable
investigation could have learned of a breach or repudiation. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.
141 Limitation of Actions 241 €=>103(4)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 HI Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl01 Existence of Trust
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of
Trust
241kl03(4) k. Notice of Repudiation.
Most Cited Cases
Where a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a
violation of the trust, it constitutes an exceptional
circumstance calling for application of the discovery
rule to toll statute of limitations. U.C.A.1953,
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78-12-25
151 Limitation of Actions 241 €=>95(1)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) k In General, What Constitutes Discovery Most Cited Cases
To determine when rigid application of statute of
limitations may be irrational or unjust, so as to warrant
application of discovery rule, Court of Appeals applies
a balancing test to weigh the hardship imposed on the
claimant by the application of the statute of limitations
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the passage of time U C A 1953,78-12-25
1 £ Limitation of Actions 241 €^>103(4)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl01 Existence of Trust
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of
Trust
241kl03(4)k Notice of Repudiation
Most Cited Cases
Beneficiary's cause of action to impose constructive
trust on property that was held in mother's trust and
sold by father, as trustee, to beneficiary's sister, accrued, and four-year limitations period began to run,
when beneficiary received documents from estate
planning attorney concerning mother's trust and father's subsequent transfer of family home to her sister,
not when her father passed away and she felt it necessary to obtain an actual copy of her mother's trust
document from mother's estate planning attorney
U C A 1953.78-12-25
121 Limitation of Actions 241 €^>104(1)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action
241kl04(l) k In General Most Cited

Cases
Four-year statute of limitations for beneficiary's
claims of trustee's misconduct regarding trustee's
transfer of family home to beneficiary's sister was not
tolled by concealment version of discovery rule, even
if beneficiary was told that mother's trust was no
longer in existence, where beneficiary knew family
home was sold from trust, she never actually asked
anyone to see copy of mother's trust, and she was not
precluded from obtaining the trust document at any
time U C A 1953,78-12-25
181 Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 1 7 3 ( 1 0 )
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation m Lower Court
of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30kl73 Grounds of Defense or Opposition
30kl73(10) k Time of Bringing Suit,
Limitations, and Laches Most Cited Cases
Whether beneficiary's action for constructive trust on
real property that father, as trustee of mother's estate,
sold to beneficiary's sister, was time-barred could be
determined on appeal as a matter of law, even though
jury decided disputed factual issues against sister, as
successor trustee to mother's estate, in its special verdict, where jury did not consider and resolve any
factual issues that would establish that statute of limitations did not begin to run until time beneficiary
obtained copies of mother's trust documents, and those
disputed facts submitted to jury were not dispositive
of case U C A 1953,78-12-25
*263 E Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
David W Scofield, Paige Bigelow, Salt Lake City, for
defendant
ZIMMERMAN, Justice
TI 1 This case arose from an action by Lynda Snow
("Lynda"), against her sister, Gloria Rudd ("Glona"),
to impose a constructive trust on real property that was
sold to Gloria by their father The trial court granted
Lynda's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that their father, as trustee of a trust which held the
property, breached his trust obligation and, therefore,
that the sale was voidable The trial court also denied a
motion for summary judgment by Gloria, ruling, inter
aha, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
on Lynda's claim until 1993 The matter was submit-
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ted to the jury on issues concerning an accounting for
the trust assets, and elements of a laches claim. Gloria
appeals, raising a series of contentions. She claims that
Lynda had no standing to bring this suit. She also
claims that the trial court erred in: (i) denying Gloria's
motions for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and laches issues; (ii) imposing a constructive trust on the sale of the property to Gloria; (iii)
denying Gloria reimbursement for her expenditures as
constructive trustee of the trust; and (iv) awarding
Lynda attorney fees and costs, and in holding that
these fees had to be paid by Gloria personally or from
her portion of the trust assets. Because we reverse the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Lynda on the statute of limitations issue, we have no
occasion to address the other points raised.
Tl 2 We first state the facts, which we recite in a manner
most favorable to Gloria, the party opposing summary
judgment. See Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 975
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998). On June 17, 1976, Dr.
Lyndon Daynes Snow ("Dr.Snow") and Mrs. Glayde
V. Snow ("Mrs.Snow") created a trust called the Inter
Vivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow (the "Glayde V. Snow
Trust"). Mrs. Snow was the trustor and Dr. Snow was
the trustee. On August 9, 1976, Dr. and Mrs. Snow
conveyed their family home, located at 381 11th
Avenue, in Salt Lake City, as well as an adjacent lot,
to Dr. Snow as trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust.
Mrs. Snow was to receive the net income of the
Glayde V. Snow Trust during her life, as well as so
much of the principal as the trustee deemed "necessary
or appropriate for the health, support and maintenance
of the Trustor, having in mind the standard of living to
which the Trustor [had] been accustomed." If Dr.
Snow survived Mrs. Snow, he was directed to provide
for his benefit all of the net income from this trust.
Upon the death of Dr. and Mrs. Snow, Gloria and
Lynda, if still living, were to receive in equal shares
any residual assets of the trust. Furthermore, if Dr.
Snow died or in some other way ceased to be trustee,
both Gloria and Lynda became successor trustees.
K 3 On October 15,1977, Mrs. Snow passed away. Dr.
Snow then approached *264 Richard Rudd, Gloria's
husband, asking him to purchase the family home.
When Richard refused, Dr. Snow asked Gloria to buy
the home, which she agreed to do. On May 8, 1978,
they entered into a real estate contract under which Dr.
Snow would be allowed to live in the house rent free,
and Gloria would make payments to Dr. Snow on the
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purchase price of the home and also assume all the
financial responsibilities of ownership of the home.
After a few years, Gloria told Dr. Snow she could not
afford to continue to pay expenses related to the
maintenance of the home as well as make payments on
the purchase contract. She discontinued making
payments on the contract, but continued to pay the
operating expenses of the home.
U 4 In 1984, Dr. Snow consulted an estate planning
attorney, Mr. Jay Gamble. Dr. Snow informed Mr.
Gamble of his previous estate plan. Mr. Gamble suggested that Dr. Snow start over by creating a new trust
and that he complete the conveyance of the home to
Gloria by a forgiveness of the remaining purchase
money debt. A meeting in furtherance of this new plan
took place on December 27, 1984, between Dr. Snow,
Mr. Gamble, Lynda, and Gloria. At this meeting, Dr.
Snow's estate plan was reviewed, including his newly
created inter vivos trust ("the Dr. Snow Trust") and
the debt forgiveness related to the sale of the home to
Gloria. Lynda heard references during the meeting to
the Glayde V. Snow Trust, but, in her deposition testimony some ten years later, she could not recall the
substance of any specific references to it.
U 5 In March of 1985, Lynda received a package of
documents which included a copy of the warranty
deed transferring the family home to Dr. Snow as
trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust; a copy of the real
estate contract in which Dr. Snow, as trustee of the
trust, sold the family home to Gloria; and a copy of the
warranty deed, which transferred title to the property
to Gloria. Each of these documents clearly stated that
one of the parties to the transaction was Dr. Snow, as
trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda testified
that she was confused as to what the Glayde V. Snow
Trust was. When she approached her father to ask
about the Glayde V. Snow Trust, he told her not to
worry and that it had been taken care of. She made no
further inquiry into the nature of the Glayde V. Snow
Trust until after her father's death because, as she
testified, she had no reason to "primarily" distrust her
father and did not want to call him a liar. But, she also
testified that she felt that her father lied to her on occasion, and that both Gloria and Dr. Snow were lying
about the family home. Lynda testified that during this
time she asked Gloria questions about the sale of the
family home. She testified that when she questioned
her father on this issue, Dr. Snow told her that no sale
had really taken place, and that the terms of the real
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estate contract were not being fulfilled. Lynda alleged
that because she always received different and vague
answers when she asked about the sale of the property
to Gloria, she eventually stopped inquiring.

question of whether Lynda's claim was barred by
laches. At the close of the second day of trial, the trial
court took the laches issue away from the jury by
ruling that as a matter of law Lynda could not be
charged with undue delay for waiting to bring her suit
until she obtained a copy of the trust document. The
court struggled with whether the statute of limitations
issue should be decided by the jury. Even though the
court had decided that the statute of limitations period
began to run when Lynda received the trust document,
less than a year before the suit was filed, the court was
concerned that its decision would be reversed on appeal. Therefore, the court allowed in all evidence
relevant to the statute of limitations issue. The court
also asked the parties to propose questions for a special verdict that would address whether and when
Lynda had notice of the breach of trust. Some questions that appear directed at the statute of limitations
issues were included in the verdict form, although
those proposed by Gloria were rejected. And despite
the inclusion of these questions in the verdict form,
and a request by Gloria's counsel for jury instructions
on the statute of limitations issues, when the jury was
instructed, no mention of the statute of limitations
defense was included. The matter was submitted and
the jury returned a special verdict finding, inter alia,
that "prior to the death of Dr. Snow, ... Lynda Snow
[did not] know of her rights under the Intervivos Trust
of Glayde V. Snow," nor was she "fully aware of all
facts necessary to show that the conveyance of the
[family home] to defendant was a violation of plaintiffs rights as a beneficiary of the Intervivos Trust of
Glayde V. Snow."

H 6 Dr. Snow died on May 18, 1993, and soon thereafter the family home was listed and sold by Gloria.
Lynda claims that following Dr. Snow's death, references to the Glayde V. Snow Trust in his papers
caused her to search for the actual document establishing this trust. She contacted retired Judge Joseph
Jeppson, whom her mother had mentioned in the
1970s as having helped with the estate plan, and he
gave her a copy of the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda
testified that she could have asked Judge Jeppson for
the document when she first learned of the trust, but
did not do so until almost ten years later, after Dr.
Snow's death. She further testified that no one stopped
her from inquiring as to the terms of the Glayde V.
Snow Trust or from obtaining a copy of the trust.
K 7 In January of 1994, Lynda filed a claim to impose a
constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the
family home. In the complaint, she asserted that the
sale of the home was without adequate consideration
and was in violation of the terms of the trust; that the
sale of the property operated to impose a trust on the
proceeds "in favor of the Glayde V. Snow Trust and its
beneficiaries"; and that Gloria was guilty of fraud.
Gloria answered asserting, inter alia, a defense of
laches and statute of limitations. *265 There followed
a series of motions for summary judgment addressing
various issues. For the purpose of this opinion, it suffices to say that by the time of trial, the trial court had
determined as a matter of law that the Glayde V. Snow
Trust gave no power to the trustee to forgive payments
due on a contract for sale of trust assets. The conveyance of the trust property to Gloria was "unauthorized and in violation of the trust," and any proceeds
from the sale were subject to the terms of the Glayde
V. Snow Trust. As to Gloria's defenses, the court held
that the statute of limitations period did not begin to
run until Lynda "could have discerned the existence of
a cause of action," which point the court fixed as
"when she obtained a copy of the Glayde V. Snow
Trust, following the death of Dr. Lyndon Snow in
1993." Therefore, it concluded that the action was
timely filed.
\ 8 In September of 1997, a jury trial began to resolve
the outstanding evidentiary issues which included the

JJQ H 9 Gloria now appeals, raising a number of issues.
We address only the trial court's denial of Gloria's
motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue.— A trial court's grant or denial of
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See
Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah
1999). Here, the trial court held that the statute of
limitations was tolled until 1993, when Lynda actually
obtained a copy of the trust document and learned the
details of its contents. On appeal, Gloria argues that
the statute of limitations period ran from either January of 1985, when Dr. Snow forgave Gloria's indebtedness, and Lynda contends the breach of trust occurred, or at the latest, in March of 1985, when Lynda
had information that would have put a reasonable
person on notice to inquire. Gloria contends that because the four-year period contained in section
78-12-25 of the Code applies, the action is barred.
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FN1. For the purposes of this opinion, we
assume Lynda has standing to bring suit.
[2111 10 We have generally held that a statute of limitations period begins to run " 'upon the happening
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action.' " Berenda v. Lan^ford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah
1996) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86
(Utah 1981)). Here, that would be when the breach
occurred. But in certain circumstances, we apply a
"discovery rule" which benefits a plaintiff by operating "to toll the period of limitations 'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.' "
Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229,
1231 (Utah 1995) (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). We
apply the disco very *2 66 rule only when required by
statute, when a defendant has affirmatively concealed
a plaintiffs cause of action, or when exceptional circumstances exist. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51.
r31[4][51 U 11 Before we proceed with our analysis, we
must clarify an ambiguity in the law. We have held
that when a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until
something has occurred to give the beneficiary a
"clear indication" that a breach or repudiation has
occurred, or, alternatively, the circumstances must be
"such that [the beneficiary] must be charged with
knowledge" of such a repudiation or breach. Walker v.
Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah
1965); Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d
720, 724 (Utah 1959). In other words, a statute of
limitations period will not begin to run until the beneficiary knows or through reasonable investigation
could have learned of a breach or repudiation.
ffggGeorge Gleason Bogert and George Taylor Bogert
Trusts & Trustees § 951 (2d ed.1995). What is unclear
about the rule of the Acott and Walker cases is whether
that rule is a special statute of limitations rule for
trusts, or merely a part of what we now term the
"discovery rule." Although we have never explicitly
so stated, we now conclude that this special "trust"
statute of limitations rule is a version of the discovery
rule. To explain, where a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a violation of the trust, it constitutes an
"exceptional circumstance" calling for application of
the discovery rule. We have held that under certain
"exceptional circumstances" we will find that a rigid
application of the statute of limitations may be "irrational and unjust," and thus make the discovery rule
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available. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,
1129 (Utah 1992). To determine when this is the case,
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute
of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the passage of time." Seyy v. Security
Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995) (citing
Myers, 635 P.2d at 87). In the category of cases involving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct,
we have, in effect, already conducted this balancing
test. In Acott and Walker we found, in substance, that
to not apply the discovery rule would lead to unjust
results because of the close familial relationship involved. See Acott, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d at 724;
Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d at 257. In such a
situation, the beneficiary will be less likely to question
the motives of the trustee and less likely to sue. See
Walker, 404 P.2d at 257. Therefore, it is appropriate to
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged
breach or repudiation.
[61 U 12 We now address how the discovery rule applies to the facts before us. The issue Gloria presents
on appeal is whether the trial court should have
granted her summary judgment motion, finding that,
as a matter of law, Lynda knew or had reason to know
of the accrual of a cause of action more than four years
before she filed suit. In addressing this issue, we consider the facts in a light most favorable to Lynda, the
non-moving party. See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 399 (Utah 1998). In the December,
1984 meeting with her father, Gloria, and Mr. Gamble,
Lynda heard the Glayde V. Snow Trust mentioned, but
she did not remember the specifics of the references to
it. In March of 1985, Lynda received the package of
papers from Mr. Gamble, some of which referred to
the transfer of the home from her mother and father to
the Glayde V. Snow Trust, and subsequent transfers to
her sister. She later recalled that in receiving these
documents, she was confused about the nature of this
trust. She confronted her father about the trust, because he was the named trustee in the documents.
According to her testimony, she never asked anyone
for a copy of the trust document and never took any
steps to get the document until after Dr. Snow's death.
After her father's death, Lynda approached Judge
Jeppson, who her mother, almost twenty years before,
had told her was involved in her mother's estate planning, and asked him about the Glayde V. Snow Trust.
Judge Jeppson produced the trust document. She
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stated that she asked for the document because "she
wanted to know the history of the *267 [trust] documentation" and because her mother had told her that
the family home was going to her two daughters, and
she was concerned that the sale of the home to Gloria
was contrary to that wish. Lynda also said in her deposition that she probably had had that concern since
she had received the packet of materials mentioning
the Glayde V. Snow Trust in 1985. When she was
questioned as to why she did not ask Judge Jeppson
earlier, she said she was not sure whether he had
created the trust. But, after her father's death, she did
contact him "on a guess," because he was the only
lawyer that her mother had ever mentioned.
Tl 13 Even considering these facts in a light most favorable to Lynda, there can be no doubt that, as a
matter of law, she had knowledge as of 1985 of all
facts necessary to put her on notice to inquire as to
whether the sale of the house to her sister breached the
trust. She knew nothing in 1993 that she did not know
in 1985, and when she acted on her knowledge in 1993
she quickly gained the trust instrument and all that she
needed to file suit. This is a clear case of a plaintiff
simply sitting on her rights.
12111 14 Lynda asserts that even if she was charged
with knowledge of the potential breach, the discovery
rule should permit the statute to be tolled until she
received the trust document because the concealment
version of the discovery rule should apply. Lynda
claims she was actively misled to not inquire into the
nature of the trust and her rights under it. We have
held that "in order to invoke the concealment version
of the discovery rule it must be shown that given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not
have brought suit within the statutory period." Warren, 838 P.2d at 1130. Here, because Lynda is suing to
enforce her rights as a beneficiary of the Glayde V.
Snow Trust, it is proper to bring suit against Gloria;
not only for her own alleged concealment, but also,
because of her role as successor trustee, for all alleged
wrongdoing under the trust. When Lynda approached
her father to ask him about the nature of the Glayde V.
Snow Trust, he gave her various answers which she
interpreted to mean that the trust had been dissolved or
at least was not in existence anymore. His claim that
the Glayde V. Snow Trust did not exist did not erase
her need to inquire into the actual terms of this trust.
Even if she was told that this trust did not exist anymore, she was aware that the family home was sold

Page 6

from this trust. If she thought she at least had a part
interest in the family home, then she should have at
least inquired as to why the family home was owned
by the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda never actually
asked her father, Gloria, or anyone else to see a copy
of the trust document until after her father's death. It is
clear that Lynda was not precluded from getting the
trust document before her father's death and she was
never told by anyone that she could not have the
document or that it did not exist. We therefore hold
that no concealment took place and the concealment
version of the discovery rule did not toll the statute of
limitations after the point in March of 1985 when
Lynda received the documents of conveyance naming
the trust.
[81 H 15 Finally, Lynda claims that we cannot decide
the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law because there were disputed factual issues that were
decided by the jury against Gloria in the special verdict. The answers to this assertion are several. First, it
seems clear that when the trial court submitted the
special verdict questions purporting to address the
statute of limitations issues, it was attempting to protect against having to retry the case should an appellate court find error in the grant of summary judgment
against Gloria on this issue. However, this attempt
miscarried because the special verdicts are not phrased
in terms appropriate to the applicable legal standard.
In the special verdict, the jury decided that prior to Dr.
Snow's death, Lynda did not "know of her rights under
the Intervivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow" nor was she
"fully aware of all facts necessary to show that the
conveyance of the [family home] to defendant was a
violation of plaintiffs rights as a beneficiary of the
Intervivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow."However, the
standard of knowledge this verdict assumes is necessary, is far higher than what is actually required. As
discussed above, all that is needed to toll the statute of
limitations is a finding that through reasonable investigation, the plaintiff *268 could have determined that
there was reason to believe there had been a breach of
trust. The special verdict was not written with this
standard in mind and no instructions were given to the
jury on the statute of limitations and discovery rule
issues. Therefore, we conclude that the jury did not
consider and resolve any factual issues that would
establish that the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until 1993. Second, even if the court submitted
issues to the jury on the premise that some facts were
in dispute, those disputed facts are not dispositive
here. Our decision today addresses the correctness of

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

998 P 2d 262
998 P 2d 262, 387 Utah Adv Rep 45, 2000 UT 20
(Cite as: 998 P.2d 262)

the denial of Gloria's motion for summary judgment
on the statute of limitations issue, a motion made
before trial and one that assumes the facts in a posture
most favorable to Lynda And we find those facts
insufficient to warrant the trial court's denial of Gloria's motion
^j 16 In conclusion, we hold that as a matter of law, the
statute of limitations period of four years had run
when Lynda filed her claim We find the discovery
rule does not operate to bar Gloria's assertion of the
statute Lynda had adequate notice to inquire as to the
terms of the Glayde V Snow Trust, which would have
led to the discovery of her rights We deem this notice
to have occurred when she received the documents
from Mr Gamble, which mentioned the Glayde V
Snow Trust The statute of limitations period began in
March of 1985 and closed in March of 1989 Since
Lynda's claim was filed on January 5, 1994, it is
barred^
FN2 Since we reverse on the statute of limitations issue, we do not address any of the
other issues Gloria raised on appeal
K 17 We, therefore, reverse
11 18 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
DURHAM and Justice RUSSON concur m Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion
% 19 Justice STEWART heard the arguments but retired before he could act on the opinion
Utah,2000
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